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EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER).

PAPERS REGARDING BRITISH RELATIONS

WITH THE

NEIGHBOURING TRIBES

ON

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA

AND

PUNJAB FRONTIER ADMINISTRATION.

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EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER).

Papers regarding British Relations with the Neighbouring Tribes on the North-West Frontier of India, and Punjab Frontier Administration.

No. 1.

(Printed on page 26 of C. 8714 of 1898.)

(*Telegraphic.*) *From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 13th October*, 1897.

My telegram of 6th October. Political settlement should, in my opinion, follow as speedily as possible upon termination of military operations in the field. You will agree with me that in present circumstances, internal and external, political and financial, no new responsibilities should be taken unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of British Indian border. I also think that present opportunity should be used for defining our permanent position and policy. Some modifications of existing arrangements, especially with a view to concentration of force, will no doubt be necessary, but I understand you to be in favour of strictly limiting our interference with independent tribes, and thus avoiding serious eventual responsibilities involved in extension of administrative control over tribal territory. In this I entirely concur. The question of disarmament, so far as it appears to imply protection, should be examined from this point of view. Assuming that our policy is to maintain permanently our position as it existed before these disturbances, you will no doubt consider and let me know what posts and lines of communication you regard as indispensable for this purpose, due regard being had, first, to what is possible with existing military force, second, to financial situation, and third, to great political importance of avoiding any measures likely to cause discontent among tribes and consequently recurring disturbances. Local arrangements should be based upon a clear and well-defined general plan which it should be our object to obtain.

No. 2.

(Printed on pages 172, &c., of C. 8714 of 1898.)

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable The Governor General of India in Council, dated 28th January, 1898.

I have received from time to time the various Letters from your Excellency's Government, in which you have reported to me the progress of events on the Punjab frontier, and the success of the military operations which, during the past six months, you have been compelled to undertake against the tribes in arms against the British Government over a long tract of border land, extending from the valley of the Tochi to the country on the northern borders of the Peshawar

district inhabited by the Bunerwals. Now that the active phase of these operations has almost closed, the time has arrived for briefly reviewing the narrative of events, in order to examine the causes of the late widespread outbreak and to indicate the policy which Her Majesty's Government desire to pursue in the future.

2. The first of several violent outbreaks, which have thrown the extreme North-West borderland of India into confusion and disorder, entailing a series of actions that have been fought with the greatest gallantry and attended with heavy casualties, occurred on the 10th June in the Tochi valley. It will be convenient here to give a short account of the circumstances under which Mr. Gee had proceeded from Datta Khel to Sheranna and Maizar, when his escort was treacherously attacked. In 1894 Her Majesty's Government sanctioned a policy of more effective protection and closer relations with the headmen of the Waziri tribes; and in his Despatch of the 24th of August, Mr. Fowler wrote: "Since I sanction with reluctance any assumption of fresh responsibilities, and any increase of the public expenditure, I do so in this instance on the understanding that your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan will be kept within the narrowest limits that are practicable." In the following year measures were taken to carry out the delimitation of the Afghan boundary as fixed by the Durand agreement of the 12th of November, 1893. On the 6th of April, 1895, the Maliks, or Chiefs, of the Dawaris and of the Waziri tribes in the Tochi asked to be taken under British protection, and applied for service and allowances; and in reply to your Letter dated the 15th of May, 1895, I sanctioned your detailed proposals for giving effect to the policy laid down, in 1894, by my predecessor, on the clear understanding that your expenditure, both on Wano and Tochi, did not exceed the sum allowed for Wano alone. In my Despatch of the 9th of August, I reiterated the conditions which my predecessor had associated with his sanction of control over these tribes. In 1896 steps were taken to establish permanent military posts in the Tochi valley, and you reported for my information the outbreak of certain disturbances which occurred in February among the Madda Khel Waziris, and the murder of Honda Ram, Muharrir of the Sheranna post, which happened on the 9th of June of that year. For these outrages you sanctioned the imposition of a fine of Rs. 3,000, which was subsequently reduced to Rs. 1,200. It was with the intention of collecting this fine, and of choosing a suitable site for a military post, that Mr. Gee proceeded in June last to Sheranna and Maizar, when his party were suddenly attacked as they finished a meal prepared for them by the Madda Khels, and only succeeded in making good their retreat after the loss of all their British officers killed or wounded, and other casualties.

3. At the time of the dastardly attack made by the tribesmen the British force in the Tochi valley consisted of 1,476 rifles and 120 sabres, with four maxim and four mountain guns distributed over five posts of Miran Shah, Datta Khel, Boya, Idak, and Saidgai. The retreat of the small escort in the face of a large gathering of hostile tribesmen was conducted with great gallantry, in which the wounded British officers and the Native officers and men highly distinguished themselves. The Madda Khels upon the arrival of succour fled to the hills, and on the 21st of June Major-General Bird assumed command at Bannu of the punitive force which your Government collected for an advance to Maizar. On the 13th of July a proclamation was issued to the tribesmen announcing the terms of submission, and a few days later the British force reached Sheranna, encountering no difficulties other than those caused by the unhealthy season of the year and by the physical nature of the country traversed. It was not, however, until the receipt of your telegram dated 26th November that I learnt that Sadda Khan, his brother, and other headmen of the Madda Khels who were concerned in the attack at Maizar, had surrendered, and that the tribe had finally given in and accepted the terms of submission ultimately demanded from them.

4. On the 26th of July, within a fortnight of the issue of the proclamation to the Madda Khels, an outburst of fanaticism, as serious as it was unexpected, broke the peace of the Swat valley which had been maintained without interruption since the close of the Chitral campaign. One Saidulla, known as "the mad fakir," also called the Sartor or bareheaded fakir, suddenly gained

notoriety as a worker of miracles, and publicly announcing that he had been sent to lead a Jehad or religious war, prophesied that all British troops would be driven out of the country within eight days. His pretensions were at first disputed by the Mianguls of Swat and by other chiefs of the tribes, but the uncontrollable religious enthusiasm and superstition which his actions excited overbore all opposition on the part of the responsible tribal headmen or Maliks, and in a few hours his supporters increased from a small gathering of boys and men to an army of well-armed fanatics. The tribal levies in the locality fled, and the British positions on the Malakand and at Chakdara, held by about 4,000 men, were attacked with great fury on the night of the 26th July. Fighting continued without intermission, notwithstanding the severe losses inflicted upon the tribesmen, who were constantly replaced by fresh adherents to the cause of the mad fakir, until the 31st of July when reinforcements under Colonel Reid reached the Malakand ; and on the 2nd of August a relief column detached by Major-General Sir Bindon Blood completed the relief of Chakdara. In the interval between the first attack and the final relief the mad fakir had withdrawn, but his followers were joined by tribesmen from the Utman Khels, the Bunerwals, the Bajauris, Ranizais, Lower and Upper Swatis, and the Adinzais and Dush Khels. As soon as the first excitement subsided, those tribes with whom agreements had been made for the maintenance of the road to Chitral, between the Malakand and Chakdara, a distance of some ten miles, began to send in jirgas and to sue for peace, protesting that their tribesman had been carried away by belief in the miraculous powers of the fakir, and by his call to a religious war. The Ranizais from Khar to the south were among the first to come in, followed by the Alladand jirgas, and by deputations from the Shamozais and other sections on the right bank of the Swat river. It is a significant fact that the disturbance did not extend northwards of the Panjkora river or affect the road or posts established on the way to Chitral, and that the Nawab of Dir resisted all pressure put upon him by the Akhundzadas, consistently refusing to break his agreement with the British Government.

5. I do not consider it necessary to follow minutely the course of the various operations which were undertaken by Sir Bindon Blood, who advanced to Saidu on the 12th of August, and rapidly succeeded in restoring tranquillity and exacting compliance with the terms imposed upon the several tribes for their unprovoked attack upon the British posts established, under tribal agreements, for the maintenance of communication with Chitral. During the operations in Upper Swat, a force was moved to Rustam to threaten Buner in the event of the Bunerwals rendering assistance to the Swatis and repeating the offence which they had committed at Malakand. The Bunerwals were in due course informed of the satisfaction which your Government demanded of them for their participation in the attack on the Malakand, and ample time was allowed to them for compliance. On the 24th of December you instructed the Government of the Punjab to announce the final terms of submission decided upon, and to give the tribe one week within which to comply with them. As they declined to avail themselves of this offer, you despatched a military expedition against them, and I have since been informed by your telegram, dated the 19th of January, that the Bunerwals have complied with your terms. Elsewhere the advance of British troops against the Swatis, Utman Khels and other tribes was uniformly successful, and from your Excellency's letters and telegrams I have learnt that the terms imposed by you in the matter of fines, restitution of property, and surrender of arms have been generally complied with.

6. Five days after the relief of Chakdara, and while all available resources were being hurried to the north, the Adda Mulla of Jarobi, Najam-ud-din, who has for years past been active in intrigues and hostility against the British Government, arrived with a following of 5,000 men on the frontier of the district of Peshawar, and after burning the British village of Shankargarh attacked the frontier post of Shabkadar, which was garrisoned by Border Police, and which, for fifty years, has been incorporated in British territory. It appears that this attack was not so entirely unexpected as that made upon the Malakand, and the Commissioner of Peshawar, as well as the Hindu residents of the village, had been warned to expect it. But by the time that troops arrived from

Peshawar the enemy were found in occupation of the low hills near Shabkadar, from which they were dislodged, with some loss on our part, on the 8th of August. The losses inflicted on the Adda Mulla's followers were very heavy, and these included not merely a number of Mohmands but also several Afghan subjects and levies from the country between Jalalabad and Dakka, as well as from Asmar. The Mulla withdrew to his home at Jarobi, which lies within the sphere of influence which you offered to recognise as belonging to the Amir, and when Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, advancing *viâ* Bajaur, effected a junction with a force advancing from Shabkadar, the Adda Mulla attacked the two forces and sustained a severe defeat. In September a brigade was detached to punish the Mamunds, and after the forcing of the Bedmanai Pass on the 23rd of that month, further resistance collapsed, and the terms imposed upon the various tribes and sections between the Swat valley and the Khaibar pass were in due course exacted. From your telegram of the 7th of October, I learnt that the Mohmand field force had been broken up.

7. It was inevitable that the popular disturbance caused by these events, of which the most exaggerated and erroneous accounts reached the tribes occupying the tract of country intervening between the Tochi valley and the Khaibar pass, should react upon the powerful clans of Afridis and their neighbours the Orakzais. Reports were current, sometimes of an impending Afridi rising and sometimes of a coalition between them and the Orakzais. Sir Richard Udny was, however, not disposed to credit these rumours, and on the 20th of August you informed me by telegram that the reports which you had already transmitted to me appeared to be very much exaggerated. In a later telegram of the same date you reported a gathering of the Orakzais in the hills north of Sadda, but "no disturbance in the Khaibar." Two days after this reassuring news you informed me that a large hostile gathering of the Afridis was then approaching the Khaibar, and on the 23rd August I learnt that Ali Masjid and Fort Maude were being attacked by them. Ali Masjid was captured and burnt on that day, and on the 25th of the same month Lundi Kotal was wrested from its garrison of Khaibar Rifles and the pass was completely closed for traffic. In your Excellency's telegram of the 26th August you referred to this unprovoked aggression as gravely affecting your position on the frontier, and asked my approval to an expedition against Tirah, which I sanctioned in my telegram dated the 1st of September, on the express condition that all questions involving our future policy on the termination of the campaign must be referred for my consideration before any action should be taken. Further information respecting the treacherous attack upon Lundi Kotal only served to increase the gravity of the offence committed by the Afridis. They had entered into an agreement in 1881, undertaking to be responsible for the security of the road and the maintenance of all posts and buildings in the pass, and in particular for holding the fort of Ali Masjid. Liberal subsidies were paid to the tribesmen for these services, and the levies to which the custody of the Khaibar was entrusted were mainly recruited from them. As observed in your letter dated the 14th October, 1897, "our relations with the Afridis, founded "upon tribal subsidies and payment for tribal services, had stood the test, "almost unbroken, of sixteen years' experience. Their country has not been "touched, and they have been left to govern themselves undisturbed." Under such circumstances, I can hardly doubt that the letters which were found on the 17th of November in the house of the Akha Khel Mulla, Sayad Akbar, in the Waran Valley, addressed to him by the Adda Mulla of Jarobi, and calling on the Afridis to join in a religious war, supply the real explanation of an attack which you justly describe as "fanatical in its origin."

8. Whilst these events were taking place in the Khaibar, the southern neighbours of the Afridis, the Orakzais, commenced to attack the British posts established on the Samana range for the safeguarding of British territory in the Miranzai valley of Kohat. In your telegram of the 16th of August you informed me of the preparations you were making, "owing to a report of a possible hostile combination of Orakzai and Afridi tribes." I observe that at the very outset the earliest information received by you associated the Adda Mulla with these disquieting rumours, but on the following day you reported that a Mulla, who was preaching a religious war in the Orakzai country, had returned to his

village on receipt of a further letter from the Adda Mulla. On the 18th of August you learnt that the Orakzais were about to attack the forts on the Samana, at the very time that the Afridis were marching on the Khaibar, and Parachinar was simultaneously threatened by the Massuzai section of the Orakzais. On the 20th, however, you were led to believe that these reports were "exaggerated," but on that same night an attack was made upon a village near Sadda in the Kurram, and reports of further disturbances in the Orakzai country reached you simutaneously with the news of the fall of Ali Masjid. The tribes, however, still seemed somewhat half-hearted in their movements, and on the 8th of September you informed me that all was quiet in the Upper Kurram, and that confidence was fully restored. Two days later Fort Lockhart was vigorously attacked, and the gallant Sikh defenders of Saragari were killed to a man on the 12th of September. No time was lost in expelling the combined forces of the Orakzais and Afridis from the Samana range into the Khanki valley, but their open hostility left you no option but to carry out your preparations for the expedition into Tirah. As you state in your Letter of the 14th of October, "we had given neither tribe any cause of offence. The "Orakzais, since they were punished six years ago for raiding in the Miranzai "valley, have been left undisturbed."

9. I do not propose to dwell at any length upon the details of that campaign, which was carried out with complete success by the 18th of December last as regards the Orakzais, but which has not yet been brought to a final close against the Afridis. But there are a few satistactory incidents to which I may here advert. Her Majesty's Government have learnt with gratification that the Kohat pass Afridis, who are under an engagement with the Government of India to keep open the road through their country, and upon whom the main weight of the fiscal policy which led to the enhancement of the Kohat salt duty must have fallen, stood true to their engagements with your Government, and resisted the pressure of the Mullas. In Tirah, owing to the inclemency of the season, and to the exceptional difficulties of the country traversed, consisting of a succession of rugged passes, intricate defiles, and swampy valleys, success could only be attained at the cost of severe hardship and numerous casualties. But the conduct of the troops employed has been excellent, and Her Majesty's Government have heard with the highest satisfaction, not only of the alacrity with which loyal offers of help were made by the Native Princes of India, but also of the conspicuous part taken by the Imperial Service troops in the Tirah and other expeditions during the last six months. I desire to record my sympathy with His Highness the Raja of Kapurthala in the unfortunate catastrophe which overtook the Kapurthala infantry in the Kharmana defile on the 7th of November, when the retreat of a party was cut off by a jungle fire.

10. Passing from the narrative of the events which preceded and marked the course of the several risings of the Pathan tribes, to a consideration of their causes, I entirely agree with your Excellency in Council in regarding fanaticism as the principal motive for an outbreak which has been unprecedented alike in the suddenness with which it broke out at each point, in the large extent of country affected, and in the simultaneous action of distinct tribes or sections of tribes. In referring to the outrage which had occurred in Tochi, you informed me on the 17th of June that the Commissioner regarded it as fanatical, and in your Letter of the 21st of July you accepted the view that the attack was prearranged, but fuller information has led you to alter this opinion, and to attribute it to tribal quarrels. That religious excitement was not the predominant incentive in the Madda Khel rising may be inferred from the inaction of the Waziri tribes when the news of the attacks on Malakand and Shabkadar reached them. But elsewhere fanaticism principally accounts for the proceedings of the Swatis, Utman Khels, Mohmands, Afridis, Orakzais, and other Pathan tribes. Indeed there appears to be a remarkable unanimity of opinion on the part of your officers along the whole of the disturbed border that the outbreaks generally were fanatical in their origin. The proceedings of the tribes, the express statements of His Highness the Amir, and the correspondence discovered in the course of the subsequent military operations, all point to the same

conclusion. Although the first attack on the Malakand was unexpected, still several indications of a religious movement had already attracted the serious notice of your Government. You were aware that Mullas were busily engaged in circulating on the country side two books which had been published in Kabul, of a tone and character that must inevitably have stimulated the fanatical spirit of wild and ignorant tribesmen. From your Letter dated the 14th of July, I learnt that efforts had been persistently made by Mullas, for several months previously, to arouse and combine the tribes, not merely in the Swat country, but also in Tirah and other parts of the Afridi land. Upon ground thus carefully prepared Najam-ud-din, the Adda Mulla, found it easy to work, and the letters addressed by him to the Mianguls of Swat, and to the Afridi Mulla, Sayad Akbar, in the Waran valley, show the range of his preparations and intrigues. That he was also the moving spirit in other parts is evident from the reply made by the Khani Khel section of the Chamkannis, when they stated that they could not refuse to obey the Fakir of Swat or the Adda Mulla. His Highness the Amir, in addressing the Commissioner of Peshawar on the 18th of August last, described Mulla Najam-ud-din as the reputed prophet of the Mohmands and the people of Jelalabad and the mountain districts of Jelalabad, and he added :—"What calamities are there that his disciples have "not suffered, and what blood is there that they have not shed by his senseless "commands?" In writing to your Excellency on the following day, His Highness enclosed for your information a proclamation written by the Adda Mulla to the people of Ningrahar, exaggerating the successes of the tribesmen, and calling upon the Afghans to join in a religious war. So late as the 2nd of September last, the Mulla was endeavouring to rekindle the sparks which had died out in Swat, and was impudently promising external assistance in an early renewal of risings in that part of the country. At one time reference was made to the victories achieved by Mahomedans in Europe, and at another the active intervention of the Amir of Afghanistan was promised by this unscrupulous preacher and his fellow-workers. It is evident that in several places the tribal organisation was powerless to oppose this outbreak of fanatical fervour, and the Maliks were reluctantly forced to follow where the Mullas or the fakirs led.

11. From the information which has reached me it is evident that the necessary task of delimiting by marks and pillars, in accordance with the terms of the Durand Convention, the spheres of British and Afghan influence, furnished the religious preachers with material for stirring up alarm and jealousy among the tribes, who were thus persuaded to connect the delimitation with ulterior designs upon their independence that were in no way contemplated by your Government. The work of marking out a frontier line through hundreds of miles of wild tribal country could not fail to arouse such suspicions, notwithstanding the scrupulous observance by you of the conditions laid down by Her Majesty's Government in 1894 with a view to avoiding interference with the tribes. I have every reason to believe that your Government has carefully kept within the scope of the operations sanctioned by my predecessor in his Despatch of 24th August 1894, to enable "you adequately to fulfil your obligations in "regard to your own territory and the trade routes which go through it, and "to the Amir and to the well-affected amongst the tribesmen themselves." Although it is probable that the steps taken by you to delimitate the frontier under the Kabul Agreement of 1893 gave to the Adda Mulla and others an opportunity for misrepresenting your policy by associating it with an intention of depriving the tribesmen of their existing independence, I do not think that this necessary work could have been carried out with greater circumspection and caution.

12. Amongst other reasons set forth to give some colour of justification for tribal unrest was the recent enhancement of the duty on Kohat salt from 8 annas to Rs. 2 for each Kohati maund. In your letter of the 30th of September last, you explained to me your domestic reasons for raising the duty to a rate nearly approximating to that fixed for Cis-Indus salt, so as to allow of the abolition of the preventive customs line extending from the north of the Hazara district to the junction of the Indus with the Sutlej. I approved of your action in my Despatch, dated 25th of November 1897, and I have only to add here

that, although the enhancement of the duty was skilfully used to excite disaffection, I consider that, in the interests of your own subjects, it was justified as a measure of internal policy.

13. Having followed the course of the risings and discussed their causes, I proceed now to examine the stage which has been reached in the history of our frontier relations with the Pathan tribes, in order that I may indicate the direction which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, our future policy must take. Our frontier relations assume so many varying phases, and include or touch so many interests, both local and Imperial, that a comprehensive survey of the objects to be attained is a necessary preliminary to any general enunciation of policy. The duties imposed upon your Government by the advance of British influence and by consequent contact with the territory occupied by Pathan tribes may be roughly classified under three heads,—first, the police and administrative protection to be given to British districts in the immediate vicinity of the tribal country; secondly, the strict exclusion of extraneous interference from the tribal area that has been placed by a formal agreement within the British sphere of political influence; and, lastly, the fulfilment of our obligations towards Afghanistan and the safeguarding of the natural frontiers of India.

14. The events of recent years have necessarily enlarged the area of your responsibilities to British subjects, and the chances of collision with the tribes. Commerce and trade between the tribal country and British India have grown to larger dimensions, intercourse for all purposes is more frequent, and the extension of cultivation and prosperity on the immediate border land offers a greater temptation to lawless neighbours and enhances the need for protective measures. A rising which suddenly closes a main artery of commerce, like the Khaibar pass, is not a matter merely affecting your foreign relations; it at once injures the interests of Indian trade. The tribes have learnt in your military service many lessons of war, and they are able to supply themselves with arms of precision and ammunition to a degree quite unknown in former days, when blockades and small punitive expeditions sufficed to bring them to terms. Their Mullas travel in India and proceed through India to Mecca, and on their return they propagate rumours and reports as to what is occurring in Europe and India of the wildest and most inaccurate character, but always appealing to the fanaticism of their entourage. A significant instance of this was afforded by the letter, dated 25th October 1897, which was found in the house of Mulla Sayad Akbar, and which contained the information that "Aden, a seaport which was in "possession of the British, has been taken from them by the Sultan. The Suez "Canal through which the British forces could easily reach India in 20 days has "also been taken possession of by the Sultan, and has now been granted on lease "to Russia. The British forces now require six months to reach India." Moreover, the utterances of British statesmen and of members of Parliament upon questions affecting the status and prospects of Islamism and its rulers are reproduced, distorted, and exaggerated. To these and other causes may be largely attributed the recent combination, under the instigation of their Mullas, of trans-frontier tribes which have hitherto acted disunitedly. Their fighting strength and their power to combine have simultaneously increased of late years. It must also be remembered that sections of these tribes have permanently settled down in the adjacent British districts, and as they are always in close intercourse with their fellow tribesmen across the frontier, they are naturally affected, more or less, by the elements of disquietude and disaffection prevailing from time to time among them. Frequency and facilities of intercommunication have thus drawn together all sections, and incitements to Jehad on the common ground of religious fervour have gained adherents, not only from distant parts of the border land, but even on both sides of the British frontier. To these influences may be attributed the participation of British subjects in the disturbances on and around the Malakand pass, and even in the Mohmand attack on Shabkadar; and they provide additional and substantial reasons why the state of the tribal country immediately outside our settled territory should have become a matter of much more serious concern than heretofore.

15 The above observations are almost equally applicable to the second branch of your responsibilities.

For the present I would direct my remarks to that section of tribal territory which is between British territory and Afghanistan, commencing with Waziristan and running up northwards to the Swat river. The character and internal government of the Baluchi tribes controlled from Quetta so differ from those of the northern Pathans that the arrangements working satisfactorily there need not now be reviewed, or criticised, as necessarily forming a foundation upon which to base our action elsewhere. The relations of the northern tribes with your Government vary greatly, graduating from those where a tribe has accepted our protection, as in the Dawari section of the Tochi valley, to the case of a tribe undertaking independent responsibility for specified duties, as in the Khaibar pass. In some cases a light assessment is paid by a tribe, and in others it receives subsidies from the Government of India in return for military or police duties. Though the characteristics of the tribes and their normal attitude towards the British Government vary considerably, yet there are certain features in our relations with these which are common to all. In the first place, the fear of encroachment or attack upon their territory from Afghanistan has been removed by the Durand Agreement. The influence of fear which formerly led a threatened tribe to seek our help, is no longer felt. Nevertheless, the arrangements and the delimitation effected by the Durand Agreement have made the protectorate an accomplished fact, and no interference from outside can be tolerated within the territory now distinctly recognized as belonging to the sphere of British influence. Mr. Fowler, in his Despatch, dated the 24th of August, 1894, adverted to this subject, and expressed his opinion that the programme advocated in the minute of dissent appended to the letter from your Government would not meet the necessities of the case, "and that, in the existing state of our relations with Afghanistan and with the tribes, it is essential "that your Government should be in a position to maintain, if necessary, an "effective control over Waziristan." The Waziri frontier was only one part of the line demarcated under the Durand Convention, and now that the sphere of British influence has been traced along almost the whole Afghan border, your responsibilities in connection with the territory thus delimited cannot be ignored or put on one side. Though the agreement made with the Amir of Afghanistan has relieved your Government from the constant friction which the undefined and debateable land lying between Afghanistan and British India produced between their respective Governments, in other respects it has not been an unmixed benefit, from the suspicions and misgivings it has aroused amongst certain of the tribes as to the ultimate intentions of your Government. To gradually allay these doubts should be one of the primary objects of our future action. As communications multiply so the tribes will mix more freely with British subjects ; and this intercourse, becoming closer in the course of years, cannot fail to increase our responsibilities on the frontier by drawing the tribesmen out of their highlands into closer contact with their neighbours and with your officers. Whether the risks of collision will have been thereby augmented or diminished, remains to be seen. By care and foresight it may be possible to avoid actual conflict, and the effect of frequent intercourse may be to mitigate the lawless aud predatory instincts of the hillmen, without interfering with the tribal system of self-government.

16. If your obligations inside your territories and the sphere of British influence have been increased, the case is not otherwise in respect to the Amir of Afghanistan and his country. The engagement with His Highness in July, 1880, as set forth in the communication* from the Marquis of Ripon, contained this clause :—"If any Foreign Power should attempt to "interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked "aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in that event the British "Government would be prepared to aid you, to such extent and in such manner "as may appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided

* *See* pages 40 and 89 "Afghanistan (1881) No. 1," C. 2776," presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 1881.

" that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government " in regard to your external relations." These responsibilities were again confirmed but not extended, when Sir Mortimer Durand concluded the agreement† of the 12th of November, 1893 ; and as a proof of the increased good will existing between the two Governments, the subsidy of the Amir was at the same time increased by six lakhs. To the obligations thus contracted is added the ever present duty of watching over the frontier passes of the mountains into India, so as to maintain sufficient control over the main routes connecting Afghanistan with India, for the purpose of preventing the establishment of any political influence adverse to your Government in the higher plateaux which within Afghanistan dominate these passes.

† Printed in "East India (North-West Frontier), C. 8037," presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 1896.

17. Frontier questions ranging thus from the daily performance of a policeman's duties to the possible despatch of a large army present so many complications and entanglements that any set of precise instructions would prove to your Government a source of embarrassment rather than an assistance. The call for interference, or even for military help, may arise from different quarters and under conditions wholly distinct. You may be required suddenly to fulfil your duties of protecting your own subjects, as recently at Shankargah when it was attacked by the Mohmands, or perhaps to discharge your obligations to the Amir. In either of these cases the points attacked or threatened may be few or numerous. You may have to insist upon the stipulated performance of tribal service in a pass, or to punish treachery or attack upon your posts. It is conceivable that under certain circumstances you might have to fulfil all these obligations at one and the same time. It is obvious, therefore, that the steps which may have to be taken by your Government cannot be reduced to a formula, or your procedure mapped out on a pre-arranged plan. The extent of the demand made upon your resources, military and financial, cannot be foreseen until the occasion arises and has had time to develop itself. Any attempt to lay down a set of uniform rules for your guidance would be apt to defeat the main object of the general policy which Her Majesty's Government desire to pursue, namely, to show that we are as determined to respect the rights of others as we are able to enforce our own.

18. At the same time, there are certain leading principles underlying our frontier policy to which Her Majesty's Government have resolved to adhere, and to which I proceed to invite your attention. The extent and difficulty of this mountainous border render it expedient that posts and cantonments should be limited to those positions only which are indispensable to the fulfilment of the policy just indicated. In my telegram of the 13th of October I addressed your Excellency as follows :—" You will agree with me that in present circumstances, internal and external, political and financial, no new responsibility should be taken unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the British-Indian border. I also think that the present opportunity should be used for defining our permanent position and policy. Some modifications of existing arrangements, especially with a view to concentration of force, will no doubt be necessary." As a practical instance of the questions to which I desired to invite your attention, I would refer your Excellency to my Despatch of the 9th of August 1895, in which I insisted on " the very great importance of keeping your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan within the narrowest limits ;" and to my later Despatch, dated the 8th May, 1896, in which, having regard to the extension of your military posts in the Tochi valley, I asked for a statement of your conclusions on " the question whether the maintenance of the Wano cantonment is so necessary as to justify the expenditure." Your Excellency was unable to supply me with this statement before the recent outburst of fanaticism occurred, but my inquiry in respect of the posts occupied in Waziristan is one which should be extended so as to apply to the whole of the affected frontier. The two main objects to be borne in mind were indicated in my telegram of the 13th October, namely, the best possible concentration of your military force so as to enable you to fulfil the several responsibilities to which I have adverted, and the limitation of your interference with the tribes so as to avoid the extension of administrative control

over independent tribal territory. I anticipate that the question of the best location of our frontier posts, and the selection of the communications through the border land which it is most necessary to maintain, will require very careful thought, but it is an essential step towards arriving, as far as it is possible to do so, at a clear and well-defined plan upon which to base local arrangements. The experience gained in the past few months has suggested the inference that certain military posts such as Saragari were not sufficiently defensible, and it is probable that, without altering or diminishing the existing lines of communication, you may wish to modify the past arrrangements for their maintenance. In any such modification of existing arrangements I wish to impress upon your Excellency the advisability of establishing regular troops nowhere except in such posts or localities and under such conditions as will enable them to promptly repel any attacks upon them, and of making the local or tribal levies assume, as far as is possible, the aspect of a police rather than a military force. It will be necessary, in framing these arrangements, that an estimate of the cost of frontier defence, including charges for tribal services, should be prepared and transmitted to me, since full regard must be had to financial considerations. It is not sufficient that the measures proposed should be desirable ; it is necessary that the gain should be commensurate with the expense.

19. The second principle upon which stress must be laid is the avoidance of any interference with the tribes which can be avoided with due regard to the interests already set forth. It was for this latter reason, that, after full consideration, I was unable to give my consent to the imposition of tribute upon the Afridis and Orakzais. I recognise the force of the arguments used in favour of such a visible assertion of the responsibilities which you have incurred under the Durand Convention. It is not improbable that the regular payment of even a nominal tribute might strengthen the hands of the tribal leaders, the Maliks, against the teachings of their Mullas and against fanatical outbursts. The fear of an enhancement of the tribute might at times restrain the evil disposed amongst the tribesmen. But, on the other hand, it is desirable to avoid giving any countenance to the idea that your Government means to administer the tribal country or to inclose it within your provincial limits. Moreover, I apprehend that the imposition of even a nominal tribute might rankle in the minds of the Pathan tribes, furnish disaffected persons with material for imputing to the British Government designs which it does not contemplate, and, above all, might enable the tribes to choose their own time for refusing payment, and thus for openly defying your authority. In such a case the only means of enforcing your demand, besides punitive expeditions and blockades, might be the imposition of direct administrative control, or, in the last resort, annexation of fresh tracts of country, But the extension of your direct administration across the border involves an increase of responsibilities which it has always been our policy to avoid ; and annexation would imply a still larger addition to your civil and military establishments, with a very serious and growing burden upon your financial resources. On the other hand, the fear of occupation is undoubtedly a deterrent to the commission of acts of violence, and it may prove an influence on the side of order which should not be wholly thrown aside.

20. The next point to which I adverted in my telegram of the 13th of October, in connection with the subject of protection, was that of disarmament. I approve entirely of the imposition of the terms of peace which require a tribe that has resorted to arms to surrender as large a number of arms as may reasonably be demanded. But any attempt to keep the tribal country, or even one section of it, permanently disarmed, involves serious consequences. In the lawless state of society which prevails across the British administrative frontier, a tribe could not exist without the means of defence. Unless we are prepared to wholly undertake their protection against their neighbours, some limit must necessarily be put on their deprivation of the means of self defence. At the same time, Her Majesty's Government are alive to the importance of the fact disclosed by the recent operations—that the tribes have access to large quantities of arms of precision and ammunition. To control this traffic in arms and munitions of war is an object of the first importance, and I consider that a systematic inquiry as to the sources of supply, whether from your arsenals and factories or by means of illicit importation into India, should be

instituted. I have dealt in a separate communication with one part of this subject. I have only to add here that, whenever the trade routes to Afghanistan are re-opened and the export of arms and ammunition for His Highness the Amir is resumed, special arrangements should be made to keep an account of the class of arms exported, with a view to future identification should occasion arise, and to prevent any of them passing into the hands of the tribes *en route*.

21. The maintenance of the Khaibar pass as a safe artery of communication and of trade is an essential measure, whether viewed from the standpoint of your obligations to the Amir or from that of the protection of British subjects. It may be that, as a military route, others may be preferred to this pass, but under any circumstances the retention of an effective control over the Khaibar is essential ; and accordingly, in your letter of the 4th of October, addressed to General Sir William Lockhart, you desired him to announce to the Afridis your intention to re-open the pass in such manner as you might consider most desirable. I approved of this intimation, and on the 3rd of November I authorised your consideration of any scheme for improving or re-aligning the present road, provided that any changes of importance should be reported to me. I have not yet received your report, but whilst I agree that the arrangements which have hitherto subsisted with the tribesmen have been cancelled by their own violent breach of them, I trust that it may still be possible to give the Afridis some share in your new scheme and thus to enlist their good-will and assistance in the future protection of the road. But I do not consider that your Government is bound in any way by the engagements which the Afridis so deliberately broke. Whilst Her Majesty's Government, therefore, adhere to the general policy of avoiding interference with the independent tribal organisations or with the domestic affairs of the Afridis, the safety of the pass must be the paramount consideration in any reconstruction of your arrangements with the tribe.

22. The march of events in Central Asia and Afghanistan and the recent occurrences along our borders have tended to elucidate the problem to be solved. Facts have taken the place of surmise, and successive engagements or assurances have defined the legitimate spheres and responsibilities of the Governments interested. The recent outbreak of fanaticism, in response to the propaganda of the Mullas, has revealed a source of danger deeper-rooted and wider-spread than was suspected, whilst on the other hand the leniency of the terms of submission imposed upon the recalcitrant tribes, and the manifest reluctance of your Government to interfere with their independence or customs of self-government, cannot fail to gradually allay any suspicions they might previously have entertained of the intentions of the Indian Government. The immediate difficulty to be dealt with is not so much associated with apprehension of interference from without, as with that of restlessness within the area of our influence. Your Excellency will doubtless give full weight to this change in the situation, and devote your foremost attention to that portion of the question which has thus prominently asserted itself.

23. I desire, in conclusion, to express on the part of Her Majesty's Government their high approval of the manner in which your Excellency's Government has met an arduous crisis, and of the success which has attended the various military operations conducted on the North-West frontier under conditions of extreme difficulty, upon which a separate communication will be made to you. Not only was the rising one of unprecedented extent and violence, which, moreover, occurred at the most trying season of the year, but your resources were already taxed to the utmost by the necessity for carrying on at the same time a campaign against widespread famine in India, and for dealing with the plague which had appeared in several parts of the empire. The contingency that frontier disturbances may arise at a time when attention is being devoted to other important affairs, must always have a certain weight in balancing the considerations which should determine your policy in that quarter. It adds weight to the conclusion that no new responsibility should be undertaken, unless absolutely required by actual stragetical necessities and the protection of the Indian border.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 3.

Extract from letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 23rd June, 1898.

In Your Lordship's despatch, dated the 28th January, 1898, you invite our attention to leading principles underlying our frontier policy to which Her Majesty's Government have resolved to adhere. The two main objects to be borne in mind were stated to be the best possible concentration of our military forces, so as to enable us to fulfil the several responsibilities which rest upon us, and the limitation of our interference with the tribes, so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory.

Your Lordship indicates that the maintenance of the Khyber Pass as a safe artery of communication and of trade is an essential measure, whether viewed from the standpoint of our obligations to the Amir or from that of the protection of British subjects ; and you inform us that, whilst Her Majesty's Government adhere to the general policy of avoiding interference with the independent tribal organisations or with the domestic affairs of the Afridis, the safety of the Pass must be the paramount consideration in any reconstruction of our arrrangements with the tribe.

We have from time to time reported the course of events on the North-West Frontier of India, and the two despatches, marked on the margin, bring up to the present day the account of the situation with the Afridi tribe with which, in this despatch, we propose to deal. We have been in military occupation of the Khyber Pass since the end of December, the whole Afridi tribe have submitted to us and for some time past they have been quiet and peaceful. Even the turbulent and adventurous characters, who can seldom be relied upon in any trans-border tribe, have of late given singularly little annoyance.

Dated the 16th June, 1898; not printed.

In these circumstances, the time has come, in our opinion, to determine and make known the manner in which our relations with the Afridi tribe shall in future be carried on, and the means which shall be employed for keeping open the Khyber Pass. On this subject we have consulted His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart. We have been pressed to make an early announcement to the Afridis to the effect that the allowances which they received under the terms of our agreement with them of 1881 shall be restored to them. We do not deny that a period of suspense, between the termination of hostilities and the resumption of friendly relations, is a very trying time for those who have to deal locally with the tribesmen. The Afridis themselves are impatient. Some of them have been prevailed upon to turn to the Amir of Afghanistan in the hope of bettering their position with the British Government, and the Mullas and malcontents are too alert not to seize the opportunity for working upon their feelings. It must, however, be remembered that by their own acts the Afridis ruptured their engagements and forfeited their right to receive any allowances, that they have not made good and declare their inability to make good the loss and damage which they caused, not only to buildings in the Khyber, but by carrying off or destroying goods and chattels, and that they were told that the restoration of the latter, or the payment of their value was required of them before we could enter into any new arrangements for the future. In our opinion, therefore, a premature announcement of the restoration of their allowances would have appeared to them to be a bid for their good-will, before we had shown that their submission could be enforced. Besides this, restoration of their allowances in their entirety would anticipate our decision as to the future, while an intimation of our intention to restore them, coupled with exceptions or reservations, would have been apt to tie our own hands without satisfying the tribesmen.

Enclosures Nos. 7 and 2.

Aitchison's Treaties, Vol. IX., p. 277.

We have therefore decided to withold for the present any indication of our intentions beyond a general expression to the effect that we would deal sympathetically with their case, and that their behaviour in the interval would not improbably influence the final decision. Of their behaviour we have little to complain. Even in turning, as some of them did, to Kabul they have strengthened rather than weakened our position; for the rebuff which their advances met at the hands of the Amir must have shown them that they have nothing to hope from not accepting our terms.

Sir William Lockhart has stated, in the memorandum embodying his views upon the best way of holding the Khyber Pass in the future, that the more important object we should have in view is to ensure a ready access into Northern Afghanistan for our army, in the event of military intervention in that country becoming necessary. The plan put forward by Sir William Lockhart for the improvement and extension of the reservoirs and water-works, and for erecting a fort capable of protecting them, is one which has much to commend it, and advantage may be taken of the opportunity which is now presented for carrying out this plan.

In giving to Sir William Lockhart's scheme our support, to the above extent, we do not, however, concur in thinking that the fort at Landi Kotal should be occupied by regular troops of the Indian Army. We agree in the principle that a local tribal corps should be raised, for service in the Pass, and that it should be commanded by British officers. This distinguishes the local corps sharply from the original corps of Jezailchis dependent as it was, under the Agreement of 1881, on the responsibility of the tribal council; and, further developing the "Khyber Rifles" as they came in late years to be constituted, it acknowledges the local force to be British; and the ultimate responsibility for the safety of the Pass is accepted as ours. Between a tribal levy and a local militia, there is an essential difference which is not always recognized. By a "levy" we mean a body of men who are dependent on tribal authority, and, strictly speaking, are employed, paid, and summoned for any special duty, by tribal authority. Any contribution which the British Government makes towards their support is made in order to co-operate in the assertion of the right and power of the tribe to restrain the bad characters and "young bloods" of their own and neighbouring territories. Drill and discipline are not wanted, and British officers in command or even as inspectors are out of place. When greater efficiency is desirable, the direct superintendence of British officers becomes essential, but it then equally becomes necessary to recognize the force as a British and not a tribal force. The ultimate responsibility for the actions of the force ceases to rest on the tribe. The proposal to place regular troops of the Indian army at Landi Kotal raises other questions. A battalion in such a position would be capable of no action beyond passive defence, and would constitute a standing temptation to the tribes, while, if a rising did occur, it could do nothing to make the forcing of the Khyber more easy, though it would materially add to our anxieties. Service at Landi Kotal would be unpopular, for the men would have to be practically confined to the limits of the fort, and even with the utmost precautions, there would be constant risk of men being murdered, and rifles stolen. Continual friction would thus be kept up between us and the Afridis. It is, moreover, the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor and of the officers acquainted with the frontier, whom His Honour has consulted, that the Afridis would strongly resent the placing of troops at the further end of the Pass. We believe that we should fail to enlist the good-will of the tribe on our side, and we should certainly excite the suspicion, if not the antagonism of the Amir of Afghanistan. Everyone agrees that the good-will of the Afridi tribe is essential to the smooth working of our arrangements in the Pass, and it seems to follow that the attempt to strengthen them by stationing troops at Landi Kotal would, in fact, prove to be a source of weakness.

The alternative which we propose to adopt is to hold the position at Landi Kotal by means of the local militia to which we have already alluded,

increasing their numbers to a strength sufficient to enable the patrol and convoy work in the Pass itself, as well as the garrison duties at Landi Kotal, to be undertaken by them. The cost of building a strong fort on Suffolk Hill, at Landi Kotal, is now estimated at six and a half lakhs of rupees, and about two lakhs for water supply; and it will take two winter seasons to complete the works. The full estimate for the works in the Pass is given in the margin.

	Rs.
1. New works at Fort Maude, Ali Masjid, &c.	4,00,000
2. New works at other places, Zintarra, &c.	2,00,000
3. Improvements to Landi Kotal Sarai ...	50,000
4. Suffolk Hill Fort	6,50,000
5. Water supply	2.00,000
Total	15,00,000

We have no reason to fear that a corps such as we contemplate would be untrustworthy in the hour of need. The history of our empire in India appears to teach the contrary. The conduct of the Khyber Rifles themselves last year also points to the same conclusion. Had they been organized, officered and supported in the manner which we propose for the future, we have no reason to doubt that they would have remained true to us, as their fellow tribesmen in the regular regiments of the Indian army, with very few exceptions indeed, remained true. It must be borne in mind that it is an essential part of our plan that a moveable column of sufficient force shall be equipped with transport and ready to support the irregular force in the Khyber on the occurrence of any emergency calling for action of the kind. Your Lordship will be separately addressed regarding the details of our proposed military arrangements.

We think that the former management of trade affairs in the Pass has been satisfactory; and that, as far as can be, the future arrangements should reproduce them. The frequent kafilas went up and down the Khyber road in safety, and, if the volume of trade in late years contracted when we would have looked to it to expand, the reasons for that are not to be found in any deficiencies within the Pass, but in the fiscal policy which finds favour in Afghanistan. The Political Officer who directed the local arrangements has been a subordinate of the Commissioner of Peshawar. The control of political relations with the Afridis and their neighbours, as well as the control of the Khyber Rifles themselves, were in the same hands. The majority of us wish to continue this system. We think that it is essential to have one authority in the Pass, and that the only possible authority, under present conditions, is that of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. We therefore think that the control of the Political Officers and of the militia must be in the hands of the Lieutenant-Governor. The militia should be officered by British officers, and the conditions of service should be such as to ensure its efficiency for the purposes for which it is intended, but we think that the authority over it should be the same as that which directs the political relations of the Punjab Frontier.

Three other courses are suggested. The officer entrusted with political dealing in the Khyber Pass might, it is suggested, be directly under the Government of India in the Foreign Department, or he might remain under the Commissioner of Peshawar, but the Commissioner himself be directly under the Government of India, or the Military Officer, who commands the Khyber Militia might also be the Political Officer in the Pass. These plans oust the authority of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab from the Khyber Pass, and introduce a special system in a narrow wedge of country bordered on each side by, and having intimate relations with, country with which the Lieutenant-Governor conducts the political relations. The first plan would not be practicable. The organization of the Government of India is not such as is adapted for dealing with local routine work of which the mass of business would consist. We could not afford to station in the Khyber an officer of the standing and experience to be trusted in cases of importance and emergency. The district is

too small for an expensive staff and too important for any other than a thoroughly reliable authority. The second plan would put the Commissioner of Peshawar in the position of serving two masters and would divorce the control of affairs on the British side of the border from the control of affairs on the further side, while the two directing authorities would work through the same officer. The third plan would put the whole direction of affairs, political and military, in the hands of the military authorities over whom the Punjab Government which controls the political relations with the rest of the border would have no power. Our Hon'ble Colleagues, His Excellency Sir Charles Nairne and Major-General Sir Edwin Collen, dissent from our views in desiring to maintain the authority of the Local Government over the militia and the political relations with Afridis of the Khyber. Their Minutes are enclosed.

One most important consideration in dealing with the future arrangements in the Khyber is that of our communications with Landi Kotal. A good road now exists through the Pass, but, in the event of our having to make a military advance in any of the circumstances discussed in the 6th paragraph, we are of opinion that it would be of the highest importance to have the use of a railway to Landi Kotal. A recent survey shows that a light railway on the two-foot gauge can be run from Peshawar to Landi Kotal independently of the present road, at an estimated cost of Rs. 36 lakhs. We think that we ought to secure, in the settlement which is about to be made with the Afridis, the right to construct and work a railway and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction upon it. We do not propose actually to lay the rails beyond Jamrud now, but we would make the railway bed ready for the laying of the permanent way when the time came for doing so. This, however, is a project for which we should desire to obtain an expression that the approval of Her Majesty's Government before we take any steps towards its inception.

In our new arrangement with the Afridis we must make adequate provision for the railway and for the exercise of jurisdiction upon railway lands, the trade road and within the militia posts, as well as for the constitution of the militia as a British force. We think, however, that our terms should be drawn, in some essentials, upon the same lines as the Agreement of 1881 followed, and this is the unanimous opinion of all who have been consulted; that is to say, first;—the Afridi clans who are connected with the Khyber should still be paid allowances for keeping the pass open and safe, and in commutation of their ancient rights in respect of tolls and otherwise; and second;—a local force should be raised from the Afridis themselves for service in the Pass in carrying out the objects with which we dominate it. The circumstances of the uprising against us, in contravention of the agreement under which the Afridis had for many years worked, constituted an absolute rupture of all relations, and the defeat and subjection of the tribe might, if we chose, be held to obliterate all rights. We decide in our own interests to enlist the good-will and the assistance of the Afridis, but we hold that we have a clear right to attain our ends in whatever way we please. We propose, then, to renew our former relations as much on the lines of the old agreement as is compatible with present aims, but where a departure from the old footing seems expedient, we think it should be made in a manner to leave us the utmost freedom in the future. The form itself of the new document may with advantage perhaps approach rather to that of a sanad than take again the appearance of a treaty. This is a matter for future decision, but, if it can be so arranged, we would rather make the document a statement of the terms which we grant to the Afridis with their acceptance recorded upon it. It may be necessary, as was done in our instructions to Sir William Lockhart, to leave a certain amount of discretion to the officer or officers to whom we entrust the duty of entering into communication with the tribe, and to be guided, as to the final form, by the reports we receive.

We have said that Sir William Lockhart required of the Afridis the payment of the value of public and private property looted by them in the

Khyber, and that they have not made good this demand. The property has been valued at Rs. 28,600. We fear it must be accepted that it is impossible to enforce these claims, unless we are prepared to use force to compel compliance. In addition to this, the damage done to buildings in the Khyber has been assessed at two and a half lakhs of rupees. We reserved the question of requiring the Afridis to make good the cost of this damage for consideration when renewing relations with them. It is in our opinion useless to make any demand on that head now. Notwithstanding the terms of Sir William Lockhart's proclamation, we know that the Afridis regard themselves as having complied with what was required of them. We know that they have been put to many shifts and contrivances to enable them to comply to the extent to which they have done so, and that they are unable to pay more now and do not admit their liability to pay more. Any renewed demand or even any deductions from their allowances spread over the future would, we believe, be thought by them to be an injustice, and it will detract much from the value of any settlement, if it is not cordially accepted by the tribe from the outset. We cannot readily agree, however, to wipe out this demand altogether, since it was deliberately made. We propose, therefore, to make the renewal of allowances date from the day on which the Afridis accept our new terms of settlement. The tribesmen might, and they probably will, ask for the allowances to be paid from the date on which we made peace with them. We shall make them understand that we made peace with them without exacting the full terms originally imposed, and that their allowances cannot, therefore, be restored until the date on which a new settlement is arrived at.

In one matter we shall have to forego our demand altogether. The Afridis were told that they must restore the arms taken from troops during the campaign. This they have not done, alleging that it is not the custom of their country to restore arms taken in war, that they told Sir William Lockhart so, and that he gave them no definite reply. As many of these arms have been sold out of their country, they cannot comply in full with this demand, and, after full consideration, we have, with regret, come to the conclusion that we cannot press it.

We propose to reserve for other despatches an expression of our plans for dealing, on the principles stated by Your Lordship in the despatch cited at the beginning of this letter, with other sections of the North-West Frontier, such as the Kohat-Samana-Kurram Frontier, Malakand, the Tochi Valley and Wano; there is, however, one consideration which we may mention here. We concur with Your Lordship in thinking that advanced posts in tribal country, held by regular troops, should be established under such conditions as will enable the garrisons to promptly repel any attacks made upon them. We think, however, that a well organized militia might be a most valuable addition to this system, especially in relieving the regular troops of most, if not all the duty on the lines of communication, and in small and unhealthy posts. Before the transference of the Punjab Frontier Force to the Commander-in-Chief, there was in existence a force which bore the name of militia and which performed duties somewhat of this character. In the Kurram Militia we have a revival of that system. If the proposed organization of the Afridi Militia in the Khyber is accepted by Your Lordship, we would propose to place at the disposal of the Local Government an officer of experience of the frontier and with Pathans, who could not only act as Commandant of the Khyber Militia, but as an adviser in the matter of organising other corps of militia where required.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

Letter from General Sir W. Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. Dated Calcutta, the 3rd February, 1898.

With reference to the conference held yesterday at Government House, over which His Excellency the Viceroy presided, I have the honour to forward a memorandum drawn up by the Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force, submitting certain proposals for the holding of the Khyber pass.

2. These proposals, in which I concur, may perhaps be found to offer a reasonable solution of the question which was under discussion yesterday.

Memorandum by Brig.-Gen. W. G. Nicholson, Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

In deciding on the agency by which the Khyber is to be held, there are two points to be kept in view. First, the Khyber is used as the principal trade route between the Punjab and Northern Afghanistan; and, secondly, in the event of military operations having to be undertaken in Afghanistan, the most direct and easiest road to Kabul lies through the Khyber. To meet trade requirements it would, no doubt, suffice to hold the Khyber by tribal levies drawn mainly from the Afridi sections, whose custom it was in former days to exact tolls from caravans making use of this pass. But to meet military requirements such an arrangement seems hardly appropriate. We ought to have an advanced post capable of ready expansion into an advanced military depôt at the most commanding point in the pass, namely, at Landi Kotal; near that post an adequate supply of water is indispensable; and, in view of recent occurrences, it would appear to be neither prudent nor conducive to our prestige to expose the defensive works and water-supply which the Government of India may order to be constructed to the chance of being wrecked by a tribal outbreak. The importance of the military aspect of this question has, I believe, been fully recognised by the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government since the year 1885.

The following proposals are put forward as likely to meet the two requirements indicated above:—

1. The Khyber to be held for trade purposes by the Khyber Rifles, drawn proportionately from the tribal sections concerned, and organized somewhat in the same way as the Kurram Militia. The men to be armed, clothed, equipped and trained by Government. The Head-quarters of the corps to be as heretofore at Jamrud, with a strong detachment at Landi Kotal, and the remainder distributed in suitable posts between Landi Kotal and Jamrud. The original Landi Kotal Serai to be remodelled so as to provide quarters for the detachment there, and the old posts along the line, including that at Ali Masjid, to be restored with such improvements as regards site and design as may seem necessary.

In the event of Government approving of the continuance of tribal allowances to the Afridi sections living in the Khyber, the pay and allowances of the Khyber Rifles to be taken into account as really constituting a tribal subsidy.

My own view is that Afridis much prefer to be commanded by British officers, and for this reason among others I am inclined to favour the appointment of one or more carefully selected British officers to the Khyber Rifles.

But on this point I hesitate to express a decided opinion, although I doubt whether, if a different policy be adopted, any Native officer well adapted for the command of the corps would be forthcoming. Aslam Khan has done well, but his qualifications are quite exceptional.

2. For military purposes a really strong work, armed with guns, should be constructed at Landi Kotal on a site which, if possible, would protect the water-supply. It is understood that such a site can be found near what is known as "the General's Camp." The normal garrison of this work might be fixed at one battalion of native infantry, with a detachment of gunners, and it may here be noted that Landi Kotal is a much more healthy station for troops than the Peshawar valley. The work should, however, be so designed as to be capable on an emergency of housing a larger garrison, while being thoroughly defensible when occupied by its normal garrison. There should be no difficulty about this, if suitable flanking arrangements are made. The work should provide storage for reserve ammunition and for at least one month's supply of food and water for the normal garrison. The type of work and the armament should be such as to enable the defenders to withstand a powerful tribal combination without needing immediate re-inforcement.

In conclusion, I would observe that the foregoing proposals do not, so far as I can see, involve the annexation or administration by us of the Khyber to any greater extent than has hitherto been the case. The political arrangements and the Khyber Rifles would remain as before under the control of the Political Officer in charge of the pass, and the military garrison of Landi Kotal would be under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Peshawar District. The latter would act in concert with the former in all matters in which the presence of the troops might affect the management of the pass and of its inhabitants.

Dated, CALCUTTA,
The 3rd February, 1898.

(Sd.) W. G. NICHOLSON, *Brig.-Genl.*,
Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, to General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., dated Fort William, the 1st March, 1898.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 3rd February 1898, in which you forwarded a memorandum drawn up by the Chief of the Staff of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, making proposals for holding the Khyber Pass.

2. These proposals, which meet with your concurrence, involve the holding of a strong work at Landi Kotal, with a garrison of one battalion of Native Infantry and a detachment of gunners, while the Khyber Pass itself would be guarded for trade purposes by a Militia recruited from the tribal sections concerned, and organized somewhat in the same way as the Kurram Militia.

3. The scheme, of which this short description does not purport to be even a sketch, has been examined by the Government of India in the light of what has hitherto been the policy of the British Government, and the instructions of the Secretary of State conveyed in his despatch of January 28th, paragraph 21, bearing particularly on the present subject. The Governor-General in Council is not prepared to accept the plan without further investigation of the whole question of the best way in which to secure the safety of the Khyber Pass. The Governor-General in Council, therefore, wishes you and Sir Richard Udny to put before him, in greater detail, the plan of holding the pass which commends

itself to you, and to discuss at the same time any alternative ways of doing so. It has, for instance, been suggested that a Militia, maintained on the analogy of the Kurram Militia, might guard the pass without the immediate presence and support, in time of peace, of any military force, if a body of troops is kept ready to move to the assistance of the tribal ~~militia,~~ should they be seriously menaced, and if a definite assurance be given to them that such assistance will be afforded.

4. Some time may yet elapse before the Government of India can arrive at a final decision in this matter. That decision must be influenced by other than purely military considerations, and you may now be in a position to advise the Government of India on the disposition and temper of the Afridis, showing how they would view a military occupation. Sir Richard Udny was understood, when you and he were personally consulted in Calcutta, to favour a system under which the whole responsibility for the administration, as well as the safety of the Khyber, would be taken entirely out of the hands of the Afridis. The Governor-General in Council would desire to know, if this is a correct description of Sir Richard Udny's views, how he would propose such an arrangement would be worked out in detail, and what extent of country on either side of the road through the pass would be included in such arrangement. Still another plan which has been mentioned is to fall back upon tribal responsibility and tribal methods entirely, relaxing even what amount of British supervision and superimposed authority there has always been in the Khyber arrangements since 1881. The Government of India will await the expression of your views before coming to any conclusion as regards these suggestions.

5. It is in the opinion of the Government of India inevitable that the present military occupation of the Khyber must, at least temporarily, continue, and that, when all the clans submit, they must be told that the Khyber will continue to be occupied for the present. They will be warned at the same time, if they show any disposition to resent this military occupation and a desire to arrive at a state of relations under which they will have complete or considerable freedom from control, that their conduct in the interval between this and the settlement of the future will be taken into consideration in arriving at a decision as to the nature of the final arrangements which may be made for the safety of the pass.. The sanction of the Secretary of State must be obtained before any announcement of this kind can be made.

6. I am to ask that your best consideration may be given to the several questions which have been put before you in this letter, and that your opinion may be expressed to the Government of India as early as you are able to reply. The points raised in paragraph 5 were referred to you by telegraph.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) W. J. CUNINGHAM,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

Letter from General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Peshawar, the 11th March 1898.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1098 F., dated 1st March 1898, calling for a report by Sir Richard Udny and myself on the method which appears to us to be the best for holding the Khyber Pass in future.

2. My views on the subject are embodied in the accompanying memorandum. In order to save time I submit this at once without waiting for the paper which Sir R. Udny is drawing up on the subject, and which I hope to forward on the 14th instant.

Memorandum by Gen. Sir W. Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.

The Khyber Pass has to be kept open by us with two objects, and can be held in one of four ways. The objects are—first, to provide a direct and easy trade route between the Punjab and Northern Afghanistan; and, secondly, to ensure ready access into Northern Afghanistan for our army, in the event of military intervention in that country becoming necessary. The latter purpose is undoubtedly the more important of the two, both in connexion with the defence of Afghanistan and India against foreign aggression, and because the trade between those two countries is quite insignificant in amount and value. The temporary closing of such a trade route as the Khyber makes very little difference to the Government or people of India, but from the strategic standpoint it might be essential that the main road into Northern Afghanistan should be kept open in times of excitement and fanaticism on or beyond the frontier. The delay of a week or a fortnight in entering Afghan territory might involve momentous consequences in a political as well as a military sense. It will be seen, therefore, that the measures which would suffice for guarding a trade route might be quite inadequate for keeping open the line of military communication between the Punjab and Northern Afghanistan.

The ways in which the Khyber can be held are—first, by regular troops; secondly, by a force consisting partly of regular and partly of irregular troops; thirdly, by irregular troops alone; and fourthly, by tribesmen under tribal management and responsibility.

2. As regards the first method of holding the Khyber, it may be objected that, in view of existing military requirements in the Punjab and elsewhere, the Khyber could not be held in adequate strength by troops alone without a proportionate addition to the Indian army; that permanently to lock up a considerable military force in a narrow pass is not the best way of guarding against the recurrence of a frontier rising; that for occupying the heights bordering the pass from Jamrud to Landi Kotal, local irregular troops or levies are more suitable and likely to be more efficient than regular troops; that during the summer the pass itself (except its highest point at Landi Kotal) is so hot and unhealthy that service therein would be intolerable for British soldiers and extremely distasteful to native soldiers; and, finally, that to exclude the Khyber Afridis from any share in the custody of the pass, and the emoluments attaching thereto, would certainly create ill-feeling among them and incite them to mischief.

With reference to the first objection, I would remark that some increase in the army to meet the needs of an expanding empire seems inevitable. As matters stand, a large proportion of the troops quartered in the Punjab have of late years been almost continually on outpost duty on or across the frontier, or on field service.

With reference to the second objection, it may be urged that it is by no means obligatory to lock up in the valley of the Khyber the whole of the troops that might be required to secure the pass. The Bazar valley would furnish a strong strategical position, and, if a brigade were quartered at or near China, while a smaller force occupied a fort at Landi Kotal, the pass would be as safe as it could be made by purely military means. On the other hand, it is understood that the permanent occupation of Afridi territory in the Bazar valley would be opposed to the decision of Her Majesty's Government, and I am inclined to think that such a step might embitter our relations with some at least of the Afridi sections, and thus lead to their giving trouble whenever they imagined that our troops were fully occupied elsewhere.

However this may be, the last three objections are to my mind unanswerable, and dispose of the idea of holding the Khyber by regular troops alone. Picquet and patrol duties in the pass can best be performed by a local and irregular corps, the employment of which gives the Khyber Afridis their due interest and profit in the custody of the pass, and obviates any necessity for quartering troops between Landi Kotal and Jamrud.

3. As regards the second and third methods of holding the Khyber, which can best be discussed together, it may be said that for the past eighteen years the pass has been guarded by irregular troops alone, inasmuch as the tribal levies which were raised, trained, and paid by us under an agreement with the Afridi sections concerned have by degrees been assimilated more and more closely to an irregular frontier corps. This system has saved much trouble and expense in the past, and might, if properly controlled, have continued to work well in the future, but for the unfortunate occurrences in August last. However loyal and well-disciplined irregular native troops may be, they can hardly be expected to fight against overwhelming odds of their own kinsmen, after their British Commandant has been withdrawn, and they have been warned that no support or assistance is to be looked for. Under such trying conditions, the best mercenary troops in the world might be expected to waver, and I think it highly creditable to the Khyber Rifles that, when left to their own resources, they fought as well as they did.

The Kurram valley is held by the Kurram Militia under a British Commandant, and this force has done excellent service, even during the recent period of disturbance. But the local conditions in the Kurram and in the Khyber are wholly dissimilar. The Kurram Militia is mainly composed of Turis, a tribe of Shiahs which only flourishes under British protection, and is at continual enmity with the Sunni tribes surrounding it. Moreover, we have provided the necessary support or stiffening to the Militia by the regular garrison quartered in the Para Chinar Fort.

The holding of the Khyber was entrusted to a local force in some respects analogous in constitution to the Kurram Militia, but with these differences: First, the Khyber Riflemen were drawn from the Afridi sections which inhabited and bordered the pass, and consequently they had no traditional feeling of enmity against their neighbours to strengthen their loyalty towards us; and, secondly, the defensible serai at Landi Kotal had no garrison of regular troops like the fort at Para Chinar. It seems possible, however, had the Khyber Rifles been promptly re-inforced by regular troops in August last, that with few exceptions, they would have stood to their engagements, that the various posts and the defensible serai and water-supply works at Landi Kotal would have been saved from destruction, and that the formidable tribal gathering would have melted away, as it did on a previous occasion, as soon as troops were moved up the pass in support.

It ought to be an axiom of frontier policy that, in using local levies or irregular corps to hold passes or outposts beyond the limits of British India, the one thing of essential importance is to inspire these levies or irregulars with the fullest confidence that, in time of emergency, they will be as fully and as promptly aided and reinforced by the army behind them as regular troops would be. Up to August last, I believe that the Khyber Rifles possessed that confidence, but for the time it has been weakened, if not destroyed, by their being left to themselve to hold the pass, and to defend the buildings and other public property which had been entrusted to their care. According to the strict letter of the law, it is doubtless the case that our agreement with the Afridis did not oblige us to assist with our troops the representatives of the sections concerned, or the Khyber Rifles, in carrying out the duty for which these scctions received allowances, and for which the Khyber Rifles had been organized. But these wild mountaineers are unacquainted with the niceties of political jurisprudence, they had for many years fulfilled their part of the agreement, some of them had been employed by us as irregular troops in frontier warfare elsewhere, and they may reasonably have hoped for the assistance which, technically speaking, they had no right to demand. One of my two

main reasons for supporting the proposals put forward by the Chief of Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force, is that their adoption will restore the confidence of the Khyber Rifles and the Afridis living in or near the Khyber Pass. These will know that, so long as a strong outpost at Landi Kotal is garrisoned by regular troops, there is no chance of our again leaving them to stem the wave of tribal fanaticism unaided. There is of course the objection that on military grounds it may be hazardous to hold an advanced post with regular troops, while the road between this post and the base remains in the hands of locally-raised irregulars in whose fidelity we cannot place implicit reliance. I do not attach much weight to this objection, for Landi Kotal is at the top of the pass, and is therefore regarded by the Afridis as dominating the road between it and Jamrud. Moreover, as previously stated, the heights bordering the road are so inaccessible, and so devoid of water, that they could not be permanently held by regular troops, either British or Native, without involving a strain on our military resources quite out of proportion to any conceivable advantage to be derived from such a measure. The feasibility of covering the pass by means of a cantonment in the Bazar valley has already been discussed in paragraph 2 of this memorandum.

My other reason for supporting Brigadier-General Nicholson's proposals is that, without involving heavy outlay or alienating the sympathies of any section among the tribesmen, they are likely greatly to strengthen our hold over the Khyber, and to enable us to carry out such arrangements in the way of railway extension, water-works, and the like, as may be required to facilitate our access to Northern Afghanistan, should circumstances demand our intervention in that quarter.

4. As regards the fourth method, its practical effect would be that the Government of India would pay blackmail to the Khyber Afridis, instead of the latter imposing blackmail on the kafilas making use of the road. It would mean a reversion to the barbarous system which was condemned as intolerable at the beginning of the last Afghan war. Difficulties would be certain to arise regarding the repair of the road and the maintenance of the posts needed to protect it; the Landi Kotal water-supply would cease to exist; our prestige along the whole of the north-west frontier would suffer; in short, the fourth method of holding the Khyber has nothing to recommend it.

5. From the foregoing remarks it will be seen that I am in favour of the second method. The defile of the Khyber should, in any case be guarded by irregular troops raised locally. As regards regular troops, it would no doubt strengthen our hold on the Khyber from a military point of view, if a strong force were permanently quartered in the Bazar valley at or near China, as well as a smaller force in a defensible post at Landi Kotal. From a political point of view, the permanent occupation of China might give rise to tribal ill-feeling, and thus cause us grave embarrassment; for it must be remembered that, in undertaking military operations in Afghanistan, the friendly attitude of the frontier tribes would be of much greater moment than the absolute safety of any single pass, however important. If the attitude were friendly, the pass would be secure in any case. If the pass were secure, while the attitude was unfriendly, we should be harassed in other directions. I am, therefore, inclined to recommend the scheme sketched out by Brigadier-General Nicholson as offering the best prospect of a satisfactory settlement.

I consider that the organization of the Khyber Rifles might advantageously be strengthened by attaching to the corps three British officers instead of one, namely, a Commandant, 2nd-in-command and Adjutant, possibly also a medical officer. While drawn from the same local sources as heretofore, the corps might gradually be assimilated to one of the infantry regiments of the Punjaub Frontier Force in matters of equipment, pay and pension.

6. I see no necessity whatever for instituting a civil administration over the Khyber. What we ought to tell the tribesmen is that, so long as they fulfil their engagements to us, and so long as their attitude towards each other does not bring them into conflict with us or endanger the security of the road, we are perfectly content to leave them to manage their own affairs. The Political

Officer in charge of the Khyber would naturally exercise considerable influence over the tribesmen, but I doubt whether that influence would be increased by investing him with the functions of a civil administrator.

7. As soon as we are fully assured of the complete submission of every Afridi section, I should be disposed to renew the tribal allowances in the Khyber, subject to such re-adjustment as may seem equitable or politic—subject also to such conditions with respect to railway and road construction, and the acquisition of sites, as we may think fit to impose. When the tribesmen see that their allowances are not to be forfeited and that the Khyber Rifles are not to be disbanded, I am of opinion that they will welcome the construction of a strong post at Landi Kotal, as furnishing a tangible proof that, if they do their part to keep the pass open, we shall not fail in ours.

8. There are two other points to which a brief reference is necessary: First, the advisability or otherwise of constructing an alternative road to Landi Kotal from Peshawar through the Mullagori country. Such a road would be nearly twice as long as the Khyber route, and its cost would be some 9 lakhs, but the alignment is an easy one. If, as laid down by the Secretary of State, the maintenance of the Khyber Pass as a safe artery of communication and trade is essential, it seems to me that it would be a waste of money to provide a second and much longer roadway which would never be used, unless the Khyber were closed—a condition of things which is not contemplated. Secondly, it may be convenient to mention that the cost of the defensive works, water-supply, &c., needed in the Khyber, if occupied in the manner suggested in Brigadier-General Nicholson's Memorandum, is roughly estimated by the Commanding Royal Engineer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, at 9½ lakhs, namely :—

	Lakhs.
Fort on Suffolk Hill...	4
Water-supply	1
New post and tank at General's camp	½
Restoring defensible serai	1
Blockhouses, Upper Khyber...	1½
„ Lower „	1½
	9½

The cost of restoring the works which would be required if the Khyber were held by the third method, *i.e.*, without a garrison of regular troops at Landi Kotal, may be taken at about 5 lakhs.

9. In conclusion, I would refer to the supreme importance of improving the communications between our frontier outposts and the supporting stations behind them. By this means alone can the due concentration of our forces and the rapid reinforcement of any threatened point be provided for. I advocate the immediate extension of the North-Western Railway system to Kohat and Bannu on the west, and to Landi Kotal and Dargai below Malakand on the north.

(Signed) W. S. A. LOCKHART, *General*,
Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, Lieutenant-Governor's Camp, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated Banda, the 19th March, 1898.

LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR'S views in regard to re-opening of Khyber Pass have been given in paragraph 5 of Punjab Government's letter, dated 21st September, and in two demi-official letters to the Viceroy, dated 18th October

and 6th March, the material parts of which will now be put into official form and letter sent by post. To what he has already said, Lieutenant-Governor would add as follows :—*First.* It is very undesirable that we should show anxiety to restore allowances to Afridis before our objects regarding pass are defined and fully secured; such attitude would be misinterpreted and would make final settlement extremely difficult. There is no need for haste as pass is open, and military occupation must continue till sufficient guarantee for the permanency of arrangement is secured. *Secondly.* It is desirable, in view of reckless infringement of former agreement, that, as recommended in paragraph 5 of Punjab Government letter, dated 24th September, cost of constructing buildings damaged in outbreak should be deducted by instalments from the allowances, and this question should be settled before allowances are restored. *Thirdly.* In regard to re-enlistment in Khyber Rifles, Lieutenant-Governor, as already intimated, thinks this desirable, provided Government reserve complete liberty of action in regard to constitution of force and its relation to tribal control. These are questions which, in Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, require full deliberation and discussion with the tribes, and allowances should not be granted until they are settled. Even if Government has framed its policy in regard to the Khyber, the tribes are hardly in a position to enter into definite engagements which must depend for their fulfilment on the concerted action of the several sections.

Enclosure 5 in No. 3.

Letter from General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Peshawar, the 16th March, 1898.

In continuation of my letter, dated 11th March, 1898, I have the honour to forward a Memorandum, dated 15th idem, embodying Sir Richard Udny's views on the future arrangements for holding the Khyber Pass.

2. The only remarks I have to make on this Memorandum, which I am gratified to find in substantial agreement with my own, are with regard to the following points :—

Paragraph 9.—I would first observe that, although Brigadier-General Elles concurred with the Commissioner of Peshawar in thinking it inexpedient last August to send troops into the Khyber, I am not aware that he represented such a movement to be a military impossibility. But in cases of local disturbance, the responsibile military adviser is not the General Officer in local command, but the Lieutenant-General of the Command concerned, and in this instance the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, strongly urged on Army Head-quarters the desirability of re-inforcing the Khyber and supporting the Khyber Rifles with regular troops.

Secondly.—I am doubtful about the necessity for keeping a full equipped flying column at Peshawar in readiness to reinforce the Khyber, The correct principle to be followed in the military occupation of the frontier is to concentrate the troops needed to support the outlying garrisons in suitable and healthy positions, and to keep up the transport and equipment required to enable these troops to move at a moment's notice. Further, to perfect the means of rapid communication between the outpost and their supports by the construction of railways and the improvement of roads. To hold a long and exposed frontier with a moderate force, it is essential that the communications should be as complete as they can be made by civilized methods.

Thirdly.—I do not agree with Sir R. Udny about the Khyber Rifles being encouraged to provide their own arms. I can see no advantage in such a system, which would offer a premium on the theft of breech-loading rifles or their component parts from our troops or arsenals. I consider, too, that the Khyber Rifles should be as well armed as our Native Infantry Regiments.

Paragraph 10.—Admitting the existence last summer of a strong fanatical feeling along the north-west frontier, I doubt whether this feeling in the first instance took a firm hold on the majority of the Afridi tribesmen. They assembled, possibly in large numbers, to attack the Khyber posts, but their attitude was at first vacillating and half-hearted, and I cannot but think that, after having upheld their religious reputation among their neighbours by a skirmish with our troops, they would have been only too glad of an excuse to disperse to their homes. To me it is inconceivable that the Khyber Rifles would have attempted to hold out against their kinsmen, if the hostility of the latter towards the British Government had been as bitter and as fanatical as Sir R. Udny supposes. Apart from their Mullas, the Afridis have always been on friendly terms with us. In fact, as a tribe they like us, and many of us like them; and it is well known that the Mullas have less influence over the Afridis than over any other frontier tribe.

Memorandum by Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I.

The management of the Khyber previous to the outbreak of last August was based upon an agreement made with us in 1881 by the Afridis,* or rather, to speak quite accurately, by the Kuki Khel, Zakka Khel, Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamrai and Sipah clans of that tribe, for the Aka Khel and Tirah Adam Khel clans had no more to do with the Khyber than the sections of the Adam Khel Afridis, who inhabit the Kohat Pass and the wedge of independent territory adjoining the pass to the eastward. To prevent misconceptions as to the terms of this agreement, it should be read through carefully, but for present purposes it may be sufficient to say that the arrangements under it were as follows:—On Tuesdays and Fridays in every week one caravan went up through the Khyber from Jamrud to Landi Kotal, a distance of 20 miles, while another came down from Landi Kotal to Jamrud, and these caravans were accompanied by guards of the Khyber Rifles which exchanged at the half-way post of Ali Masjid, the escort which had come down with the caravan from Landi Kotal returning there with the upward caravan from Jamrud, while the escort from Jamrud retraced its steps with the downward caravan. On these days too the heights which command the road through the defile were picquetted by Khyber Riflemen. On other days of the week the pass was closed to traffic, though special arrangements of the same kind were occasionally made on off-days for distinguished visitors, and special guards used to be provided for parties of coolies employed on the repair of the road or on such duties as the building of the fortified serai at Landi Kotal, the construction of the water-supply works near Landi Khana, &c., &c. Officials too connected with the pass, like the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber and the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles, frequently travelled through it with small escorts of the latter corps on other than caravan days, though, according to the strict letter of the agreement (clause 13), they were bound to give sufficient notice of this to the tribesmen beforehand. From this it will be seen that the Khyber cannot be said to have been "held," except in a very modified sense even for purposes of trade, and that in a military sense it was not "held" at all, while the system in force was absolutely different from that prevailing in the Kohat Pass (through the country of the Adam Khel Afridis), which, in return for a comparatively very small subsidy, is open every day of the year and all day long, like any road in British India, for all travellers, whether European or Native, without any precautions of guards or picquets.

* And the Shinwaris of the Lwargai plateau round Landi Kotal.

R. UDNY.

2. The question that Government now have to decide is whether we should content ourselves with regaining the same measure of control over the Khyber that we possessed in the past, or whether we should seek to obtain a larger measure not only in order to secure it more effectually for military purposes as our main line of advance into Afghanistan, but also to render it impossible for the Afridis to close the road and to destroy our posts in the pass

as they did last August. I think there can be no doubt that this question must be answered in favour of the second alternative, and, as it seems to me that the objects in view under this alternative could only be completely attained by holding the pass for ourselves in a military sense and by regular troops, I said at the Conference which was held by His Excellency the Viceroy at Calcutta on the 2nd ultimo that I should like to see this done in future *if the military authorities considered it practicable.* Although too I am absolutely averse as a general rule to any occupation or quasi-annexation of territory beyond the frontiers of British India when it can possibly be avoided, and I have always been strongly of opinion that we should refrain from interference with the tribes, unless it is necessary for the security of our own subjects and border, I think that in the special case of the Khyber the objects to be attained would justify us in making an exception, and that, however much the Afridis might dislike our occupation of the pass with the consequent forfeiture of their pass allowances,* the trans-border world could not fail to admit that it was a just and appropriate punishment, which they had brought upon themselves by an unprovoked outbreak and by showing us that we could place no lasting reliance on tribal agreements. But even with a military occupation of the Khyber I would have kept up the Khyber Rifles—as an auxiliary irregular corps on the model of the Kurram Militia and entirely under our own control—for two reasons—

* In this connection I may note that, *if we continued to pay them their old allowances,* the Afridis could not object to our re-occupying the Khyber with troops or regard it as any breach of the 1881 Agreement, since this was specially provided for by clause 5 of that agreement, which seems to have been made while we were still in military occupation of the Khyber.

R. UDNY.

(i) as providing an opening for the Afridis, who would still feel that they retained a considerable interest in the pass arrangements while they had a local levy to enlist in ;

(ii) to escort caravans and to furnish picquets on the hills during their journey through the pass in times of peace, because such duties —particularly hill top picquets—would be harrassing for regular troops, and could be performed satisfactorily by Khyber Riflemen in ordinary times as they have been during the past.

I had no intention, however, of proposing that we should undertake any responsibility for the administration of the Khyber as well as for its safety, and I would simply uphold the existing regulation published in Government of India Notification of the 2nd July 1880 (as amended by Notification of the 15th June 1886), which provides for the trial of criminal offences in "the Khyber Pass and the lands immediately adjoining the pass on either side of the roadway,"* without attempting to interfere with the tribesmen elsewhere. It will be observed too that this regulation in its concluding words allows a discretion to the officers empowered under it to refrain from using it unless the parties are all British subjects.

* I should prefer to read this, when the new arrangements have been concluded, as "the road through the Khyber Pass and the lands immediately adjoining this road-way on either side."

R. UDNY.

3. Sir William Lockhart in his Memorandum on future Khyber arrangements is opposed to a purely military occupation of the pass by regular troops, principally on the grounds—

(*a*) that irregular troops (*i.e.*, local levies) are more suitable, and likely to be more efficient, than regulars for occupying the heights bordering the pass, which are so inaccessible and devoid of water that they could not be permanently held by regular troops, either British or Native, without an undue strain on our military resources ;

(*b*) that during the summer the pass itself is so hot and unhealthy that service in it would be intolerable for British, and extremely distasteful even for native soldiers ;

(*c*) that the exclusion of the Afridis from a share in the custody of the pass and the emoluments attaching thereto would create ill-feeling and incite them to predatory action ;

and also more or less because—

(*d*) a military occupation would involve an increase to the Indian army ; and

(*e*) to lock up a considerable military force in a narrow pass is not the best way of guarding against the recurrence of a frontier rising.

4. Some of these objections to holding the Khyber entirely by regular troops are so purely military that as a civilian I feel great diffidence in making any remarks upon them at all, but in frontier questions political and military considerations are so inseparably associated that it is impossible to refer to the former without touching upon the latter Perhaps, therefore, I may be permitted to say that I fully recognise the force of (*a*), (*b*), (*d*) and (*e*) ; and as regards (*a*), even if it were safe to allow local levies to hold permanent positions upon the heights which command the pass, the difficulty of water is one which it would still be probably impossible to overcome.

As for (*c*), I have already said that in my opinion the special objects to be attained by a military occupation of the Khyber would justify us in disregarding the natural dislike of the Afridis to such a measure ; but their resentment might no doubt lead to "predatory action," and, if there is any question whether such action could be adequately met by military precautions, this certainly furnishes an unanswerable argument against attempting to dispense altogether with tribal arrangements. On the whole, therefore, I am quite content to accept the conclusion that, so long as we have only the pass itself to deal with, and are debarred from taking up covering positions in the country on either side of it, a purely military occupation of the Khyber is *not* practicable.

5. The alternative methods of holding the pass are stated by Sir William Lockhart in his Memorandum to be—

(i) partly by regular and partly by irregular troops (*i.e.*, local levies) ;

(ii) by irregular troops alone ;

(iii) by tribesmen under tribal management and responsibility ;

and Sir William Lockhart thinks that the first and second of these methods can best be discussed together ; but I should prefer to group (ii) with (iii) as in point of fact constituting a single method, for we may take it as certain that, if we are to use only local levies, it must be in combination, as hitherto, with tribal arrangements, while on the other hand in clause (6) of the Khyber Agreement of 1881 the tribesmen themselves said that the maintenance of some kind of Jezailchi Corps was "absolutely necessary to enable them to render the road secure." This method, however, is the system which broke down in August last, and, if we reverted to it without special precautions, although the Afridis have since been taught a lesson which they are not likely to forget in a hurry, we should have no security against the recurrence of similar events in times of excitement on the border.

6. If it be said that this objection might be met by keeping up a permanent flying column at Peshawar of sufficient strength and complete with transport and commissariat, which would always be ready in case of necessity to support the Khyber Rifles, and to assist them in guarding the pass until the excitement had died away, I would reply that the primary object of a special force is always liable to be overlooked, as the events which led to its formation are gradually forgotten, and that in a time of stress elsewhere—the very time it must be remembered when excitement is most likely to spread to the Afridis—it would probably be utilised for other purposes. If, for instance, we had had a Khyber Flying Column in Peshawar when the rising occurred on the Malakand last July, no one, I think, will deny that in all probability it would have been despatched in that direction. While, however, I desire to point out the danger of relying upon a special force of this kind, I trust I may not be misunderstood as arguing against the creation of such a force. The maintenance of a flying column at Peshawar is in fact one of the precautions I would urge upon Government in any case, whether we are to revert to the old system *pur et simple*, or whether we are to strengthen it by a post of regular troops at Landi Kotal, as

suggested by Brigadier-General Nicholson, which remains the only other alternative for discussion. All I would say is that a flying column at Peshawar is not enough alone, and that it should be supplemented by the establishment of a military fort at the further end of the pass, which might at least cover the post of Khyber Rifles at Landi Kotal, and would be able to hold out till relieved even if the flying column were not immediately available.

7. I concur, therefore, with Sir William Lockhart in supporting General Nicholson's proposal that "a really strong work armed with guns should be constructed at Landi Kotal," while the Khyber Rifles should be maintained as a local levy to guard the road, and for ordinary escort and picquet duties with caravans, &c. When the question of the Khyber was discussed many years ago (? by the Defence Committee), I believe that the idea of guarding the pass by any mixed system of this kind was summarily dismissed, because it was thought that military principles forbade the location of troops in an advanced position if the line of communication with their base could only be held by levies. Prior, therefore, to the Conference at Calcutta on the 2nd ultimo I had put this alternative aside as out of the question, under the impression that it would never be accepted by the military authorities; and when I was asked my opinion about it at the Conference, I rejected it on this account as impracticable. But when General Nicholson propounded the present scheme, and I found that military opinion was not so opposed to it as I had imagined, the case assumed a different aspect, and I now entirely agree in the proposal for a fort at Landi Kotal as a considerable step towards the complete security of the Khyber, which would be obtained by a purely military occupation if that were practicable, while in some respects General Nicholson's solution of the difficulty is preferable as avoiding the danger of Afridi discontent, which would arise if we held the pass for ourselves and deprived the tribesmen of their allowances. At the same time I doubt whether the Afridis would consider a military fort at Landi Kotal to "dominate" the pass, *i.e.*, the twenty miles of road between Landi Kotal and Jamrud, which it is in contemplation to hold as before by posts of local levies, or whether, in other words, such a fort would effectually restrain them from attacking these posts and stopping the road as they did in August, unless its military garrison were large enough to send out a really strong column for operations in the pass itself; and, as I presume that Government would scarcely be prepared to keep up a *permanent* garrison of this size at Landi Kotal, I would insist upon the necessity for maintaining a flying column at Peshawar (which might be called the "Khyber Flying Column"), with every possible precaution to keep in memory the primary object for which it is intended, and to provide against it or its equipment being diverted to other purposes.

8. If the old system of guarding the road between Jamrud and Landi Kotal by a local levy is to be continued, it follows that tribal allowances for the pass must also be renewed, and I observe that Sir William Lockhart is disposed to hold the same view. The only question is whether they should be restored at the old rates, and at first I was inclined to think that, if the Afridis by their unprovoked outbreak compelled us to go to the expense of building a strong fort and maintaining a military garrison at Landi Kotal, it was only equitable that they should suffer some reduction in the amount they received, which, though to some extent a compensation for the tolls they used to realise on the Khyber road when they held it themselves, had originally been fixed on the understanding that they were responsible for guarding the pass without our assistance. On the other hand, though the site of the proposed fort would, as I understand, be in the limits of the Lwargi Shinwari, like the old Landi Kotal fortified serai, I cannot think that the Afridis would welcome its construction. It is more probable that they would regard it as a threat to their independence,* and, if at the same time we reduced their allowances, this would be an additional grievance which might greatly delay their settling down to the new régime. On the whole therefore I think that, if we are to restore the allowances at all, we should do so without

* But, as pointed out in my marginal note to paragraph 2 *supra*, the Afridis could not regard occupation of a fort at Landi Kotal by regular troops, as any breach of our old agreement with them so long as we paid them their old allowances under that agreement. R. UDNY.

altering them ; but it should be made a condition of their restoration that we reserve to ourselves the right of running a railway through the pass, and of taking up the necessary sites for this purpose, without paying anything for the ground required (unless culturable) or increasing the allowances.

9. As to the Khyber Rifles, it seems advisable for me to note that they are the present form of the Jezailchi Corps, which originally consisted for the most part of men provided by the Maliks under clause (6) of the 1881 Agreement and subject to their control, who were paid Rs. 7 a month if they carried matchlocks or Rs. 8 if they brought rifles. Gradually this corps became more and more "regularised," the men were supplied with Sniders, the property of Government, while they were withdrawn by degrees from the control of the Maliks, and a very material addition was made to the Government posts in their charge by the erection in 1888-89 of the fortified serai at Landi Kotal. From time to time the tribal Maliks still continued to assert their right of control, but these claims were steadily resisted by the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber, and before the Afridi rising occurred last summer this control had practically disappeared, so that the Khyber Rifles were very similar in organisation to a regiment of the Native army, though until Captain Barton was appointed in 1896 the important element of British officers was entirely wanting. Whether this was a wise policy is, I think, very questionable, as it certainly tended to obscure the real footing upon which the corps subsisted, and if, as Sir William Lockhart believes, but I venture to doubt, it inspired the men with confidence that we should support them by regular troops in case of attack by their own tribesmen, I can only say that it was a great mistake to introduce such a policy without simultaneous arrangements to ensure this support being given, which, as I have explained in my letter of the 3rd October 1897 to the Punjab Government, was judged by the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar on the occasion of the outbreak in August to be a military impossibility. For the future, however, I agree that the Khyber Rifles should be maintained under our own control on the same system as the Kurrum Militia, provided always that we have a properly equipped flying column in Peshawar ready to support them, and that we are holding the Landi Kotal end of the pass with regular troops in a fortified position. In order also, if possible, to reduce the number of Government rifles in their hands, I think a handsome increase of pay (say, Rs. 12 month instead of Rs. 9) might be offered to men who brought their own Sniders. I made a similar suggestion in the Conference at Calcutta, but I observe that, in the Notes of that Conference, I am represented by mistake to have said "buy" instead of "bring."

10. There is one passage in paragraph 3 of Sir William Lockhart's Memorandum about which I must say a word in conclusion, as I am glad to have this opportunity of clearing up a matter regarding which it would appear that a good deal of misconception exists. The passage I referred to is as follows :—"It seems possible, however, had the Khyber Rifles been promptly reinforced by regular troops in August last, that * * * , and that the formidable tribal gathering would have melted away, *as it did on a previous occasion, as soon as troops were moved up the pass in support.*" The italics in this passage are my own, and, as the words thus italicised seem to allude to the attack made upon the Khyber by Malik Amin Khan, Kuki Khel, in July 1892, I desire to point out the important features in which that attack differed from the outbreak of last August. On the first occasion Amir Khan's "lashkar," probably numbered "four or six hundred men," and did not, I believe, include even the whole clan of the Rajgal Kuki Khels, but was only a gathering of the men of that clan who belonged to Amin Kha'ns own faction. The Mullas in Tirah combined to try and persuade other Afridi clans to join, but without success, and the direct motive of the attack was Amin Khan's personal resentment at having been deprived of half his "maliki" allowance for previous misconduct. On the last occasion, on the other hand, the strength of the Afridi gathering, when it came down upon the Khyber, was estimated at ten or twelve thousand men, collected from all clans except, curiously enough, the Rajgal Kuki Khels who had supplied the "lashkar" in 1892 ; and the motive swaying this army was the irresistible wave of fanaticism which had spread throughout the tribe. On the first occasion again, Amin Khan's "lashkar" occupied a hill above

Shadi Bagiyar to the south of the entrance of the Khyber on the evening of the 4th July 1892, and during the ensuing night made attacks on the posts of Shadi Bagiyar, Jahangira and Fort Maude just inside the pass; but the gathering retired and dispersed early on the morning of the 5th July, because (it was thought) they had heard of the arrival at Jamrud of re-inforcements from Peshawar, *viz.*, 200 men of the 14th Sikhs, who reached Jamrud on the evening of the 4th July, and 100 of the Royal Scots Fusiliers with 2 field guns, who marched into Jamrud at 2 A.M. on the 5th. Not a man, however, of these reinforcements ever advanced a yard beyond Jamrud. In August last, on the other hand, the Afridi gathering attacked and took the same three forts on the 23rd of that month in spite of a British force of 1,400 infantry and a mountain battery (besides a regiment of British Cavalry and a battery of Horse Artillery), which had been sent out to Jamrud five days previously, in the hope that it might act as a demonstration to overawe the tribesmen. I will not enter into the question whether or not such a "lashkar" of the whole Afridi tribe would possibly have melted away if the troops at Jamrud (all that were considered to be available from Peshawar) had been pushed forward into the pass; but I may remark that four months later, after we had overrun Tirah and when we had no one but the Zakka Khel left to oppose us in the Khyber, one brigade at Landi Kotal was found insufficient to hold that pass and the line of communication from Jamrud, and a second brigade had to be moved up from Jamrud to Ali Masjid, as stated in paragraph 36 of Sir William Lockhart's Political despatch of the 3rd ultimo.

(Signed) R. UDNY,
Chief Political Officer,
Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Dated PESHAWAR;
The 15th March 1898.

Enclosure 6 in No. 3.

Letter from Sir William Cuningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., dated Fort William, the 25th March 1898.

I AM directed to address you with reference to the 7th paragraph of the memorandum on future arrangements for holding the Khyber Pass which you forwarded with your letter, dated the 11th March 1898. For convenience of reference the paragraph in question is here quoted in full:

"As soon as we are fully assured of the complete submission of every Afridi section, I should be disposed to renew the tribal allowances in the Khyber, subject to such re-adjustment as may seem equitable or politic—subject also to such conditions with respect to railway and road construction, and the acquisition of sites, as we may think fit to impose. When the tribesmen see that their allowances are not to be forfeited and that the Khyber Rifles are not to be disbanded, I am of opinion that they will welcome the construction of a strong post at Landi Kotal, as furnishing a tangible proof that, if they do their part to keep the pass open, we shall not fail in ours."

2. The Government of India have consulted His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on this point in advance of inviting His Honour's opinion upon the whole question of the management of the Khyber, as it is put before them by your letter above cited and by your further letter dated the 16th March, and I am to inform you that the Governor-General in Council is of opinion that, while the Khyber Rifles may be continued on a temporary footing, the whole question of the restoration of tribal allowances to the Afridis must be reserved at present, as it is inexpedient to renew payment of them until at any rate the permanent arrangements for the Khyber have been discussed and settled. It is necessary in order to arive at a decision upon this matter of the permanent arrangements, to institute enquiries which will be taken up at once.

Enclosure 7 in No. 3.

Letter from Sir William Cuningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Fort William, the 28th March, 1898.

I am directed to forward, for the favour of the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, a copy of the correspondence cited in the margin, on the subject of the future arrangements for the control of the Khyber Pass.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated the 11th March 1898.
From do., dated the 16th March 1898.
To do., dated the 25th March 1898.

2. I am further to enclose a copy of a telegram, Confidential, dated the 24th March 1898, from General Sir William Lockhart, suggesting certain reductions in the Tirah Expeditionary Force, in the probable event of a settlement with the Afridis being effected by the end of March. Conditional on the realization of Sir William Lockhart's anticipations, his proposals have been accepted; the force will be reduced to three brigades, and the distribution proposed is approved, subject to the General Officer Commanding explaining the necessity or advantage of retaining a brigade at Mamani. The further reduction of the force to one brigade will be made when practicable.

3. The Government of India have not yet received the official expression of His Honour's opinion the despatch of which is referred to in your telegram, dated the 19th March. If that has been sent before the receipt of these papers, it is possible that a perusal of them may suggest further expression of the Lieutenant-Governor's view.

4. His Honour will see that both Sir William Lockhart and Sir Richard Udny favour the plan of holding the actual pass by irregular troops or militia raised from the Afridi and other neighbouring tribes, while the western outlet is garrisoned by troops. Sir Mackworth Young's opinion already given on this question is in favour of holding the pass by tribal agreement and by a tribal force maintained on tribal responsibility. The primary difficulty, however, which has arisen is to find a Native officer to take the place long filled by Colonel Muhammad Aslam Khan. It is essential that a tribal levy in the proper sense of the term should not be commanded by a British officer, and the fact that Captain Barton was in command of the Khyber Rifles last year has done much to complicate the questions involved. The Governor-General in Council is of opinion that, where it is thought expedient to introduce British officers, it must be recognised that the force ceases to be a mere tribal levy and becomes an irregular force or militia. The distinction is one with which His Honour is well acquainted from the case of the Kurram Militia. Whether the Khyber Rifles will be more acceptable to the Afridis as irregular troops or militia than as a mere tribal force looking for support exclusively to their own tribal headmen is a point on which there is room for difference of opinion, and cannot be settled without careful enquiry into the feeling of the tribesmen themselves. It will be noticed that Sir W. Lockhart is of opiuion (paragraph 7) that the establiishment of a military post at Landi Kotal and the consciousness that this means our supporting the Khyber Rifles themselves against hostile attack will do much to obviate opposition. Sir R. Udny does not concur in this anticipation, and I am instructed to point out that the establishment of the military post at Landi Kotal in the manner proposed by Sir W. Lockhart is itself still under consideration, and the Government of India have arrived at no conclusion in regard to it. But unless the Pass is to be held throughout by regular troops, the Khyber Rifles must be continued in some form, and I am to invite His Honour to consider whether the difficulties of a purely tribal organisation are not so serious that the time has come for the constitution of the force as a militia under British officers.

If the Afridi Rifles are to be maintained on the footing of irregular troops, the constitution of the corps as regards the proportion to be enlisted from the different clans may nevertheless be subject of tribal agreement.

5. My letter, dated the 25th March, to General Sir William Lockhart, communicates the decision of the Government of India to the effect that the Afridi tribal allowances cannot at present be restored. They cannot be settled until the plan of holding the Khyber is determined. On this must depend not only the amount to be paid, but the purposes for which payment is to be made. The enlistment in the meanwhile of tribesmen in the Khyber Rifles, under temporary conditions, which has been already permitted, puts a considerable sum of money into the hands of the tribe. The Government of India do not think there is any necessity to go further and to restore at the present time payment of any of the Afridis Maliki allowances. The Government of India had formed an intention not only to hold the allowances in reserve until the Afridis accept whatever conditions they are ready to grant, but to confiscate them, in whole or in part, until the cost of repairing the forts and posts in the Pass has been made good. This intention has not been abandoned. Even, however, if this reason did not exist, the Government of India, as a matter of expediency, would prefer not to display undue readiness to restore the allowances.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) W. J. CUNINGHAM,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 8 in No. 3.

Letter from The Hon'ble Mr. L. W. Dane, Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, the 1st April 1898.

IN continuation of my telegram dated 18th March 1898, I am directed to communicate in some detail the views of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor so far as they are formed up to date in regard to the future policy to be adopted in the Khyber.

2. It has already been decided that, pending a complete settlement with the Afridis, the Khyber Pass will continue to be occupied by our troops, and orders have also been recently issued for the re-opening of the pass to trade ; but it is understood that, as soon as we are assured of their complete submission, the Government of India are anxious to determine the details of the permanent settlement to be effected with the tribes and the manner in which the future arrangements should be carried out and our political relations with the tribes conducted.

In the first place Sir Mackworth Young would strongly deprecate the hasty acceptance of any cut-and-dried scheme for keeping open the Khyber route, however feasible or simple the proposals might at first sight sppear. The measures to be adopted must be carefully thought out and fully discussed by and with the tribes themselves, for the best guarantee for permanence in the new arrangements will be a deliberate estimate of what they are able and willing both to promise and to perform. In a matter of this kind there is the greatest danger in hurrying or patching a settlement, and His Honour thinks we should guard against doing this. Moreover, as the pass is open and it is clear that a military occupation must continue till a sufficient guarantee for the permanence of the arrangements to be made is secured, there does not appear to be any necessity for haste in the matter.

3. In view of these considerations Sir Mackworth Young cannot propound at the present moment, any matured scheme for the future maintenance of the Khyber route, but he has always considered, as intimated in paragraph 5 of Punjab Government letter, dated 21st September 1897, that the re-opening of this route must, for the present at any rate, form one of the main objects of our future policy, and, if possible, that it should be re-opened under

arrangements for which, in the first instance, the tribes themselves should be responsible. He sees no reason for supposing that there will be another break-down in the arrangements if properly worked out, and he is of opinion that the restoration of the old order will in one respect have a better effect than anything new, in that it will clearly illustrate the hopelessness of attempting to upset our arrangements. He is not in favour of any change in the conditions, which would impose the duty of maintaining the peace of the Khyber in times of disturbance on the British Government. It is better that the tribesmen should bind themselves to keep the route open and safe, only looking to us to supply the supervising agency, without which it is impossible for them, owing to their feuds, to co-operate for the common object.

The Lieutenant-Governor thinks it will be desirable that the corps to be raised for watch and ward in the pass should be officered, as far as possible, by members of the tribes responsible for the pass, though one or more British officers will certainly be required to hold command, and to organise and supervise their discipline and distribution much in the same way as British Inspecting Officers do in respect of Imperial Service Troops. At the same time the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that we should again provide (as in clause 5 of the Khyber Agreement) that we may at any time send troops into the Khyber and occupy positions there without further payment, and that, having made this provision, we should ensure that a sufficient force is always kept ready mobilised at Peshawar or Nowshera to move into the Khyber on the orders of the responsible political authorities, and that suitable positions for such a force to occupy are worked out and kept in readiness.

4. With reference to the question as to how the future settlement is to be made and who is to be primarily responsible for the conclusion of the agreement with the Afridis, the Lieutenant-Governor believes that the Government of India are in favour of retaining the political work in the Khyber for the present under the direct control of the Foreign Department, and of entrusting the reconstruction of the arrangements to the Brigadier-General in Command, assisted by a civil officer of a standing that would give weight to his advice. Sir Mackworth Young feels bound to say plainly that he does not think this plan would prove a good one. If the Khyber is again to come under the political control of the Punjab Government, His Honour thinks it is very desirable that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab should be in a position to regulate from the first and in detail the scheme which is laid before the Government of India for orders. To leave the Local Government out during the formation of proposals is to deprive the Government of India of the best experience available just at the time when it is most required. It is not the same thing to refer the proposals after they have been worked out to the Punjab Government for opinion. It may be too late then to give a turn to the proceedings. The same reasons apply against excluding the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, from the negotiations during the early stages. Sir Mackworth Young would therefore recommend that, as contemplated apparently in paragraph 4 of Foreign Department letter, dated 15th September 1897, the reconstruction of the arrangements when the tribes have made submission be made over to the Punjab Government, and that the settlement be carried out by the Commissioner for the time being of the Peshawar Division under its direction. A civil officer would also be required in the Khyber to work out the arrangements under the orders of the Commissioner. In fact, His Honour would employ the same machinery as was employed with marked success when the Khyber Agreement of 1880 was effected, and he forsees serious difficulties if the Punjab officers are called upon to work any scheme for the maintenance of the Khyber route with which they have not been closely associated from the beginning, though he can assure the Government of India of the most loyal co-operation on the part of all officers concerned in any policy which they may decide to adopt.

5. This brings His Honour to the consideration of certain proposals which have apparently been made with the object of re-assuring the tribes and making them more willing to accept any arrangement we may hereafter adopt. Sir William Lockhart proposes in the memorandum forwarded with Foreign Department endorsement, dated 3rd March 1898, that, as soon as the tribes

have assured us of their complete submission, their tribal allowances should be restored, "subject to such re-adjustment as may seem equitable or politic, and subject also to such conditions with respect to railway and road construction and the acquisition of sites as we may think fit to impose." He also favours the re-enlistment of the Khyber Rifles. As regards the latter, the Lieutenant-Governor has already intimated in my letter, dated 11th September 1897, that he considers the re-enlistment of the Khyber Rifles desirable as a means of giving the men employment and keeping them out of mischief, provided this is expressly done subject to whatever measures are ultimately found necessary in regard to the Khyber, when, if the former constitution of the corps is to be altered, the men could be given the option of leaving or re-engaging. But as regards the renewal of the allowances, Sir Mackworth Young is of opinion that it is very undesirable that we should show anxiety to restore allowances to the Afridis of the Khyber Pass before our objects regarding the pass are defined and fully secured. Such an attitude would be misinterpreted and would make the final settlement extremely difficult. We have other means of inducing the tribe to make complete submission and to set about a future settlement in a reasonable frame of mind. Though the Lieutenant-Governor trusts no further advance of our troops will be necessary, it is still open to us to re-impose the blockade if the tribe is obstructive about the pass question, and it seems neither necessary nor desirable to hold out the prospect of an immediate regrant of their old allowances as an inducement to them to comply with our wishes in this respect. Moreover, in view of the reckless infringement of their former agreement, it seems desirable that, as recommended in paragraph 5 of my letter, dated 24th September 1897, and contemplated in paragraph 11 of Government of India letter, dated 4th October 1897, to the address of Sir William Lockhart, the cost of reconstructing the buildings damaged in the outbreak should be deducted by instalments from the allowances, and this question should, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, be settled before the tribal allowances are restored. The Government of India have just called upon this Government for a report as to the value of these buildings, and the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, has been asked to supply the information, but it will necessarily take some time before the information can be furnished.

6. If the views of the Lieutenant-Governor expressed in this letter meet with the approval of the Government of India, His Honour will endeavour to have a scheme for the future maintenance of the Khyber worked out under his personal direction by the Commissioner; and will submit this for their orders at as early a date as is possible under the circumstances of the case.

Enclosure 9 in No. 3.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab and its Dependencies, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 16th April 1898.

WITH reference to the request contained in Foreign Department letter, dated 28th ultimo, that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will favour the Government of India with his opinion on the subject of the future arrangements for the control of the Khaibar Pass, I am desired, in continuation of my letter, dated 2nd instant, to forward a copy of a letter from the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 2nd instant, and a Memorandum in which Sir Mackworth Young has recorded his views on the general question of the control of the Pass, so far as he has been able to arrive at any definite conclusions on the subject.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) L. W. DANE,

Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Annex I.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Peshawar, 2nd April 1898.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your endorsement, dated the 18th instant, enclosing for remarks a copy of correspondence on the subject of future arrangements in the Khaibar.

2. So far as I am able to judge there appear to be three distinct systems for consideration, and no more than three, and I will deal with each in succession.

The first plan would be to ourselves accept the whole responsibility for the administration as well as for the safety of the Pass, and to take it entirely out of the hands of the Afridis. This is annexation. Declared or virtual annexation will not matter; the tribes concerned will perfectly understand the drift of the measure. If we annex, whether expressly or by implication, the special consideration, *viz.*, tribal responsibility for the safety of the Khaibar, in return for which we have been paying a part of the late handsome allowances to the Khaibar clans (the other part represents the tolls), disappears, and with it must go the allowances; unless indeed we consented to continue to pay what will then be naked blackmail; such a course would, however, be out of the question. Under these circumstances it is only too probable that we shall be compelled to hold the road with a strong military garrison, and that sooner or later we shall come again into collision with the Afridis. They look upon the Khaibar as their country, which it is, and upon the levy of tolls as their ancient and indefeasible right. It is unlikely that they will surrender either without a further determined struggle.

I have not a copy of the Secretary of State's despatch of the 28th January with me, but I think I am not mistaken in believing that anything like annexation will be directly opposed to the policy therein indicated.

3. At the other end of the scale of systems is the plan of falling back upon tribal responsibility and tribal methods entirely, and of relaxing even that amount of British supervision which there has been in the Khaibar arrangements from 1881 to 1897. This plan will assuredly fail. It postulates a power of combination, of self-government, and of self-restraint which is utterly wanting among the Afridis. Such a power exists among some other clans and tribes, but (and this is a most important factor in border management) no two tribes are alike in individual character, and it does not follow that because one tribe can do a thing or bear a particular treatment the same will be the case with its neighbour or with another tribe further off. For instance, during all the time that the Khaibar has been shut, from the days of the Emperor Akbar down to 1878–79, the Mohmands were able to keep open the routes through their territory, and to make a large income from the tolls that they imposed; but the Afridis, though anxious enough to secure the tolls, were incapable of uniting for the purpose of keeping the Khaibar open and safe, and consequently it remained closed for centuries. The Afridis have not changed their character, their unreflecting cupidity and their reckless greed; the intestine feuds and jealousies among them are as virulent as ever; cohesion is entirely wanting; and if purely tribal management ever does get a start, it will break down in six months. That is a just deduction from the history of centuries.

4. Neither of the above systems being possible, it seems to me that a partnership of Government and of the Afridis; a mixture of tribal management with such a quantity of outside authority as will be sufficient, and not more than sufficient, to correct the inherent weakness of a tribal system, is the course plainly marked out to us, by the conditions of the case, as the only prudent and economical line to take. There are two phases in this partnership, which completes the list of the three systems. The two phases are: one with troops permanently stationed somewhere in the Khaibar, preferably at Landi Kotal,

and the other without troops quartered in the Pass, but held ready in the background at Peshawar, always prepared to be slipped upon the Afridis. In one case the corrective authority, requisite for the purpose of steadying the tribal machinery, is, or is supposed to be, on the spot; in the other case it exists also, but is kept in reserve.

5. Before discussing the two classes of the system of joint management of the Khaibar, I would point out that first a local corps to work details which cannot admittedly so well be undertaken by any one else, and secondly the grant of allowances, are of the essence of the partnership. Unless the tribes receive allowances they cannot well be asked to assume responsibility for the road. Both these matters, the local corps and their allowances, I will discuss below; it is enough here to say that they are I think indispensable adjuncts to any system of joint management.

6. Reverting now to the question of partnership, I propose to consider it on purely political and administrative grounds, leaving aside military considertions on which I am not competent to submit an opinion except in so far as they are based upon matters which are within the scope of judgment of Civil Officers or of any man with ordinary common sense.

The *crux* of the whole position is this: Shall troops be permanently stationed at Landi Kotal or not? If they are so stationed, then with every intention and the most honest desire to maintain the political independence of the Khaibar (as distinguished from its municipal independence), it is quite certain that this political independence will shortly disappear, and subsequently also (more or less as the case may be) the municipal independence of the Khaibar. I do not mean the independence of Tirah, or of the Bara Valley, but of the Khaibar proper. That is the perfectly inevitable sequence of events trans-frontier, for wherever we plant power, in the shape of British bayonets, across the border among the tribes, one of two things must happen,—either we must withdraw that power or, it must be supreme and must increase and widen as it remains. In connection with this most important consideration I venture to quote an extract from a note which I wrote for Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in 1896: "It is quite impossible for ourselves or for the tribes to divest British officers of their attributes as the officers of an all-powerful State. All their acts and all their utterances have at their back this power. Unless this power is to be flaunted, what its agents wish and desire must be done; however platonic that wish or desire may be, once that it is expressed, it becomes a clear or veiled command, because it emanates from the source of authority; if it is disregarded then that authority is condemned. A British officer cannot among the tribes act as *amicus curiæ*, being in truth the *curia* himself." The presence or absence of troops at Landi Kotal will have a most profound effect upon the political situation in the Khaibar hereafter, for with the best will in the world, if there are troops permanently in the country, the situation will from the first day radically differ from what it will be if there are no troop in the Pass; and whatever we may say or wish the facts will be too strong for us, and we shall drift into a position which will, all but in name, be annexation with its attendant difficulties. Take a concrete case: supposing two hostile sub-sections are fighting between Ali Masjid and Landi Kotal; if there are no troops at Landi Kotal it does not matter to us what the belligerents do; it is easy to arrange that on the days the Pass is open they abstain from interference with the road and caravans on it, and for the rest they can do what they like for all we care. But if there are troops at Landi Kotal it is intolerable that there should be fighting and the risk of interruption on our line of communications; we must forbid it. If we prohibit an appeal to arms, if we intervene as the supreme authority, it follows that the parties must, when they are not allowed to fight it out, appeal to us to settle their quarrel. We cannot refuse to interfere; if you deprive the people of one tribunal, viz., that of arms, you must substitute another; and we shall find ourselves called upon to undertake the administration of justice. Between that, between administering justice and virtual annexation, the distinction is fine, it is a hair's breadth. This is the difficulty that confronts us everywhere across the border—in Chitral, in Swat, in Waziristan. If we put the magnet among the iron filings, how are we to prevent the

filings from crowding to it? We cannot possibly canton troops beyond the border without sooner or later having to assume the civil administration of the country around them. Whenever we go over the border in force we must I think be prepared to assume an authoritative position; it must, by the nature of things, be authoritative; if not, it will be thrust upon us, not without the penalty which we must always pay for the neglect or disregard of natural laws.

7. Apart from military considerations, the question therefore is this: is this authoritative position necessary and expedient in the Khaibar or not? I venture to consider that it is neither necessary nor expedient. It is not necessary, for the system on which the Khaibar was managed for 17 years without such a position worked admirably, as has been repeatedly and publicly acknowledged in every possible quarter. It broke down, but under circumstances which would have smashed any plan except that of holding the Pass with troops. The authoritative position is not expedient because we have to adopt an arrangement which shall enlist the Afridis on our side and shall induce them to remain willingly in the partnership. That being so, anything that is likely to lead to virtual annexation is certain sooner or later to meet with the opposition of the Afridis and to terminate in a rupture of the partnership. An authoritative position in the Khaibar will assuredly lead to complications, for some day or other it will be resisted and then at all costs it must be asserted. And where are its limits to be drawn? It may be argued that the presence of troops at Landi Kotal does not at all mean the assumption of this authoritative position, but I venture to repeat that it does; that we cannot go there and then decline to be bound by the conditions of the case. Events will be too strong for us.

8. If we are to enter into partnership with the Afridis at all, any basis of the partnership which must end in the eventual absorption of the weaker partner will lead to the violent disruption of the bond. There are no two ways in the matter, for the Afridis will not consent to a peaceful absorption. That is their nature, we cannot change it, and we must reckon with it in our calculations. I therefore strongly recommend the second phase of the partnership, *viz.*, management of the Pass without a permanent garrison of regular troops at Landi Kotal. For 17 years a system without troops in the Khaibar worked admirably as I have said. It broke down under unusual stress, but the ship has not been built that will weather every storm. For 17 years the Khaibar road was as safe as any highway in India; for 17 years the Afridis were amenable to our wishes and we were at peace with them. It is not to be supposed that the tremendous punishment they have just received will be without lasting effect, or, if they are not touched in what they prize perhaps more highly than anything on earth, their independence, that they will not be content to remain good friends with us, and to co-operate with us in the task of keeping open the Khaibar. They were content to do so from 1881 to 1897 without any previous punishment to speak of, without our power having been brought home to their very doors, and it is not likely that the case will be different now. If a storm were again to rage such as has recently swept along the frontier, then not even the proposed military garrison at Landi Kotal will avail, for a far stronger garrison on the Malakand did not avail, to keep the country quiet; and if so, because the presence of troops in the Khaibar will assuredly lead to a virtual annexation and to consequent complications, therefore, I say, better avoid these and have no troops which will be there only for the one eventuality when, troops or no troops, we shall have to fight it out.

I consider that all that is wanted for political and trade purposes can be attained by the employment of a local force, coupled with tribal allowances, and without a military garrison at Landi Kotal, provided that this local force is backed up by the presence at Peshawar of a moveable column ever fully equipped to go out at the shortest notice, and provided that the local force and that the Afridis know this.

These provisos are absolutely essential.

With these conditions maintained, it is possible to guarantee, as much as one can guarantee anything, that the Khaibar will not again be disturbed, to any appreciable extent.

9. Whether on grounds of Imperial policy it is necessary to have troops in the Pass it is not for me to say. But I venture to urge that, if it is decided to keep troops in the Khaibar, we be very careful of what we say now, or, since in the course of years the position of the major and of the minor partner in the Khaibar arrangements will have, perhaps imperceptibly but none the less inevitably, altered, an agreement now made may not faithfully reflect the changed conditions of the time, and this will give a handle five or ten years hence to agitators. Nor with Afridis will it be possible to modify agreements from time to time, except at the risk of misunderstandings and a rupture. A definition of the relations of the partners was made in the agreement of 1881. That agreement is abrogated by the recent hostilities, and we ought I think to take advantage of this fact in order to make a fresh start. The Afridis will no doubt clamour for some kind of writing, for without a tangible deed of partnership they will feel themselves insecure in the Khaibar business with so powerful a partner as Government. As His Honour is aware, these men are great lawyers, and sea lawyers to boot, and whatever we record now ought, if troops remain in the Pass, to be very carefully framed so as to be in accord not only with the present situation, but also with the situation as it will have developed in the future out of the beginning that is now made.

10. Assuming that troops are to be permanently stationed at Landi Kotal for military reasons (although with deference I would note that the absence of an advanced post at Landi Kotal, capable of ready expansion into an advanced military depôt, did not apparently hamper our advance in November 1878), on general grounds I would strongly suggest a larger garrison than one native regiment with a detachment of gunners. The chances of attack by Afghan troops are very remote. But where troops are permanently located a bazar and habitations invariably spring up; as the recent disturbances fade with the past and a sense of security revives, houses will be built, works undertaken, and gradually a position will be created which will become exceedingly embarrasing when danger threatens. And danger is much less likely to threaten if the visible force on the spot is strong enough to move out instantly on the offensive. Nothing encourages these clansmen more than the sight of troops cooped up in a fort and beseiged. Weak outposts unable to hit out mean frontier risings. I am therefore greatly in favour, if an advanced post at Landi Kotal has to be held at all, to hold it in considerable strength. For these reasons I recommend that, if the water-supply permits, a British Regiment, two Native Regiments and a Mountain Battery be placed at Landi Kotal, if troops are to be stationed there. The climate, moreover, is healthy there, although Ali Masjid is a fever hole, and a force at Landi Kotal may enable us to reduce the garrison of Peshawar.

11. But if, as I consider, it is neither necessary nor expedient to retain a permanent military garrison at Landi Kotal, and if it is best to rely upon a moveable column at Peshawar which will give the requisite stiffening to the Khaibar management, and will not commit us eventually to a virtual annexation of the Khaibar and to the risk of complications and collisions of the Afridis, in that case I recommend for consideration the suggestion to keep, all the year round, a brigade of troops and a Mountain Battery at Cherat. No better site can be found for climate, for opportunities to exercise the troops in hill work, and for proximity to the Khaibar.

12. Whatever system we take, short of annexation or purely tribal management, a local force is required, which I venture entirely to agree should be on the lines of the Kurram Militia, raised, paid, equipped, controlled and commanded completely by Government, but with this concession that, subject to the conditions of loyalty, good discipline, sufficiency of recruits and the pleasure of Government, a fixed proportion of the force (say $\frac{3}{4}$ or $\frac{4}{5}$) shall consist of Khaibar Afridis drawn from the six clans, in numbers to be determined hereafter. This is practically the system of the Kurram Militia, where we have as nearly as possible a fixed number of Turis in the Corps, with their complement of native

officers, enlisted from both factions of the Turis, the Drewandis and the Mian Murids. Owing to the existence of these factions we have not yet been able to appoint a Turi to be a Subedar-Major, but this will come in time. With Afridis most probably a good Subedar-Major could be found as Afridi society is not split into two great camps like the Turis. The Khaibar Militia ought, I think, to have a British Commandant and a British Adjutant. I would not recommend the revival of the *de jure* tribal, *de facto* Government, Corps which began in 1881 as Jezailchis and ended in 1897 as Khaibar Rifles.

13. Coming now to the question of tribal allowances, I have, after much thought, arrived at the conclusion that on the whole it will be best to restore them *en bloc*. To begin, a considerable part of them represents the tolls of which the Afridis in 1881 surrendered the collection to us. No doubt, as an act of State and by way of punishment, we could appropriate the tolls. But compliance with the terms imposed upon the Afridis is intended to wipe out their guilt; they look upon the tolls as their private property; and the appropriation of the tolls would to them be an additional punishment for their past misconduct and be in their eyes tantamount to the annexation of the Khaibar. Of course we can say: "Without us there would be no tolls at all; you Afridis would never be able to levy them,"—to which the retort would naturally be that without Afridi co-operation we should find it an uncommonly expensive business to keep the Khaibar open and collect the tolls.

With respect to that portion of the allowances which represents the tribal subsidies, apart from the tolls, we shall have and shall enforce tribal responsibility, and shall get our *quid pro quo*. If any permanent reduction is made in the allowances, then it should be made rateably all round, and favour shown, or any difference made will probably lead to infinite trouble. But, on the whole, I think it will be best to restore things to their former footing; no particular principle is involved in reduction; we are precluded from adopting the reduction as a punishment; and a reversion to the old order of things in the matter of allowances will go far towards reassuring the Afridis that we mean bygones to be bygones, and that we have no ulterior designs. But I recommend that one condition to the grant of the allowances be that we may, within defined limits, make and keep in repair roads or railways as we please, and that the allowances are not to be increased on account of these roads or railways.

14. To sum up my suggestions: annexation or purely tribal management seem to be out of the case; a mixed system appears to be the only feasible course; whether we have troops at Landi Kotal or not, a local force like the Kurram Militia and the grant of allowances are essential conditions.

We ought, I think, to be most careful to what agreement or agreements we commit ourselves.

Lastly, I am bound to represent that we are much less likely to be entangled in complications if there are no troops at Landi Kotal. The point, therefore, is whether the military considerations outweigh the risk of complications and the certainty, if Landi Kotal has a permanent military garrison, of the absorption of the Khaibar with its attendant consequences. Since this absorption would be opposed to the policy of the Secretary of State's despatch and liable to lead to trouble, and since we get what we want, without risk, by means of a force held in reserve at Peshawar, I recommend a management of the Khaibar without troops in the pass.

Annex II.

Extract from Memorandum, dated 11th April, by Sir Mackworth Young on the subject of the re-opening of the Khaibar.

General Sir W. Lockhart and Sir R. Udny are in favour of an advanced military post at Landi Kotal, the pass being guarded by tribal levies. Mr. Merk, who has not seen their opinions, but to whom I sent confidentially a copy

of General Nicholson's memorandum of 3rd February 1898, with which Sir W. Lockhart's recommendations are in accord, is against any military occupation of the pass, which he thinks should be held by a tribal militia backed up by the presence of a moveable column at Peshawar.

I have already on more than one occasion expressed my opinion against a military occupation of the pass, but I have now to reconsider the subject in the light of the weighty opinions which are now before me.

It seems reasonable that after having quelled the disturbances raised almost simultaneously by nearly every frontier tribe on the Peshawar and Kohat borders from the Indus to the Kurram we should strengthen our position by occupying any military vantage ground in the tribal territory overrun by our troops, which is desirable for Imperial defence, or for pacification of the tribes. But the immediate cause for occupation will soon be forgotten, and in judging of its effect we should look forward some years and endeavour to gauge the ultimate position.

Now I have no hesitation in saying that the permanent occupation of Landi Kotal by a military force will never be accepted by the Afridis with complacency. It is true, as pointed out by Sir R. Udny, that in the agreement of 1881 there was a clause (5) which ran as follows: "It lies with the discretion of Government to retain its troops within the pass or to withdraw them and re-occupy at pleasure." But this must be read with the following passage from the Foreign Department letter dated 31st August 1880: "It may be explained to the tribes that, although our troops will remain for the present at their stations in the pass, they will in all probability be soon withdrawn; and it may also be of advantage to intimate that the British Government has no desire to station troops in the Khaibar so long as the pass is kept open under the independent and exclusive charge of the tribes, and so long as it is managed in accordance with the agreements that may be made with the British Government." This interpretation of the intentions of Government shows that what was reserved was the right to re-occupy the pass with troops for the purpose of restoring order and enforcing the agreement, and also no doubt for an advance to Kabul if necessary; but the tribes distinctly understood that the terms of the agreement involved no permanent military occupation, and notwithstanding that they appear to have been desirous of some assistance in formulating their scheme of watch and ward for the pass (see paragraphs 7 and 8 of Major Conolly's letter, dated 23rd September 1880) there is nothing to show that they contemplated asking for a permanent garrison of British troops. On the contrary, I believe that they were then, as I feel sure they would be now, totally averse to such a garrison. It may be urged that, as Landi Kotal belongs to the Luargi Shinwaris and does not lie within Afridi territory, what reason can the Afridis have for objection to a military force being stationed at that point? To this I would reply that the occupation of Landi Kotal to a great extent dominates the pass and is a standing menace to the integrity of the Afridi territory, and that I believe that the tribe would object as strongly to a military occupation of that point as they would to the location of a force at Ali Masjid or any other similar place within their own limits. They regard the pass as their property. Occupation to them would mean annexation, and with reference to the remarks contained in paragraph 6 of Mr. Merk's letter to which I draw special attention, I doubt if it could result in anything else. It would constitute, as I said in paragraph 5 of this office letter, dated 21st September 1897, a continuing disgrace which might at any future time supply the motive for hostilities. Sir W. Lockhart assumes that whereas the quartering of a strong force in the Bazar Valley would give rise to tribal ill-feeling, the occupation of Landi Kotal would not have this effect. In this I cannot agree. The tribal honour would be seriously affected and a deep-seated resentment would be engendered instead of the friendly attitude which Sir W. Lockhart considers of much greater moment than the absolute safety of the pass.

In support of this view I might appeal to numerous documents in the literature of the frontier from 1876 down to the present time. There can be no doubt whatever that the tribes have the strongest objection to any extension of British authority over their territory. The advances which we have made

during recent years, coupled with the demarcation of a sphere of influence which to the tribal mind means ultimate annexation, must be placed in the forefront of the causes which have contributed to the rising of 1897. This opinion I have arrived at after full consideration, and I may have to enlarge upon it in another connection. My immediate predecessor, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, alluded, in paragraph 46 of his Confidential Memorandum of the 26th October 1896, to the effect on the Orakzais and Afridis of our taking up a position on the Samana, It is significant that in the somewhat insolent communication made by the Afridis just before they pillaged the Khaibar they referred to the occupation of Samana and the Malakand, though both outside their territory, as an offence against the amicable relation of the British Government with the tribes. In their petition to the Amir, which was reported on in this office (letter dated 20th January 1898), the Afridis dropped this grievance, but this was no doubt because it pertained more to the Orakzais than to themselves. The Orakzais referred to the occupation of the Samana in their petition. If the occupation of the Samana and the Malakand was an offence to the Afridis, it will readily be believed that the occupation of Landi Kotal will be bitterly resented by them.

Similarly, I may appeal to previous communications from the Punjab Government in support of the view that an advanced post on the borders of the Amir's territory will greatly irritate and annoy His Highness. It was said in the letter of the Foreign Department, dated 14th August 1896, that the definition in 1893 by the Durand Convention of the boundary of the spheres of influence of the Government of India and the Amir had removed the danger of rousing the jealousy of the Amir of Afghanistan. But I think it must be admitted that recent events have shown that the Amir's jealousy is not removed.

Thirdly, the effect of an advance in the Khaibar on other tribes must not be lost sight of. The demarcation of the spheres of British and Afghan influence has without doubt led to an impression that it is our object ultimately to secure complete control of the trans-border territory up to the Durand line, and this impression will be strengthened by the occupation of Landi Kotal.

I do not say that all this should not be faced in order to secure a substantial advantage, but it is my duty to represent the political drawbacks to the present proposal. And what is of primary importance is this, that the advance, which would possibly not be met by any overt opposition at the outset, would nevertheless constitute a grievance which would be nursed till the season of opportunity. If it is important that we should have the tribes friendly when we may have to march into Kabul, then we should avoid if possible doing that which will inevitably set them all against us.

Of the military aspect of the question I am not competent to speak. But I would venture to make the following remarks. If Sir R. Udny is right in thinking that the idea of guarding the pass by a mixed system, partly military and partly tribal, was rejected by the Defence Committee, no doubt the causes for such rejection will be examined before the proposal is revived. I incline to Mr. Merk's view that a single regiment stationed at Landi Kotal would be a source of anxiety, not of strength, and that a larger force would have to be maintained. Landi Kotal would not I believe be of much use as a base of operations in case of an advance in force to Kabul; their is neither room nor water for a large force. With the tribes friendly we should have no difficulty in pushing troops through the Khaibar, at any time. If they are unfriendly, we should have to move up in overwhelming force, and I question if a fortified post at Landi Kotal on the line of advance will contribute much to our operations. In times of peace we should have a force locked up, 19 miles from Jamrud, in a place where service would be unpalatable to our troops. The expense which will be incurred apart from the 9½ lakhs for buildings would be very considerable, especially if a whole brigade were retained there. Whether any military advantage would be secured by occupying the post with troops appears to me very doubtful, unless a satisfactory reply can be given to the above remarks.

Further, I question whether the proposal harmonizes with the policy of the Secretary of State as enunciated in his Despatch No. 1, dated 28th January

1898. One of the leading principles given in paragraph 18 of that despatch is the following : "The extent and difficulty of this mountainous border render it expedient that posts and cantonments should be limited to those positions only which are indispensable to the policy just indicated." The paragraph goes on to deprecate any new responsibilities not absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the British Indian border. The limitation of our interference with the tribes so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory is also enjoined. The military occupation of Landi Kotal means practically the annexation of the whole of the Khaibar Pass with all the administrative responsibilities attaching thereto. I need not enlarge upon this question. I feel that the proposal can hardly be brought within the four corners of the Secretary of State's Despatch, paragraphs 18 and 21, unless for military reasons it is indispensable.

Whether the presence of a military force in the Khaibar is necessary in order to give stability to tribal arrangements is a question which I submit should not be judged by the fact that when in August last it was decided not to send a force up the pass to relieve the Khaibar Rifles the latter only afforded a slight resistance to the tribal *lashkar*. I do not see that anything else could be expected, especially when the European officer in command was withdrawn. I agree with Sir W. Lockhart in laying stress on the fact that the corps without its commandant made some stand, and I should conclude from this that it would be quite possible to make more of their agency in the future by affording them the necessary support. If, however, the experiment is repeated, it must be done on a definite plan, and the true character of the arrangement must not be lost sight of. Moreover, I think that it will be necessary for some little time to keep a military force in the Khaibar until the tribal arrangements are fairly started.

As to what those arrangements should be, the choice lies, if it is decided to abandon the idea of a military occupation, between tribal levies constituted and maintained on the basis of the old agreement and a militia recruited from the tribes and commanded by British officers. I should prefer not to give a final opinion at this stage between these two alternatives. Under sufficient safeguards I should be willing to accept either, and should wish to know what the tribes themselves propose, how effect could be given to their wishes, and what prospect there was of such an arrangement being permanent and satisfactory, before deciding to insist on an arrangement according to our own ideas of what is best. The corps should I think in any case be recruited, as before, mainly from the tribes which own the pass, and the Native officers might usually be similarly selected. If the force consisted of tribal levies as distinguished from a militia, some special agreement would be required as regards the position of the British officers attached to it, for I do not think it would be possible to do without British officers for the reasons given by Mr. Merk in paragraph 3 of his letter. Upon the whole I am inclined to prefer the idea of a militia commanded by European officers, but I would direct the General Officer Commanding and Political Officer to report on this subject after discussing the question with the tribal jirgas, and would await their report before finally deciding. It is above all things desirable that we should carry the tribes with us in any arrangement that is to be made.

If a corps for safeguarding the Khaibar is established on either basis as above sketched, I have no doubt that for some time at all events it will be necessary to hold troops in reserve at Peshawar or Cherat ready to support it, or even possibly to overawe it before it has acquired a status and proved satisfactory. I believe myself that the Afridis will avoid hostilities for at all events a generation, but this cannot be reckoned upon. A force should be kept ready mobilised for some time to come, and Mr. Merk's suggestion that such a force should be stationed at Cherat in preference to Peshawar deserves consideration. The elevation is 4,500 feet and the climate is good ; the conditions are similar to those under which the force would operate, if called upon to do so, in the hills. It is 23 miles by cart road and 19 by bridle road from the Pabbi Railway Station, and the troops could be in the Khaibar at two days' notice. There is a good and permanent water-supply at Chapri about 800 feet below the ridge, and the water could easily be pumped up into a service reservoir on the ridge.

In regard to the details of any agreement which may now be made with the tribes, the correspondence which preceded the agreement of 1881 and that agreement itself will doubtless be consulted. The position is different in this respect that we now have to deal with a tribe which has just felt the weight of our hand and submitted to our demands. With those who minimize the result of our recent operations I am unable to agree. I consider that the compliance with our demand, especially in the matter of surrendering breech-loaders, shows conclusively how hard pressed the different sections have been. But for their internal feuds and the difficulty they have in combining for any purpose except fanatical warfare, they would have satisfied our demands at a much earlier date. The lesson they have had will I believe last them for some time, and if they are properly managed they will enter into fresh negotiations with the British Government and be prepared to act up to their engagements at least as readily as in 1881. I would not agree to abandon a single provision of the agreement of that year which can in any way be serviceable. I would make such further demands founded upon our recent experience as may be deemed necessary for maintaining the new arrangements, but I do not think these need include the permanent occupation of Landi Kotal with troops, and I should expect that an arrangement founded on the consent of the tribes, without such occupation, would, if duly safeguarded and carefully worked out, prove efficient and lasting. Mr. A. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., who has been appointed by the Government of India to advise the General Officer Commanding in his negotiations, has complete knowledge of the Khaibar Afridis and was associated in the previous negotiations of 1881, and, subject to such general instructions as the Government of India may issue, is quite capable of working out the details of a satisfactory scheme.

I would suggest that when the allowances to the Khaibar Afridis are regranted, a condition should be attached to their renewal, *viz.*, that in the event of the British Government making arrangements for opening any other route to Kabul they shall be subject to reconsideration. This would be in addition to the condition already agreed to by the Government of India that the allowances shall be liable to deductions on account of repairs to the forts and posts damaged in the recent outbreak. If the further condition I have now suggested is adopted, it might be well at the same time to give the Afridis the opportunity of engaging that they will improve the road or agree to the opening of a railway, should Government desire this at any time through the Khaibar. It will be to their interest to do so, if they can thereby postpone the opening of an alternative route and the consequent reduction of their allowances.

Enclosure 10 in No. 3.

Letter from Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I., Commissioner, Peshawar Division, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Peshawar, the 20th April, 1898.

1. Sir W. Lockhart was good enough to give me a copy of his letter with which he forwarded my Khyber Memorandum to you on the 16th March. The only point on which I should like to say another word is his remark "Thirdly" with reference to my paragraph 9. The advantage of the system I suggested is, as I said, that it would tend to reduce the number of Government Sniders in possession of the Khyber Rifles, and therefore the number of breech-loaders that would be liable to fall into the hands of the Afridis in the case of another outbreak like that of August last, for, as I have explained in my memorandum, I do not believe that a fort with a military garrison at Landi Kotal could be relied upon to effectually prevent such an outbreak, unless the garrison were large enough to move out a force for the defence of the whole line of the pass, though I quite admit that, after the lesson the Afridis have now received, it would be very difficult for the Mullas to induce them to break out again.

2. My suggestion, it will be seen, does not include any proposal for *taking away* Sniders from the Afridis, and, if the offer of higher pay to men who, when they enlisted in the Khyber Rifles brought their own Sniders with them, had any practical effect as "a premium on the theft of breech-loading rifles or their component parts from our troops or arsenals," our troops and arsenals must indeed be in a perilous state! If this argument has any force at all against my proposal, surely it applies with ten-fold force to our present demands upon the Afridis and Orakzais for the *surrender* of breech-loaders, and in fact to any attempt to disarm a trans-border tribe. Moreover, it must be remembered that our troops are armed either with the Lee-Metfords or Henry-Martinis. If, therefore, my proposal had the effect supposed, the Sniders that Afridis sought to obtain for the purpose of receiving higher pay with the Khyber Rifles would have to be acquired either from the Border Military Police (who, I am glad to say, scarcely ever lose a rifle) or from private sources Cis-Indus, which it should be easy to guard, as the ordinary Police, both Trans and Cis-Indus, have only *short* smooth-bore Sniders which would not be accepted for the Khyber Rifles. As for Sir William Lockhart's view that "the Khyber Rifles should be as well armed as our Native Infantry Regiments," which means, I presume, that they should be given Henry-Martinis, I can only say that to my mind such a policy would be simply suicidal. The Khyber Rifles have always performed their escort and picquet duties with caravans, &c., quite satisfactorily, no cause has ever been shown why they should require more perfect arms than Sniders for such duties which are their only legitimate ones, and at present I cannot conceive any possible reason why they should be given better weapons at the risk of these weapons falling on some future occasion into the hands of their fellow-tribesmen. If the Afridis have had their lesson, surely we have had ours too!

3. As regards the expression "military impossibility," to which Sir W. Lockhart takes exception in his first remark on my paragraph 9, perhaps the phrase was a little too strong; but at the same time I referred to my letter No. 3028 of the 3rd October, and I used it as practically summing up in two words what I had explained in full detail in that letter.

I am at a loss to understand what grounds Sir William Lockhart (who was in Europe at the time) has for asserting (*vide* his remarks on my paragraph 10) that the attitude of the Afridis when they attacked the Khyber last August "was at first vacillating and half-hearted." As I myself was on the spot at Peshawar and in receipt of the best information available, I think I am justified in asserting most emphatically that it was neither one nor the other. Again, no one ever doubted the "*desirability* of reinforcing the Khyber and supporting the Khyber Rifles with regular troops" (*vide* Sir W. Lockhart's first remark on my paragraph 9). The point is that, in the opinion of the military authorities, a sufficient force for this purpose was not available in Peshawar.

Enclosure 11 in No. 3.

Letter from Major-General W. P. Symons, C.B., Commanding the Khyber Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. Dated Camp Landi Kotal, the 29th April, 1898.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you a note by Mr. F. D. Cunningham, Chief Political Officer, Khyber Force, on the present state of our demands against the Afridis, and a suggestion for their settlement.

2. In all that Mr. Cunningham has written I thoroughly concur. He has stated the position, so far as I know it, clearly and exactly.

I also agree with his proposals for a final settlement.

3. I have made and signed one or two remarks in the margin of the note.

4. There is one other point which I think it well to mention.

On page 2 of his note Mr. Cunningham writes that "the other clans deposited 78 (rifles) on their (Zakka Khel) account, to be redeemed as they could get others out of that section."

All these 78 rifles are good and serviceable weapons. My latest information from Mr. D. Donald at Jamrud is that only 11 rifles out of 51 so far brought in to redeem deposited rifles have been passed by an Armourer Sergeant as serviceable arms.

The remaining 40, some of which I saw, have been returned to the tribesmen as unserviceable weapons, and therefore unacceptable.

I have given strict orders that none but really serviceable arms are to be accepted in place of those pledged.

I think that we shall get all these rifles from the Zakka Khel in time. Mr. Cunningham and I consider it undesirable to fix any near date just now as the latest for the redemption of deposited rifles, but to leave it to the tribes to get the rifles out of the Zakkas when they can.

In the meantime we have good rifles in our possession.

5. I am sending to-day a copy of Mr. Cunningham's note, and of this letter, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government.

NOTE ON THE PRESENT STATE OF OUR DEMANDS AGAINST THE AFRIDIS, AND SUGGESTION FOR THEIR SETTLEMENT.

The object of this note is to show—

(i) the present state of our account with the Afridis based on the demands made in the Proclamation dated 21st November, 1897;

(ii) in respect of unfulfilled demands, what we are likely to realize without a renewal of war;

(iii) the present attitude of the clans;

and to suggest

(iv) what in my opinion seem the best means of settling outstanding claims.

Up to the date of General Sir W. Lockhart's final report, No. 113 P. of 5th April 1898, the terms complied with were :—

I.—Payment of a fine of Rs. 47,800.

II.—Surrender of 765 rifles.

The fine in money and arms originally notified was Rs. 50,000 and 800 rifles, but Rs. 2,200 and 35 rifles set down as the share of a section of the Kuki Khel were remitted and the amount realised was as stated above.

Further, at the date mentioned, a small balance was outstanding against the Aka Khel, viz., Rs. 1,011* and 11 rifles, of which up to 25th April they have paid in Rs. 550† and 5 rifles. There is some hope of the balance being given in ere long.

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* The figure 900 given in General Officer Commanding's letter to Foreign Department, dated 5th April, needs correction.

A mistake was made in converting Kabuli to British rupees: this was corrected by Mr. Hastings after the date of that letter, and the sum Rs. 1,011 is admitted by the Aka Khel.

† Two rifles taken at this value—

	Rs.
Martini	350
Snider	200

2. These two terms have been practically fulfilled, but we must not assume that compliance to this extent denotes such complete submission as will ensure early or even deferred fulfilment of the remaining conditions, and it must be remembered that, since the breaking up of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, the imminent threat of renewed invasion is no longer present to induce further obedience.

Terms fulfilled.

The fine has been paid, but in such a way that only part, and probably the smaller part, has been actually collected from the clansmen at large. The Zakka Khel, the most turbulent and troublesome clan, paid nothing; their share, Rs. 9,600, had to be recovered from the sale-proceeds of confiscated property belonging to two individual Maliks in British territory.*

A large sum, generally believed to be Rs. 4,000, portion of the share of the Kambar Khel, was paid by Rahim Shah, Kaka Khel, a man unconnected with the Afridis.

Then when, in spite of the repeated threat of a second advance into Tirah, a large balance remained to be collected, at the last moment as it were, some Afridi Native officers, servants of Government, paid in what was wanted partly from their own pockets and partly by borrowing (Rs. 15,000) from a Hindu Treasurer.† Though the fine was thus completed, the matter is not yet settled, even so far as we are concerned, for to procure this payment the authorities had to give written undertakings, which bind us hereafter to arrest any Afridis whom the guarantors may point out as defaulters.

If or when the tribes learn that these individual Native officers have received the rewards for which they have been recommended, aggregating Rs. 5,000, it is not improbable the clansmen will to that extent refuse to recoup them, and we may be left to aid them in recovering what they advanced by arrest and detention of individuals, which will keep alive a certain amount of friction on the Peshawar border.

As to the rifles surrendered only half their share was got out of the Zakka Khel, the other clans deposited 78 on their account to be redeemed as they could get others out of that section.

Similarly Maliks of the other clans deposited their own private family arms to complete the tale due from the men of their sections, to be redeemed as they collect others.

I did not know this. I will enquire and get particulars.
W. P. SYMONS, *Major-Genl.*

The process of redemption goes on slowly and keeps up a certain friction inside the clans, which impedes their working in harmony to do anything *for* us, though it would not, if occasion arose, prevent their uniting against Government.

These facts are merely stated as a warning against a hasty conclusion, that because terms II and III of the Proclamation of 21st November have been fulfilled, compliance with the others, notably No. I, may be expected to follow automatically, or in a reasonable time, in accordance with arrangements made when the Tirah Expeditionary Force broke up.

If while that force remained in the field intact, and the season for a further movement had not yet passed, if while the threat of a hostile advance and the re-occupation of Tirah was imminent, such difficulties were felt that vicarious

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* Paragraph 6 of letter P., dated 5th April 1898, from General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to Foreign Secretary.

Note.—One section of the Zakka Khel, resident in the Khyber Pass, paid in Rs. 2,000 odd to save their spring crops near Landi Kotal, but the money was refunded to them. *See* Chief Political Officer's telegram, dated 4th April 1898, to Political Officer, Khyber, and the Political Officer, Khyber's telegram, dated 6th April 1898, to Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

† *See* paragraph 12 of Colonel Warburton's report, dated 2nd April, and No. 11 of the list of proposed rewards.

payment of fines was accepted for good reasons, how much greater are difficulties likely to be now when the fear of renewed measures of coercion is removed to a distance.

Demands outstanding.

3. The demands wholly or partly unsatisfied fall under the first head of the Proclamation of 21st November 1897. For clearness sake they may be divided in detail as below :—

I.—Restoration of arms taken from the Khyber Rifles, or taken by deserters of that corps.

II.—Restoration of rifles taken by military deserters.

III.—Restoration of rifles taken before the advance of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

IV.—Restoration of rifles captured in fighting.

V.—Compensation for—

(*a*) Government property looted, and for

(*b*) private property looted at Landi Kotal.

And at Ali Masjid.
W. P. SYMONS, *Major-Genl.*

I propose to deal with these seriatim, but, as there is a great difference between the feeling of the clans in respect of demands I, II, and III, and their attitude towards the others, in considering prospects of a settlement, the first three claims should be discussed separately from the remainder.

I.—ARMS OF "KHYBER RIFLES."

Demands which the clans admit and of which they promise satisfaction.

Up to the date of Sir W. Lockhart's final report, No. 113 P. of 5th April, 157 had been surrendered out of 234 outstanding. Since then 12 have come in, and the balance now (25th April) is 65.

II.—RIFLES OF MILITARY DESERTERS.

From a letter from Sir Richard Udny, Chief Political Officer, dated 2nd March 1898, to Colonel Warburton, it appears that 51* rifles were then out, 2 were brought in on 1st April. The number due on Sir William Lockhart's departure was 49. Since then 4 have come in, leaving up to date a balance of 45.

III.—RIFLES TAKEN OR STOLEN BEFORE THE ADVANCE OF THE TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

In the letter from the Chief Political Officer to Colonel Warburton, quoted above, No. 69, dated 2nd March, these are given as follows :—

(*a*) Taken at Saragarhi on 12th September, 21, out of which 8 were recovered from Orakzais. The balance of 13 is debited to Afridis —one has lately been recovered at Kohat, leaving due 12.

(*b*) Stolen from a Native Field Hospital, Peshawar, on 13th October from 28th Bombay Pioneers, 2.
(Afridi section not known, and this is a doubtful case.)

(*c*) Robbed from 8th Bombay Infantry at Burj Hari Singh on 26th October, 4.

(*d*) Taken from a patrol of 9th Bengal Lancers near Mamani 8 carbines—4 recovered from the Sturi Khel Orakzais, balance due, 4.

In regard to these (Head III), I note here that there has been no regular enquiry and there is no proof that case (*b*) should be charged to the Afridis. It is said that the thieves were Mohmands.

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* Exact figures are difficult to get, as it is not clear whether one or two rifles brought in at Kohat in February excluded from the 51. But this will be cleared up.
Also some deserters were Orakzais and are not included in the demand against Afridis.

And as to case (*d*) I put it under this head following Sir R. Udny's classification, but it appears to me that this case might fairly come under the head of rifles captured in war.

They were taken from a patrol of our cavalry within foreign (Orakzai) territory, and are distinctly regarded by the Afridis as taken in fighting.

Reasons why the clans admit these claims I, II, and III.

4. A jirga which was interviewed by General Symons, Commanding, Khyber Field Force, at Jamrud on 18th April, admitted tribal responsibility for the restoration of the rifles under Heads I, and II, and for the rifles taken on the Samana (Saragarhi), Head III ; and there is reason to hope that these will gradually be brought in.

Again it is necessary to be on our guard lest we assume from their attitude towards these claims a willingness to fulfil the remaining demands.

There are special reasons why the tribe are content to restore these rifles. In the first place the deserters of the "Khyber Rifles" want employment, and can only secure it by returning with their arms.

Secondly, the military deserters wish to be free of British territory, free to come and go and seek service ; for though not to be re-enlisted in the army, they may get other employment, and, finally, they have been promised that for every rifle restored a sum of Rs. 150 will be placed to their credit against other demands.*

Thirdly, in respect of these and of rifles taken at Saragarhi, the tribesmen draw a distinction between them and arms captured in the war. They admit these to be "stolen property," and allege that they feel it right they should be surrendered.

Lastly, more potent than this conscientious scruple is the desire of the clans of the Khyber to see the restoration of their allowances, and I have no doubt that they feel rifles carried off by deserters must be brought in before even by their own standard they can ask for their confiscated subsidies.

Other demands not admitted by the clans.

5. I come now to the greater unsatisfied demands which lie between us and a final settlement ; these are—

IV.—Restoration of Rifles Captured in the War.

V.—Compensation for (*a*) Government, (*b*) Private Property Plundered.

The captured rifles† consist of 70 Lee-Metfords and 20 Martinis. The jirga of Maliks and the so-called hostages left at Jamrud, when Colonel Warburton departed, at their interview with General Symons, Commanding, Khyber Field Force, on 18th April, distinctly said they could not restore these rifles nor pay their value.

Restoration in kind must be admitted to be impossible, because a large number have been sold ;‡ and sold at a cheaper rate than the price they now command, because until the Afridis had captured also some boxes of Dum-Dum Ammunition, they did not prize the Lee-Metford as highly as they do now.

At the accepted rates the value is—

	Rs.
70 Lee-Metfords, at Rs. 360§	25,200
20 Martinis, at Rs. 350	7,000
	32,200

* Telegram from Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to Colonel Warburton, No. 6251 T., dated 31st March 1898.

† Letter from Sir R. Udny, Chief Political Officer, to Colonel Warburton, No. 69, dated 2nd March 1898, as corrected by his No. 76 P., dated 5th March 1898.

‡ *Note*—At first in Afghanistan, later to Mohmands.

§ 450 to 500 rupees, Kabuli.

The demand for compensation under Head V. comes in all to nearly Rs. 28,600 ; details will be found in the enclosures to a letter from Commissioner, Peshawar, to Punjab Government, dated 9th November, 1897, and in paragraph 38 of Sir W. Lockhart's despatch, dated 3rd February, 1898.

The estimate of Government property * was Rs. 13,976. The principal item in private compensation is Captain Barton's property, Rs. 12,391 ; there was also a bill for losses of Khyber Rifles, put at Rs. 10,134, cut down by Sir R. Udny to Rs. 2,000, and it seems clear that only losses of British subjects among the Khyber Rifles need be considered.

Even so, however, the claim comes to Rs. 28,589, and with the value of the captured rifles, the demand under Heads IV. and V. amounts to Rs. 60,789.

These terms—restoration of rifles and compensation for property plundered —are in the proclamation, and have been mentioned in jirgas held since then. But there can be no doubt that the tribe will feel or affect surprise if *present* payment in kind and cash is insisted on, and they are not likely (save under stress of further coercive measures) to attempt fulfilment, partly because they cannot pay, and partly perhaps because they assume that Government has made peace with them.

This is clear from the attitude of the jirga and so-called hostages till lately at Jamrud, and it is the unanimous opinion of the officers † best able to judge who were on the spot when I came to the Khyber.

It is well known that during the proceedings with jirgas at Jamrud from January to April, stress was specially laid upon the second and third terms of the proclamation, and efforts were exclusively directed to securing payment of fine and surrender of the rifles taken as a fine.

For the quicker realisation of these, hostages were taken and were sent to Attock, and a blockade was maintained. As each section or clan complied with these two terms, their hostages were released, and the blockade removed. The other principal terms, for reasons no doubt sufficient, and with which I am not concerned, fell somehow or other into the background.

The tribe say, and from *their* point of view say, with some show of reason, " there is peace now between us and Government, and save for rifles of deserters, &c., which we admit are not lawfully ours, we do not understand more demands.

" Government told us to pay a fine to surrender 800 rifles, and we gave hostages for compliance with those orders ; we paid up, Government released our hostages from detention at Attock, made us free of British territory, and removed the blockade ; we understood peace was restored."

On the other hand, no doubt we know from Sir R. Udny's telegram of 8th April, to the Foreign Secretary, that he had reminded them of their liability to make good property plundered. On this point I can say no more than this, that these two large unsatisfied conditions seem to have been less constantly, less strongly, and less insistently before the clansmen, than the question of payment of fine in money and arms. Since the 30th December, the actual daily proceedings or negotiations with jirgas were in other hands ; and it will be observed that Colonel Warburton's report‡ of 2nd April is practically silent as to the large demands outstanding, Rs. 28,600 compensation, and restoration of captured rifles, the *money* value of which is Rs. 32,200.

His report covers his proceedings or negotiations ; it contains no mention of these demands, it refers only to the fine, to the rifles taken as fine, and to the arms of deserters of the Khyber Corps.

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* Excluding buildings.

† Mr Hastings, Mr. Donald and Native Officers.

‡ Enclosure to General Sir W. Lockhart's letter to Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 113P., dated 5th April.

He describes how these were recovered, and then, in conclusion, in paragraph 12 speaks of "the men who have assisted me to carry out *the present settlement with the Afridis** of the Khyber Range."

* The italics are mine.

This being the official report of the officer who at Jamrud had all direct dealings in his hands, it is not altogether surprising if the Afridi assumes, or perhaps I should say, hopes that the other † demands have fallen into the background, if not into abeyance.

† Excluding, of course, rifles of deserters, &c., for which the tribe admit responsibility.

Another fact points to the same conclusion, that is, that though the term as to compensation for property looted was mentioned by Sir R. Udny when he saw a jirga, as he notes, in February, yet it seems that the amount of the claim was never stated, its details were never discussed with any deputation, and no proposals were ever made to allot or distribute it among the seven or eight clans concerned.

6. However this may be, I am convinced that the Afridi partly cannot and partly will not pay more money down in cash, and that no measure short of another armed invasion and occupation of Tirah will induce him to surrender the rifles captured, his spoils of war.

Difficulty of realising these demands.

As to his ability to pay, I observe Colonel Warburton, who should know, in paragraph 10 of his report, doubted whether the Zakka Khel "have the means of paying up their share, Rs. 9,094, for some time to come."

Paragraph 6 of General Sir W. Lockhart's letter to Government of India, Foreign Dept., No. 113 P., of 5th April.

As a matter of fact, they did not pay; the money was recovered from property of two individual Maliks.

Still the point remains if they were too poor to pay their share of Rs. 50,000, while the Tirah Expeditionary Force remained at their doors and threatened to enter, shall we get their share of other demands aggregating Rs. 60,000 when there is no such threat?

It was said by some of the tribesmen at Jamrud, and I believe with truth, that a good deal, if not all, of the money realised by the sale of these rifles, was expended in the purchase of other rifles to make up the number 800 demanded by Government in Term II. of the Proclamation issued in Tirah, on the 21st November last.

W. P SYMONS, *Major-Genl.*

As to the captured rifles. Some, as I have said, have been sold in Jalalabad and the Mohmand hills, the remarks above made apply to recovery of their money value, the arms having left the country.

Some remain, and I am convinced from all I have seen and heard that nothing short of a renewal of war will secure their restoration. If we went to war to enforce the surrender of the remaining portion of those 70 Lee-Metfords, even in a campaign as successful as the last, we should not be sure of not losing 70 more.

7. The conclusion I have come to is that the clansmen may gradually bring in the balance—

Present attitude of the clans.

(1) of the Sniders of the Khyber Rifle Corps.

(2) of the arms of military deserters, and

(3) the rifles taken at Saragarhi, but that we shall get no more, and that they will not pay up any part of the compensation for property looted Rs, 28,600, nor arms captured or their value Rs. 32,200, without being coerced anew.

I might go further and say that the present attitude of the Afridi is rather one of expectation of fresh concessions or favours. It is unnecessary to dwell on this, but it must be mentioned as a right appreciation of their present feeling is necessary to enable Government to judge how much more the tribes are likely to yield under present conditions.

The view here stated was the deliberate opinion of Mr. Hastings and others on the spot, and it is corroborated by the tribesmen's petitions to General Sir W. Lockhart on his departure. They petitioned that the salt-tax be reduced, that their runaway women should be surrendered to them, that a British subject kept as a political detenu in Lahore should be released. These petitions were repeated by the jirga whom General Symons saw on 18th April, and any one accustomed to deal with the clans on this border will recognise at once that these requests go beyond what these or other clans would have put forward before the war. Whatever be the explanation, it is a fact that the Afridi is more interested in and keener to press petitions of this kind than to discuss how he is to fulfil the demands which are still unsatisfied.

As to the salt-tax they seem to expect some concession, though of course without reason. A report recently sent to the Commissioner, Peshawar, from Kohat showed that purchases of salt had stopped, because it was everywhere declared the duty was to be lessened; there is the same expectation in the Kohat Pass and among the Adam Khels, and it can be traced back to an origin in the Khyber.

Mr. Donald writing on the 25th April says of the Aka Khel—

"Their attitude does not seem very submissive, for they actually had the impertinence to tell Sikahdar Shah that, unless they were in the future to receive a handsome subsidy, they would start hostilities again with Government."

Question of "hostages" as security.

8. Before leaving the subject of the outstanding demands, it is necessary to advert to the hostages mentioned in paragraph 7 of General Sir W. Lockhart's final report* (*a*) as being given as security "for the restoration of all other Government property."

There seems to have been some misapprehension as to the understanding upon which these men, 144, from all sections †(*b*) of the Khyber Afridis came in. They and the Afridi Maliks present at the jirga seen by General Symons, Commanding, Khyber Field Force, on 18th April, positively denied that they were hostages in the ordinary sense, that they were personally liable to arrest, detention or to any form of coercion in default of compliance with the terms unfulfilled. They asserted they were a "hazir jirga," a friendly deputation present to assist to secure compliance with those conditions which the clansmen at large appear to admit, *i.e.*. restoration of rifles of deserters of the Khyber Rifle Corps, &c. They denied personal liability even for these; but were ready to help, and probably will help in the matter, and they totally repudiated any responsibility for "compensation" and for surrender of rifles captured in war.

They say with some force "you had hostages in detention at Attock. You took those for the fine in money and arms; when we paid up those you set free those men who were hostages—if hostages were still needed for other demands, those men would have been detained. We are under different conditions."

It is not easy to explain here how a misapprehension, if any, arose, but I can refer to telegrams‡ between Sir R. Udny, late Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and Colonel Warburton, which corroborate my view, and show that the former had great doubts whether these men were true hostages.

Telegraphing on the 4th April, the day before the date of the final political report, the Chief Political Officer said—"You must remember that the term

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* (*a*) Dated 5th April, to Government of India, Foreign Department.

† (*b*) The Shan Khel, one sub-section of the Zakka Khel, are still unrepresented.

‡ (1) Telegram from Colonel Warburton, Jamrud, to Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Peshawar, dated 4th April.

(2) Telegram dated 4th April, from Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to Colonel Warburton at Jamrud.

(3) Telegram dated 4th April 1898, from Colonel Warburton, Jamrud, to Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Peshawar.

hostages can only be applied to men who remain under our control if not under actual detention, and that men sent into independent territory to fetch rifles cannot be called hostages at all, while they are absent across the border."

No distinct reply was given to this.

While at Jamrud these men were free to come and go, and exchanged themselves with fellow-clansmen at their own pleasure.

The hostages who were in detention at Attock for payment of the fine in money and arms were clearly on a very different footing, but they were all released when the fine was made good, except a few, 12 men, of the Aka Khel still detained till the fine on that clan is paid up.

So far then as regards the unfulfilled terms which the clan do not admit, these men (144) are not satisfactory hostages, and their presence at Jamrud is no security.

In fact we have no "security" save this—

(1) the hope of the Khyber Afridis to get their allowances restored,* and

(2) the desire of all Afridis to avoid another war and the re-occupation of Tirah.

This inducement is probably sufficient to bring about compliance with the demands which the tribesmen admit, that is, restoration of the balance of the Sniders of the Khyber Rifle Corps, and of rifles carried off by deserters from regiments,† but I am convinced it is not sufficient to ensure satisfaction of the other outstanding claims.

Suggestions to mean as of arriving at a settlement.

9. The great question then remains how we can secure fulfilment of the balance of our demands. I offer an opinion on this point with diffidence, but I do so now because it may be presumed that Government are anxious, if possible, to avoid a renewal of war, and the necessity of sending another expedition to Tirah, because it is desirable to reduce the large force now maintained in the Khyber and at Bara, because with the height of the hot weather rapidly coming on time is short, because the prolongation of a period of what may be called an interruption of peaceful relations is inexpedient, and while it lasts there is more chance of the tribe or some section doing some new act of folly, which may commit them and Government to more active measures, and, lastly, because it is possible now to adopt a means by which Government may settle the whole matter satisfactorily.

The ultimate object is the restoration of permanent friendly relations with the Afridis, and a settlement of the mode in which the Khyber Pass is to be held or kept open in the future. Without anticipating the decision of Government on that point, I observe that the proposals before the Government of India range from a mixed system of tribal responsibility for the police work guarded or secured by a regular military gaarison at Landi Kotal on the one hand, to a system of purely tribal management on the other. In all the proposals there is the common factor of tribal responsibility, whether in presence of a military force in the pass or not. This implies and necessitates tribal allowances. The question of allowances has not yet been officially mentioned to the clans, but they certainly expect them, and are always petitioning about them; the hope of their restoration is a principal motive for the present good behaviour of the *Khyber* sections.

If it be granted, as I think it must, that in the end the allowances will have to be restored, I venture to suggest that we should now, without further delay, summon the clansmen, and tell them that the subsidies will be restored hereafter, that Government is meanwhile considering details of the question of the further management of the pass, I would say to them—

"Government has certain demands against you still unsatisfied, demands made in the Proclamation of 21st November, and never authoritatively waived.

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* *Note.*—This operates only on Khyber Afridis, not on Aka Khel or others.

† And of rifles taken at Saragarhi.

W. P. SYMONS, *Major-Genl.*

"Government accepts your petition that you have suffered heavy loss in the war, by the destruction of your houses and property, and as an act of grace it is content to make a settlement with you without demanding payment of those claims now *in cash*.

"These claims are—

"(1) Compensation for property looted in the Khyber, Rs. 28,600.

"(2) A sum on account of Government buildings burnt or destroyed, say Rs. 21,400.

"These make up a total of Rs. 50,000.

"This Government will recover from you by deducting 10 per cent. from your tribal allowance, so that for a few years you will receive Rs. 9 instead of Rs. 10."

About 5 years probably.

I should advise waiving the demand for surrender of rifles captured in war. Many have been sold, and I do not believe the tribe can compel the fortunate possessors of the remainder to give up what they consider spoils of war; I doubt whether the tribe would even attempt the task; it is so difficult they might prefer the risk of another war; and on our part though we should punish them heavily in a second campaign, it seems hardly worth while to undertake it for this object, seeing that in pursuit of these 70 Lee-Metfords we might lose as many more.

Moreover, the clansmen feel they have in this matter the sympathy of most people, whether inside or outside British territory; and I believe this condition might be waived as an act of grace without giving rise to any suspicion of undue weakness on our part.

10. I would as suggested above *now* make the claim (if Government still desire it) on account of Government buildings burnt or destroyed. To put it off until a settlement shall be made, adds to the difficulties of coming to any final understanding.

The reserved claim or liability for damage to Government buildings.

I strongly support this.
W. P. SYMONS, *Major-General.*

The tribe as a whole probably do not thoroughly understand the exact meaning of the last clause of the Proclamation under which, after compliance by them with all other terms, Government reserved to itself discretion to enforce on them liability "to make good all damage done by them to Government buildings."

This damage, I am told, has been estimated at Rs. 3,60,000.

Under present conditions, if they understood this, they would certainly be even less amenable than they are, and would ask what was the use of their attempting to meet other claims if Government had in reserve an undefined and possibly very large demand to be brought forward hereafter.

11. In conclusion, I may sum up by saying that my suggestion for a final settlement is based on these premises, viz. :—

Conclusion.

(1) That it is vain to expect the Afridis will or perhaps can satisfy in in cash and kind the large demands outstanding.

(2) That any scheme of "management of the pass" which is likely to be accepted by Government includes tribal responsibility whether associated with troops or not, and that as a consequence in the end the tribal allowances will have to be restored.

If the suggestion is accepted, I think the Khyber Force could soon be reduced and a satisfactory permanent settlement arrived at within a few weeks.

Time is of value, because the longer matters remain unsettled the more chance there is of some misguided section giving trouble and committing both the clans and the Government; and, as the hot weather already begun to be felt, advances, picket duty and what may be called the police work of the pass will be found a heavy burden upon regular troops.

(Signed.) F. D. CUNNINGHAM,
Chief Political Officer, Khyber Force.

The 26th April 1898.

Enclosure 12 in No. 3.

Letter from the General Officer Commanding Khyber Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Landi Kotal, the 1st May 1898.

I have the honour to forward to you a copy of a portion of a telegram received by me from Mr. Cunningham, Chief Political Officer, Khyber Force.

2. I forward the telegram, but feel confident that the Government of India is fully alive to this important question in the settlement with the Afridis.

Telegram from F. D. Cunningham, Esq., Chief Political Officer, Khyber Force, to the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Force, Landi Kotal, dated Peshawar, the 29th April, 1898.

With reference to paragraphs 9 and 10 of my note, dated 26th, I suggest your pressing on Government the desirability of an early decision on the question of tribal allowances to Khyber Afridis. If they are to be restored, as I believe is inevitable, the sooner we let clans know the better. Reasons are—first, disaffected men are encouraging them against compliance with even those demands which clans admit, by warning them they will not get their old subsidies. Second, although reports in Colonel Aslam Khan's telegrams of 25th and 26th are exaggerated and misleading, yet no doubt Amir's officials have interviewed deputations of Zakka Khel, and it would not be surprising if such officials did not discourage compliance with wishes of Government, and suggest honours and rewards from Afghan side. If clans lose hope of subsidies from us, they will look elsewhere. Third, at present hope of allowances tends to keep things quiet, but delay in announcement is creating distrust or suspicion. If clans once begin to believe they will not be restored, turbulent spirits among them would be ready to give trouble, and we could not then trust the tribal arrangement, which now holds the pass for some five miles from Gurgarra to Landi Kotal, and to that extent saves troops from burdensome picquet duty. While crops are standing uncut, we have some hold over the Zakka section, who have uudertaken to guard that part, but, once crops are cut, that security will be gone. Fourth, if tribe begin to believe subsidies will not be restored, I doubt whether the Khyber Rifles, so far as they are recruited from Afridis, could be trusted. They now guard pass from Jamrud to Fort Maude, and I understand it is desired to make over a further length of road up to Ali Masjid to them. If tribe learn, or begin to believe, subsidies will not be restored, we should have to guard entire pass with troops alone. For reason given in paragraph 9 of my note, I believe in the end restoration of subsidies is inevitable, and, if Government decide on this, early announcement is most desirable. Actual payment could of course begin later when settlement is made, but delay in announcement prolongs period of uncertainty and creates risk of trouble. Sir Richard Udny has authorised me to say that he is strongly of opinion that an early announcement on the question of the subsidies is most desirable. . . .

The remainder of the telegram refers to other and irrelevant matter.

Enclosure 13 in No. 3.

Letter from Major-General W. P. Symons, C.B., General Officer Commanding the Khyber Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Peshawar, 7th May, 1898.

I have the honour to submit, for the consideration of the Government of India, a proposal connected with the future arrangements for holding the Khyber Pass, which may be deemed worthy of acceptation.

2. I have already forwarded to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India a memorandum, in which I have given my views regarding the reconstruction of the Khyber Rifles. In this memorandum I stated that I thought that it would be desirable to attach two more British officers, and four selected Native officers, to this corps.

3. My proposal now is that the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles should also be Political Officer in the Khyber.

4. This arrangement would centralise the control of the pass, and give the Commandant that influence and authority which, in my opinion, he does not at present sufficiently possess.

5. This proposal should not be entertained, unless two other British military officers are sent to do duty with the Khyber Rifles.

6. The present Commandant, Captain Barton of the Guides, might do well, but, from all that I have heard, Captain Roos-Keppel, on special duty, Kurram, would appear to be an officer peculiarly qualified for this new appointment.

7. I have spoken to Mr. Cunningham on this matter. He concurs in my proposal.

Enclosure 14 in No. 3.

Minute of dissent by His Excellency Sir Charles Nairne, K.C.B., dated the 16th June 1898.

The Secretary of State, in his despatch of 28th January 1898, laid down that the maintenance of the Khyber Pass as a safe artery of communication and trade was an essential measure, whether viewed from the standpoint of our obligations to the Amir or from that of the protection of British subjects. How such safety is to be achieved appears to me much more a military than a political question, for not only must the protection of the pass be based fundamentally on adequate military precautions, but one of the principal ends to be thereby attained, the power of fulfilling our obligations to the Amir, is essentially military.

Sir William Lockhart has proposed that a fortified post should be built at Landi Kotal, to be garrisoned by a regular regiment of Native Infantry and to be armed with guns, while the rest of the pass should be held by a local militia. While I concur in the construction of a fort, I am opposed to its occupation by regular troops, which I believe would be a source of irritation both to the Afridis and to the Amir, would not overawe the surrounding tribes, but would be a constant source of friction. The expense of maintaining troops in such a locality would be great, and the service would be unpopular with our soldiers, while, in the event of serious friction with the Afridis, their communications would be insecure.

My view is that by suitable measures we can identify the Afridis with ourselves and with our military force to a much greater extent than has yet been attained, and that ~~by so doing we can safely~~ utilise them to hold both

the fort at Landi Kotal and the pass itself, thus not only attaining the end aimed at by the Secretary of State, but arriving at it by the very means on which he lay stress, *viz.*, by giving the Afridis the largest possible share in the scheme, and enlisting their good-will and assistance in the future protection of the road. I lay great stress on the Khyber Rifles (whether they retain that title or are termed militia is immaterial) being kept under the military authorities and being regarded as an essentially military body, the responsibility for their military control, discipline and efficiency being vested in the General Officer Commanding the Peshawar District, for not only will their efficiency be thereby greatly increased, but such a step will be highly popular with the men themselves who will feel themselves much more bound to, and identified with, our interests, while their self-esteem and military pride will be gratified and enlisted on our side when considering themselves soldiers of the Queen, as it can never be, while their status is but that of mere civil levies or local police. Nor can we by any other means instil into their minds that full assurance of unfailing support in the event of disturbances which has been rendered necessary by the events of last August.

In the pass itself we cannot have two independent powers, one Civil and the other Military, for such a division of local authority would be fatal to our complete control. It seems to me therefore essential to the completeness of my proposal to make the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles *ex-officio* the Political Officer also. In this capacity he would report to, and act under, the Commissioner of Peshawar. There are many precedents for such a course. For instance, the Commandant of the Guides had always much political work entrusted to him, and also the Commandants of nearly all the Local Corps in Rajputana and Central India.

It is because I feel that the part of this scheme which has not been adopted is essential to its efficacy, that I am reluctantly obliged to dissent from the proposals of my Honourable Colleagues.

Closely connected with the safety of the pass is the much discussed subject of the policy for many years past of the Punjab Government in its dealings with the frontier tribes. Events of the past year add another proof of the failure of that policy, and I venture to record my dissent from reverting to it.

I carry back my memory to the days of Mackeson, Edwardes, Nicholson, James, and other distinguished soldier civilians under Sir John Lawrence. Their vigorous and severe but sympathetic methods were well suited to the turbulent natures of the highland caterans with whom they had to deal, and I venture to think it is to a reversion to these methods we must look for success in our future dealings with the tribes. In conversations I have had with Afridis in the past, they have always expressed the utmost contempt for the fine and blockade system of the past 20 years. If we go among them and let our rule be felt, these frontier tribesmen will soon become, as all the military nations of India have become, our faithful friends, soldiers, and allies; but with such people half-hearted and tender methods of repression lead to nothing but failure and loss of prestige. I therefore deprecate allowing the management of the Afridis and of the Khyber Pass to be assumed by an Agency which has failed in the past, as under such a system it was bound to fail, and which will fail again in the future.

In agreeing to the decision that the road-bed of the railway only should be laid through the pass, the rails being laid to Jamrud only, I wish to say that I consider this only permissible if the pass and Landi Kotal Fort is held by the Khyber Rifles. Should it be decided at any time to garrison Landi Kotal by regular troops, I consider it will be essential to complete the railway to that place at the same time.

(Signed) C. E. NAIRNE.

Enclosure 15 in No. 3.

Extract from Minute by Major-General the Honourable Sir E. H. H. Collen, K.C.I.E., C.B., dated the 17th June 1898.

I am constrained to record my dissent from the proposal that the local corps of Afridis, to be entitled the Khyber Militia, should be under the control of the Commissioner of Peshawar, and of the Government of the Punjab, and not under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Peshawar District. While I concur in the proposal to investigate the question whether we cannot raise similar militia on other parts of the frontier, I consider these corps should be under the frontier military authorities. I am also opposed to the political control of the Khyber Pass remaining in the hands of the Punjab Government.

We have decided that we must provide for the possibility of an advance into Afghanistan to defend that country, and, consequently, we have approved generally of the plan described in Sir William Lockhart's memorandum of the 11th March 1898, with the modification that irregular troops shall form the garrison of Landi Kotal, instead of that garrison being composed of an ordinary regiment of the native army of India. Under Sir William Lockhart's plan the Khyber defile itself would be held by the Khyber Rifles. Both Sir William Lockhart and Sir Richard Udny are in favour of the military occupation of Landi Kotal.

For many reasons I should prefer that two local battalions, instead of militia, should be enlisted from the Afridis, Shinwaris, &c., and should, though officered under the irregular system, form a part of the native army of India, and preferably of the Punjab Frontier Force. One battalion would hold Landi Kotal, and the other would garrison the Khyber itself. I believe that we should in this way utilise more fully the military strength of the Afridis; that they would prefer enlistment in these regiments to enlistment in any corps of inferior status; that we should bind the Afridis to ourselves; that their honour and loyalty would be more fully pledged; that, while making it plain that we intend to hold the Khyber against all comers, we should enlist their good-will and services for its protection; that this would be a great advance in the policy of making the tribe our friends; and that, lastly, by the employment of battalions belonging to the army we should have a guarantee that the safety of the pass would be regarded as a paramount consideration.

It is a significant fact that the Malikdin Khel, who were the first of the sections to come in, had the greatest number of pensioners. The invasion of Tirah tried the loyalty and devotion to our service of the Afridi soldiers in an extraordinary degree, but they stood the strain in a remarkable manner.

There are objections to the employment of regiments of Sikhs or Gurkhas at Landi Kotal, but by the plan I proposed we should have regular troops there, recruited from the tribe we have defeated—as has happened over and over again in the history of India—men who would become soldiers in our army, just as loyal, just as devoted, as those we have already in our ranks.

The two battalions would perform all the garrison, convoy, and picquet duties of the pass in precisely the same way as that in which the militia would carry them out; but other considerations, such as the difficulty of adding to the strength of the Native Army at the present time, the possibility of opening up questions connected with the proportion of British to Native troops, &c., would cause me to waive my views in respect to the raising of two Afridi battalions of the army and to agree that these should be irregular troops raised as militia. I would agree to this on the distinct understanding that these corps should be under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Peshawar District.

The whole of the proposals in Sir William Lockhart's memorandum are based on the military importance of maintaining the security of the Khyber Pass and of the military occupation of Landi Kotal. The construction of a strong fort, the improvement of the water-supply, the construction of block-houses in the upper and lower Khyber, are all integral parts of that plan, and I

cannot see how we can approve generally of the proposals in his memorandum if we take away the essence of the plan—the military control of Landi Kotal and the Khyber.

In my opinion the military question is of higher importance in this case than any question of civil and political policy. There are only two great military highways to Afghanistan—the Khyber and the Bolan. All others are subsidiary and secondary. These two great routes we must have under our effective control. We have secured the Bolan by a military occupation of that route ; and if we are to ensure military predominance, in the case of our being forced to advance to the strategic front Kabul-Kandahar ; if we are to fulfil the guarantee we have given for the integrity of Afghanistan ; if we are to be ready to help the Amir or his successor in the way which has been indicated to us by Her Majesty's Government, we must have the Khyber route under effective control, and that cannot be obtained, in my opinion, by placing that great military highway under civil management.

In 1885–86 the whole question of the defence of the north-west frontier of India was discussed by the Government of India and by Her Majesty's Government. Field Marshall Sir Donald Stewart had pointed out in 1880 that Landi Kotal perfectly commanded the western entrance of the Khyber. Lord Roberts also considered that the main defence must be at the western end, *i.e.*, at Landi Kotal, and at the conclusion of the discussion the Government of India, in their despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 4th October 1886, admitted the great importance of including the Khyber in the scheme of defence of the north-west frontier They proposed that an enclosed "serai" should be built at Landi Kotal capable of conversion into a redoubt, and they considered that steps should be taken gradually to familiarise the neighbouring tribes with the idea of an eventual occupation of the western outlet of the Khyber, and that the earliest favourable opportunity should be taken for carrying out this defensive measure in its integrity.

The Secretary of State concurred with the Government of India that a large "serai," capable of defence, would, under the circumstances, suffice "for the present." The favourable opportunity contemplated by the Government of Lord Dufferin has now presented itself, and I am strongly of opinion that a work should be built at Landi Kotal to fulfil the double purpose of resistance against tribal attack, and capable of being heavily armed when necessary, and of forming the centre of larger entrenchments should these eventually be required.

The Khyber route must be occupied and controlled as far as the Durand line, and Landi Kotal is the strategic point which it is essential to occupy. We require it as a depôt in case of an advance into Afghanistan ; we must protect the water-supply and reservoirs already constructed ; the position is a part of the scheme of defence of the north-west frontier as commanding the western entrance of the Khyber ; and, bad as it is, the Bori-Kandao route gives us a short line into the Bazar Valley from Landi Kotal ; our hold on the Khyber would be immensely strengthened ; and, lastly, the position controls the Afridis, and would demonstrate to them and to all the frontier tribes that their outbreak had led to this strengthening of our position.

It is essential, in my opinion, that the irregular troops maintained at Landi Kotal and in the Khyber should be placed under military control, and that the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar should be held absolutely responsible for the security of the pass. If battalions of militia be formed from the Khyber Rifles and officered by British officers as proposed, there is not, I submit, any practical difficulty in placing the force under the military authorities. Up to 1890 the Derajat frontier militia were under the orders of the Officers Commanding the outposts of the Punjab Frontier Force. In 1892 the militia were turned into border military police.

It is quite true that these militia, practically only horse and foot levies, and not organised in battalions, were under the frontier military officers at a time when the frontier force itself was under the Punjab Government, but there are two special points of difference between that time and the present. In the first

place we were dealing then with the old frontier of British India running along at the foot of the hills, and with the "close border" system. Secondly, the militia of those days were always police rather than a military body. At the present time we are dealing with the tribes between our old frontier and the Durand line or frontier of British influence, and we are contemplating the formation of militia so organised as to be military bodies in every essential, with the exception that it is proposed to place them under civil and not under military control, while their officers would be British officers drawn from the army, but would be in "civil employ," and, by regulation, unfit to hold military command. Undoubtedly, in the days of the frontier militia as they were before 1890, the civil officer of the frontier district had a good deal to say to the militia although they were not under his control. But in the Khyber we have no revenue to collect nor any civil district to administer, and we have been expressly told by Her Majesty's Government that interference in the domestic affairs of the Afridis is not desired. The civil power, represented by the Commissioner of Peshawar, could at all times call upon their services, and I cannot think that there are adequate civil or political reasons which would render it necessary to place this corps under civil and not under military control. In my opinion there would be no guarantee for the safety of the pass unless the proper officer, the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar, whose head-quarters are only ten miles from the mouth of the pass—Jamrud Fort being actually in his command—is placed in a position of full responsibility.

I am also compelled to differ from the majority of my colleagues in the proposal that the political relations in the Khyber should remain under the Punjab Government. I do not desire, at this moment, to raise the whole question of the management of frontier politics, although I have long held that an improvement in the agency could and should be effected, and have expressed that opinion on various occasions. I would, therefore, simply say that I consider the management of Khyber affairs should be removed from the authority of the Punjab Government, and that they should be controlled by the Commissioner of Peshawar in direct communication with the Foreign Department of the Government of India.

In paragraph 19 of the Secretary of State's despatch of the 28th January 1898, the avoidance of interference with the tribes is impressed on us, and we are told, especially as regards the Khyber, that we should avoid interference with the independent tribal organisations or the domestic affairs of the Afridis. If this policy be strictly followed, our political relations with the Afridis should be very simple. They will be in receipt of allowances which were formerly granted to them from Kabul and of those in commutation of the tolls formerly exacted by them from caravans passing through the Khyber. The trade arrangements of the Khyber can be managed as they always have been, and I do not think there is the slightest fear that were the Khyber under military instead of political or civil control the arrangements could not be carried out precisely as before. The expansion of trade with Afghanistan vià the Khyber depends mainly on the fiscal policy of the Amir.

I venture to think, therefore, that when once we have come to an agreement with them, we ought to have no political dealings with the Afridis which cannot be managed by the Political Officer in the pass, unless occasional questions of importance should need a reference to the Foreign Department of the Government of India. The direct system is one which I should prefer, because I believe that any unnecessary link in the administrative chain is a source of weakness, more especially in our relations with the frontier tribes. But in order to meet any objection that the Foreign Department might be overburdened with Khyber political business, I would place the Political Officer in the Khyber under the Commissioner of Peshawar, who for these purposes would be in direct communication with the Government of India, just as he is now in respect to dealings with the Amir.

My proposal, which is also that of General Symons and Mr. Cunningham, lately Political Officer in the Khyber Pass, is that the commandant of the Khyber irregular troops or militia should be the Political Officer of the

Khyber. This arrangement would be exactly that which we adopt during a state of war, when the military and political functions are combined in the General Officer in command, but with this advantage, that the commandant of the Khyber troops would be a selected officer, selected for his knowledge of Pathans in general and of Afridis in particular, selected for his ability to manage Afridis with that firm but sympathetic treatment to which they are susceptible. The control of, and responsibility for, civil and military arrangements would be vested in one man; there would be no artificial distinctions between "military" and "political," no divided counsels and divided responsibility. I am convinced that the Afridis or any other frontier tribe would understand and prefer such a system; every one who knows the frontier knows how easily friendly relations are created and maintained with the tribes by a Commanding Officer of a regiment aided by his officers and native officers; the Afridis would look to one authority with force at his command, for they cannot recognise the nice distinction between civil and military control; they cannot serve two masters, but they can play off one against the other; but if that one authority is a man who likes them, a man of tact as well as strength, no better plan could be created either to fulfil the policy of Her Majesty's Government or to provide for the military security of the pass. I fully recognise the ability, courage, and honesty of purpose of those statesmen who have been at the head of the Punjab Government, but it cannot be denied that the policy of the Punjab Government has not been the policy of the Government of India. Those who have studied frontier politics know very well how wide the differences of opinion have been as to what was the proper line to take.

Regarding this very question of the Khyber, a writer,* supposed by popular report to be a civilian of the highest political ability, experience, and standing, formerly under the Government of India, says:—

"The Afridis and other tribes are said to have been treated by the Punjab Government with such exaggerated deference that they believed we were afraid of them and became intolerably aggressive and defiant. It is to this timidity of action that many attribute the recent risings, and certainly nothing could have been better calculated to foster the conceit of the ever-conceited Pathan than the condition in which the Kohat Pass, between two important military stations, has been allowed to remain for so many years. We did not even remove the stones and boulders which covered the track, and the tribesmen openly jeered about it. The system in the Khyber could hardly fail to have the same effect. 'That immortal demon, the Khyberee,' as Alexander Burnes quaintly calls him, was paid a large yearly sum for keeping open the pass, but we had no control over the tribe, our officers being forbidden to go off the road; and the arrangements, though kept from breaking down for some years by the exertions of Colonel Warburton, loyally working on a system he knew to be wrong, ended at last in a sudden collapse under the circumstances described by Sir Lepel Griffin. In connexion with this point we would again draw attention to the agreement of 1881 with the Afridis, and to the correspondence which preceded it. It will be seen that the Afridi headmen then pressed us to exercise a larger measure of interference than we were disposed to exercise, and that the local officers were inclined to some extent to meet their wishes. The Afridis were, in fact, ripe for the application of the Sandeman system, and if it had been applied our hold on the pass would, no doubt, have been much stronger than it was. There is, therefore, some ground for thinking that the loss and expense which we have lately incurred were due rather to a want of boldness in our treatment of the tribes than to the Forward Policy."

In 1896 the Government of India desired to give a wider discretion to the Political Officer of the Khyber. This view was combated by the Lieutenant-Governor of the day, who considered that the officer had already the fullest discretion, and that it would be unwise to extend it; and the opinions held by the present Lieutenant-Governor are well known. He was in favour of holding the pass by tribal agreement, and by a tribal force maintained on tribal responsibility (Foreign Department letter, dated 28th March, 1898, paragraph 4). He was not in favour of any change in the conditions, which would impose the duty of maintaining the peace of the Khyber in times of disturbance on the British Government (Punjab Government letter, dated 1st April 1898, paragraph 3).

The present and proposed system is fraught with embarrassment and delay; the officers chosen for the work are not, and would not be, the officers of the Government of India, but of the Punjab Government; the procedure is

* "Edinburgh Review," January 1898.

circumlocutory; while the fact that a moveable or flying column is to be maintained under the orders of the *military* authorities ready to advance up the Khyber, is no guarantee that the local *civil* authorities would ask for its services until too late; they would refer to the Government of the Punjab at Lahore or Simla, and the latter would refer to the Government of India in the Foreign Department at Simla or Calcutta; and that department would refer to the Military Department; and the Military Department would refer to the Commander-in-Chief. If the military security of the pass were to be entrusted to the proper authority, the commandant of the troops, under the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar, the responsibility would be fixed and absolute. "Time is everything in military operations," and prompt action would in the future, as has been the case repeatedly in the military history of India, nip any disturbance in the bud, where "fearful commenting, the leaden servitor of dull delay" would but lead to the worst and most disastrous results, however we might subsequently exact retribution or achieve victory. What may have been quite right when Jamrud was the frontier post, when the Khyber was sealed to us, when no officer dared to advance beyond that post, is not applicable now, when the Khyber route is recognised as the great highway to Afghanistan which should at all times be kept open.

The whole object of our frontier policy is to give us peace on the border and military predominance over Russia if a conflict should unhappily occur with that power. As Sir Dennis FitzPatrick said: "All peace and order on the frontier must rest on force;" and I submit, therefore, that Landi Kotal and the Khyber should be occupied in a military sense, that the military duties should be controlled by the commandant, that the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar should be responsible for the pass, and that the political work should be in the hands of the commandant, with such assistance as may be necessary.

No. 4.

Extract from Letter from Government of India, Military Department, to the Right Hon. Lord George Francis Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 23rd June, 1898.

WITH reference to our despatch in the Foreign Department of this day's date, we desire to lay before Your Lordship our proposals for the future military arrangements necessary for keeping open the road *via* the Malakand to Dir and Chitral.

In Your Lordship's despatch, dated 16th August, 1895, we received the approval of Her Majesty's Government to the proposals which we had put forward for placing a garrison in Chitral, and maintaining communication with it by a direct road from the Peshawar Valley. In that despatch a reference was made to our expectation of being able to keep open the road by peaceful arrangements with the Khan of Dir and the Swat Khans, so that the only garrisons necessary would be on the Malakand Pass, and at the crossing of the river at Chakdara. Except for a comparatively brief period last year when an unexpected outburst of fanaticism brought together a great gathering from all the tribes to attack our garrisons, the road has been kept open, and we have lately had the satisfaction of seeing the relief of the troops at Chitral pass off, for the third time, in perfect quiet and without a shot being fired.

We do not now desire to enter on the general question of our policy with regard to Chitral. We are of opinion that the reasons which induced us in 1895 to recommend its occupation by a force of regular troops still hold good, and that its occupation must be continued for at least some considerable time to come in the same manner as hitherto. We also consider that our arrangements for maintaining communication with the garrison have been successful, and do not

call for any change in principle. An essential point in those arrangements is the retention of garrisons on the Malakand Pass and at Chakdara. In considering, in the light of recent events, what alterations are desirable with respect to the strength of the garrisons, and in the conditions under which they are maintained, we have been guided by certain principles which we propose to apply generally to all plans of local frontier defence.

Your Lordship has recently drawn our attention to the probable necessity for modifying existing arrangements on the North-West frontier, especially with a view to the concentration of forces, and to the retention of troops only on such communications through the borderland as are most necessary to maintain. It was at the same time pointed out that, from what had occurred during the past year, some of the frontier posts did not appear to have been sufficiently defensible; that regular troops should only be placed in such posts or localities, and under such conditions, as will enable them to promptly repel any attacks made upon them; and that local and tribal levies should be made to assume the aspect of a police rather than a military force. We fully appreciate the value of these observations. We propose that in future the strength of the more advanced garrisons on the North-West frontier shall be kept as low as may be practicable, the troops being placed in strong works which cannot be captured by a tribal enemy so long as the garrisons have food, water, and ammunition; that outposts of regular troops shall be as few and strong as possible; that minor posts, and posts on the line of communications, shall generally be held by levies, when the duties to be performed are those devolving on a police force, or by regular troops, which we should prefer to see organised as a militia; and that risings among the frontier tribes shall be met by moveable columns of sufficient strength, placed where they can readily support and assist the stationary garrisons. Further that, in event of serious attacks on the frontier being made or threatened, as in the case of the attacks by the Orakzais and Afridis on the Samana and other posts in August and September last, the garrisons of the weaker posts shall either be reinforced or withdrawn, according to a pre-arranged plan.

[*Enclosures not printed.*]

No. 5.

Extract from Letter from Government of India, Military Department, to the Right Hon. Lord George Francis Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 4th August, 1898.

In continuation of our despatches in the Military Department, dated the 23rd June, 1898, and dated the 7th July, 1898, with which we submitted our proposals for the maintenance of the road *viâ* the Malakand to Dir and Chitral, and for the future holding of the Khyber, we now desire to lay before Your Lordship our views as to the military position to be maintained on the Miranzai border, in the Tochi Valley, and at Wana and the adjacent portion of the frontier.

The general principles which we propose should govern our arrangements for the future defence of the Punjab frontier are stated in our military despatch, dated the 23rd June, 1898, and these principles have been adhered to in the proposals now submitted.

The most difficult portion of the frontier to deal with, after the Khyber, is the Miranzai border extending from Kohat to the Kuram, and comprising the Samana range, the posts on which were attacked in great strength by the Orakzai and Afridi tribes in September last. The position of the Samana has a local military importance in that it protects the Miranzai valley through which the road runs connecting Thal, and the cantonment of Parachinar in the Kuram valley, with Kohat, *viâ* Hangu. The security of this road and of the inhabitants of the Miranzai valley must be assured, and we are therefore of opinion that the retention of some force of regular troops on the Samana is at present essential

for the protection of this portion of the frontier, and although there is considerable force in the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab expressed in the letter which forms one of the enclosures of this despatch, that it would be desirable to withdraw the troops from the Samana if this could be effected without loss of prestige, and without danger to our subjects in Miranzai, there is a general agreement that the time has not yet arrived when this course can be contemplated.

We decided that the question of the defence of the Samana should be considered on the spot by a Committee of experienced officers, including a political officer. A Committee was accordingly assembled in April last under the presidency of Brigadier-General E. R. Elles, C.B., to report generally on this question. In our instructions to the Committee, we stated that the object with which the Samana is to be held is to protect Miranzai against tribal incursions, to afford support to the police posts in resisting such incursions, and to dominate the road from Shinawari to Karappa; and the Committee were desired to consider whether the force of regular troops should be located on the Samana itself, or whether it was desirable that the posts on the crest should be limited to the smallest possible number, and the main defence entrusted to a force posted in rear of the range, the greater portion of which would be equipped as a moveable column.

The report of the Committee, which we enclose, shows that they framed two alternative schemes—

A. To hold the Samana range in such strength as would admit of a small moveable column being immediately available to support the police posts; the force being dependent on Kohat for its main support.

B. To hold the Samana range with purely defensive posts, supported by a moveable column located near at hand in Miranzai.

After carefully considering the views of the Committee, and of the Commander-in-Chief, we have decided to accept scheme A, which avoids the formation of a new cantonment on the frontier, a measure to which there are undoubtedly strong objections, and which would probably prove expensive. This scheme also affords a readier means of resisting an incursion by the Ublan Pass, and of securing communication with Peshawar by the Kohat Pass. We have consulted the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, who without being very strongly in favour of the scheme, considers it amply provides for the protection of the frontier, and preferable to scheme B. We recommend the proposals generally for Your Lordship's approval and would add that we do not propose to make any material change in existing arrangements in the Kuram Valley. The fort at Parachinar will require improvement, and a project for a new post at Sadda is being prepared by the Punjab Government, but no definite proposals are as yet before us.

Turning to the Tochi Valley, we have considered whether, and to what extent, the withdrawal of the troops now in the Tochi can be effected. In view of the fact that the inhabitants of Daur have been assured of our protection, we are of opinion that the entire withdrawal of troops from the valley would be impracticable under the circumstances now existing. We believe, however, that it may be possible before long to diminish the former garrisons,* and to concentrate the regular troops, placing the principal garrison in a strong post at Miranshah. The question of holding the minor posts by levies, or by militia, should any be organised hereafter, is engaging our attention, and if Your Lordship accepts the general principle on the subject, stated in our despatch regarding the Khyber arrangements, (Foreign Department, dated the 23rd June, 1898), definite proposals will be submitted. As we cannot now abandon the occupation of the Tochi Valley, it appears to us necessary that the construction of the main post should be proceeded with, and if Your Lordship approves our proposal that it should be located at Miranshah, we should be glad to be favoured with a reply on this point by telegram. The

* Two battalions of native infantry.
One squadron of native cavalry.
Four guns, native mountain battery.
Four maxims.

garrison has not yet been finally decided, but it is probable that one, or one and a half battalions of native infantry, with a squadron, and two mountain guns would suffice. Any troops which can be set free from the Tochi would be stationed at Edwardesabad, where a moveable column would be maintained.

With regard to Wana, Your Lordship asked in your despatch, dated 8th May, 1896, for a statement of our conclusions on the question whether the maintenance of the Wana cantonment was so necessary as to justify the expenditure incurred on it. In our despatch in the Foreign Department, dated the 1st September, 1897, we informed Your Lordship that, owing to the existing position of affairs in Waziristan, it was desirable to postpone our recommendations on the subject. We are of opinion that the presence of troops at Wana, together with that of the force in the Tochi Valley, materially contributed to prevent a rising on the part of the Waziris during the recent disturbances on the frontier.

Wana has also considerable local importance as it protects the trade route by which caravans reach the Gumal, and since the cantonment was established Waziri raids into Zhob have been greatly checked. Having regard therefore to the general peace of the country, we think that the withdrawal of the troops from Wana should not at present be undertaken. But here again we would desire to follow out the principle above mentioned, *viz.*, the concentration of regular troops, if, and when, we are able to provide an efficient substitute for holding the subsidiary posts.

We would add that the construction and improvement of roads on the North-West Frontier, also the possible construction of frontier railways, are being considered by us with reference to our requirements as a whole, and we shall if necessary address Your Lordship hereafter on these subjects.

[*Enclosures not printed.*]

No. 6.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 5th August, 1898.

I HAVE given my most attentive consideration to the various proposals for restoring and maintaining British control over the Khaibar Pass which are contained in your Excellency's Letter (Foreign), dated the 23rd of June, 1898.

2. The scheme which you recommend for the future management of affairs in this important artery of communication and commerce between Peshawar and Afghanistan consists of three main proposals. At Landi Kotal, the further end of the Pass, you contemplate the construction of a fort to be built with emplacements for guns, but not armed with guns, to be supplied with reservoirs and water channels, and to be occupied by a local militia recruited from the Afridi tribes and placed under British officers. The militia will have charge of the Pass as well as of the Fort. The second proposal is the organisation, at the British end of the Pass or in its neighbourhood, of a movable column of sufficient force, and equipped with transport for the express purpose of supporting the militia. Various posts at Ali Masjid, Fort Maude and elsewhere are to be strengthened, and preparations are to be made for extending to Landi Kotal, when necessary, a line of rail, which will be laid as far as Jamrud. Thirdly, you desire to leave with the Government of the Punjab its control over the Pass and the new militia. Besides these three proposals, there are other matters treated of in your letter, namely, the conclusion of a new agreement with the tribes, and the settlement of outstanding claims against them, to which I shall revert presently.

3. As to the first proposal of your Excellency's Government, namely, the construction of a strong defensible post at Landi Kotal, with an adequate water

supply, I observe that military opinions generally concur in its necessity. It must be remembered that the Afridis, in the course of the late disturbances, wrought much havoc in the forts and posts entrusted to their charge, and the reconstruction of these works has been forced upon you. The work, in short, is one of restoration rather than one of fresh construction or advance. There is, however, a difference of opinion as to whether the fort when built should be occupied by regular troops, or left to the care of the Afridi militia supported by a movable column at Peshawar and officered by British officers. That question is not exclusively a military one, it involves also important political issues.

4. It is convenient here to refer to two considerations which must be borne in mind in dealing with this and all other questions connected with the Khaibar Pass. The Afridis have, as you observe, "by their own acts ruptured their engagements," and in the proclamation addressed to them, and on subsequent occasions, they have been given to understand that the Pass will be re-opened under such terms as the British Government may consider necessary. No considerations of past agreements or of tribal rights stand in the way of the adoption by your Excellency's Government of any military measures necessary for ensuring the permanent safety of the Pass, and for preventing a repetition of the late disturbances. At the same time, while your hands are perfectly free, and should be kept so in any negotiations or communications that you may have to conduct with the Afridis, it has always been an axiom that the good will of the tribesmen affords the best guarantee for the success of a frontier policy. In his memorandum, dated 11th March 1898, General Sir William Lockhart remarked with equal force and truth "from a political point of view, the permanent occupation of China might give rise to tribal ill feeling and thus cause us grave embarrassment; for it must be remembered that in undertaking military operations in Afghanistan, the friendly attitude of the frontier tribes would be of much greater moment than the absolute safety of any single pass, however important. If the attitude were friendly, the Pass would be secure in any case. If the Pass were secure, while the attitude was unfriendly, we should be harassed in other directions."

5. These observations apply equally to the immediate question of the occupation of the fort at Landi Kotal by regular troops. In the opinion of your Excellency's Government, such a measure will necessarily strain the good will of the Afridis. Her Majesty's Government is therefore prepared to accept your view subject to such further consideration as may be needed after fuller experience. At the same time there is no necessity, in communicating to the tribes your intentions, to bind your Government as to its action hereafter. The reconstruction of the works destroyed by the Afridis in breach of their agreements will take some months, and the arguments both for, and against, the occupation of the fort by regular troops will receive additional weight according to the behaviour of the Afridis during the course of the next year. It is sufficient for me at present to convey to your Excellency my general sanction to any expenditure that may be found necessary for the proper accommodation and defence of the garrison which you may eventually determine to place in the Khaibar Pass.

6. I accept also your proposals for establishing a movable column, and I shall await the detailed report referred to at the end of paragraph 9 of your Excellency's Letter. I approve, further, of your measures set forth in paragraph 12 for extending railway communication, but I do not think that it is necessary for you to secure the right of working it and of exercising jurisdiction by means of any agreement with the several sections of the Afridi tribes. The Pass is now in the occupation of your Government, and it will be sufficient to intimate to the tribes your intentions for the future, and to retain the power now actually in your hands of carrying out your intentions.

7. Your third proposal, under which the Government of the Punjab is to retain its control over the Afridi militia and over the Khaibar Pass, raises an important and more difficult question. Under the altered circumstances which have arisen, it is not desirable merely to restore the arrangements which were in force before the recent outbreak. On the other hand, you are evidently impressed with the difficulty of withdrawing entirely the existing jurisdiction

of the Punjab Government on the British side of the frontier. Schemes have at various times been put forward for creating a Frontier Commissionership to hold separate charge of the Trans-Indus districts as well as of our relations with the tribes beyond. They are open to the objection that they would have the effect of breaking up the established administrative units of British India, disturbing the revenue system already introduced, and entailing a succession of territorial rectifications and compensations. There is no part of India where the need of a strong administration, equipped with all the resources of Government and capable of resisting aggressions, is more likely to be felt than on the North-Western Frontier. It may also be inexpedient to deprive the Government of the Punjab, and thus also of the Government of India, of a valuable opportunity of training officers for frontier service, and of gaining a knowledge of the feelings and habits of tribes which are constantly sending settlers into British districts. It is open to question whether it is altogether advisable to place in the hands of a single Commissioner the whole executive power on both sides of this most important section of the Empire's external frontier, without the restraint which a trained experience of financial and administrative responsibilities on a large scale imposes upon an authority charged with the government of a first-class province.

8. It is not, however, clear to me that the objections which you raise to the alternative courses indicated in paragraph 11 of your Despatch are entirely unsurmountable. I desire in particular to invite your further consideration to the second of these alternatives :—that, namely, in which it is assumed that the officer entrusted with political matters in the Khaibar Pass might remain under the Commissioner of Peshawar, the Commissioner himself being placed under the Government of India. This plan, you observe, "would put the Commissioner of Peshawar in the position of serving two masters, and would divorce the control of affairs on the British side of the border from the control of affairs on the further side, while the two directing authorities would work through the same officer." I confess that these objections appear to me to be rather formal than substantial. Your Excellency's Government already exercises direct control over the conduct of relations with Afghanistan, and in the management of the independent tribes upon the Punjab frontier there has always been a certain distribution of powers between the Local and Imperial Governments, with a more immediate supervision than is exercised over the internal administration of the Province. The Commissioner of Peshawar is, in fact, accustomed to this difference and its consequences, and in a large measure he even now serves two masters in times of peace, while on various occasions of frontier disturbances he has corresponded direct with the Government of India. The policy, therefore, of directing the affairs of the Khaibar Pass from the headquarters of the Government of India, through the Commissioner of Peshawar, is not altogether an untried policy ; and it must be borne in mind that the objects which you set forth in paragraph 6 of your letter are, all of them, matters for which your Excellency's Government is primarily responsible, subject to a reference to Her Majesty's Government. In view, then, of these several considerations, I am inclined to hold that it would be better that the Commissioner of Peshawar, and, through him, his several subordinates, who are employed in conducting external relations with the various tribes on the frontier of the Peshawar division, should, in respect of such matters, act directly under the Government of India. In such a case it would, in my opinion, be necessary that the Commissioner should be appointed by the Government of India, with special reference to the responsibility in respect of affairs on the frontier which will be placed upon him under the scheme now proposed. In respect of affairs beyond the frontier, it would suffice that he should send copies of his reports for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

9. I am aware that any such alteration of system may require additional expenditure and some relaxation of the ordinary service regulations, and also that it will involve a change in the status of the office of Commissioner. There is one point, however, which I commend to your particular attention. It seems to me to be of the first importance that the officers who are entrusted with the

delicate and difficult duties of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes, should have large liberty of action and leisure for personal intercourse with them, and should be able to devote much time and patience to these special objects. They can hardly combine such duties with the regular work of district officials ; nor will it, I think, be found convenient that they should be subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion. I shall not object to the exercise by your Government of a wide discretion in framing the arrangements, financial and executive, which may be found necessary for giving effect to these considerations, which appear to me to be very material to the success of any system introduced for the removal of the disadvantages indicated above.

10. Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India. I have indicated, in the two foregoing paragraphs, some of the considerations which should be borne in mind in dealing with this question. But the matter is too important for me to arrive at any final decision in respect to them without giving to them the fullest possible consideration. I shall receive with interest any further observations which your Excellency may desire to make on the suggestions of this Despatch.

11. The remaining portions of your Excellency's letter deal with two subjects which are closely connected with each other, namely, the exaction of the terms of submission already announced to the Afridis, and the grant to them of a sanad declaring their future relations. I accept the conclusion stated, in the 15th paragraph of your Excellency's letter, that no further steps should be taken to enforce the restitution of arms captured by the tribes during the campaign. In regard, however, to the abandonment of the demand for payment by the tribe of the value of property looted by them in the Khaibar, I consider that it would be well to make some further attempt to bring home to the Afridis their responsibility for the consequences of their flagrant breach of engagement in this respect. I desire to be informed whether a portion of the liability could not be realized from the property of Maliks Wali Mahomed and Khwas Khan in British India, and how far it might be possible by other means, such as the threat of a blockade, to enforce the pecuniary satisfaction which was formally demanded by your Excellency's Government from the tribe.

12. I presume that the allowances payable to the clans will not be renewed until you have settled the terms upon which your future relations will be conducted with them. The acceptance of these allowances might suffice as a formal adhesion on their part to the terms which may be arranged. I do not consider that it is necessary to stipulate for their "acceptance recorded upon" a sanad, or to base your reservation of the right to construct and work a railway upon their consent. The conduct of the Afridis has, as you observe, "constituted an absolute rupture of all relations." You have obtained actual and undisputed possession of the Pass, and it is sufficient to announce in clear terms to the tribes the rights which you reserve, and the relations which for the future you intend to maintain. Whether you should include in the announcement a formal declaration of your intention to make a railway and to assume jurisdiction within its limits, appears to me doubtful ; at least until your survey is complete and you are prepared to begin the work. At any rate, I presume that great care will be taken to avoid the use of any language which may limit your powers or give rise to misunderstanding in the future ; and I request that your Excellency will be so good as to send me a summary of the new settlement before you communicate it to the tribes for their guidance.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 7.

Extract from Military Despatch from the Secretary of State for India in Council to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 25th August 1898.

I have considered in Council your Excellency's Despatch, M 6636, of 23rd June, 1898, submitting your proposals for the military arrangements necessary for keeping open the road *viâ* the Malakand to Dir and Chitral.

Dealing first with the principles to be adopted generally for defences on the North-West Frontier, you propose that in future the strength of the more advanced garrisons shall be kept as low as may be practicable, being placed in strong works which cannot be captured by a tribal enemy so long as the garrisons have food, water, and ammunition; that outposts of regular troops shall be as few and strong as possible; that minor posts, and posts on the line of communications, shall generally be held by levies, when the duties to be performed are those devolving on a police force, or by irregular troops, which you would prefer to see organised as a militia; and that risings among the frontier tribes shall be met by moveable columns of sufficient strength, placed where they can readily support and assist the stationary garrisons. You consider that in event of serious attacks on the frontier being made or threatened, as in the case of the attacks by the Orakzais and Afridis on the Samana and other posts in August and September, 1897, the garrisons of the weaker posts shall either be reinforced or withdrawn according to a pre-arranged plan.

I approve of these general principles, which are in accordance with the views expressed in my despatch of the 28th January, 1898. I will merely add that in all cases the garrisons should be amply sufficient not only with regard to the perimeter of the works to be defended, but also to provide some relief for the troops in the contingency of continuous attacks for several nights running, such as occurred during the outbreak of last year.

No. 8.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Hon'ble Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. Dated Simla, the 10th November 1898.

Dated the 5th August, 1898.

As soon as we received Your Lordship's despatch as marked in the margin, we referred to the Local Government the question of the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border. We have now received the reply of the Lieutenant-Governor, but, for reasons stated by His Excellency the Viceroy in a Minute which we enclose, we have been unable to give to the Lieutenant-Governor's memorandum sufficient consideration to enable us to state our views on the question at issue.

2. In the meantime we have the honour to forward, for information, the correspondence alluded to and the Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) ELGIN.
" W. S. A. LOCKHART.
" J. WESTLAND.
" M. D. CHALMERS.
" E. H. H. COLLEN.
" A. C. TREVOR.
" C. M. RIVAZ.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

Letter from Sir William Cuningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 19th September 1898.

In my letter dated the 12th September, you were informed that a further communication would be made to you upon the question of the future position of the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division and other matters dealt with in the despatch which that letter forwarded.

2. In the 7th and 8th paragraphs Lord George Hamilton discusses alternative ways in which it has been proposed to carry on relations with the tribes on the Punjab border, and his lordship states the decision at which Her Majesty's Government have arrived in these words—"Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangement are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India."

3. Of the two plans, one is the creation of a Frontier Commissionership. Any discussion of this scheme could only be undertaken after careful consideration by the Government of India of the various objections indicated by the Secretary of State himself. The Governor-General in Council accordingly in this letter would primarily invite his Honour's attention to the alternative of making the Commissioner of Peshawar and, through him, his several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the tribes, directly subordinate, in respect of such matters, to the Government of India. The practicability of an arrangement of this nature must largely depend on local circumstances and conditions; and it cannot usefully be discussed without information which the Local Government alone can supply. The Governor-General in Council, therefore, desires to be favoured with the opinion of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor as to the way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border could be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government, and as to the changes in system which would be entailed by giving effect to the scheme above indicated.

4. The conclusion to which Her Majesty's Government have come may contemplate the extension of this system of controlling tribal relations to the whole Punjab frontier, but as all the remainder of the paragraph from which the passage above is quoted deals exclusively with the Commissioner of Peshawar and his subordinates, it would, in the opinion of the Government of India, be convenient to consider this matter first from the point of view of the Peshawar Commissionership only, and not to provide for re-arrangement of the duties and position of the frontier officers of the Punjab Commission on other parts of the border, further than alterations proposed in the Peshawar Commissionership rendered a reference to others necessary.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) W. J. CUNINGHAM,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

Letter from the Hon. Mr. L. W. Dane, Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, the 23rd October 1898.

I am desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 19th ultimo, in which it is intimated that the Governor-General in Council desires to be favoured with the opinion of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor as to the

way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border can be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government as set forth in the despatch from the Secretary of State, No. 18, dated 5th August, 1898.

Punjab Government endorsements, dated the 29th September 1898, forwarding the papers to the Commissioners of the Peshawar and Derajat Divisions and to Mr. H. A. Anderson.

Letter from the Commissioner, Derajat, dated the 7th October 1898.

Letter from Mr. H A. Anderson, dated the 17th October, 1898

Note by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, dated the 19th October 1898.

2. In compliance with these orders, I am now to submit copies of the documents noted on the margin, and to intimate that the opinions of Sir Richard Udny and Mr. F. D. Cunningham, who was consulted unofficially, will be forwarded on receipt.

Annex. I.

Government of India letter, dated the 19th September 1898. *Endorsed by Punjab Government.*

Copy forwarded to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, for favour of his very early opinion on the measures discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch, Secret, dated 5th August 1898, with special reference to the arrangement mentioned by the Government of India in this letter of making the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division directly subordinate to Government of India in regard to his political dealings with the trans-border tribes.

Copy, with copy of Secretary of State's despatch, dated 5th August 1898, forwarded to $\frac{\text{the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division,}}{\text{H. A. Anderson, Esq.}}$ for favour of his opinion on the suggestions for the future management of the Punjab frontier contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the despatch from Secretary of State, secret, dated 5th August 1898.

Annex II.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 7th October 1898.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your endorsement dated the 29th ultimo, forwarding for opinion a copy of the Government of India, Foreign Department, letter noted in the margin, with its enclosure, on the subject of the future management of the Punjab frontier.

Dated 19th ultimo.

2. The matters discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch, dated the 5th August 1898, relate primarily to the frontier management of the Peshawar Division and not to that of the Derajat Division. My excuse for submitting an opinion regarding another Division than the one in which I am just at present holding office is, that my connection with the Peshawar Division commenced 21 years ago, that in the course of that connection I have served in every district of the Division, in the Khaibar and in Kurram, and have occupied every post, from that of Junior Assistant Commissioner in the Division to that of Commissioner.

3. It may serve to explain the position as it at present stands, and help towards appreciating the probable effect of a change in the existing arrangements, if, even at the risk of unduly lengthening this letter, I proceed to give as brief an account as possible of the state of affairs that, with slight and unimportant local

modifications which do not affect the question, obtains along the whole line of the Punjab frontier, from Hazara to the Quetta Agency. It is realized that the populations on either side of the boundary line are as closely interwoven and intermingled, socially, commercially and in all the matters of every day life, as are the inhabitants of Nancy and Metz or for the matter of that the people of Berwickshire and Northumberland. Thousands of our subjects are constantly visiting independent territory, many thousands of the hillmen regularly migrate to our districts, whole clans live for half the year on this and for the other half of the year on that side of the border ; where the residents within and without the frontier are not men of the same clan or of the same tribe, they are connected by the intimate ties of common race, of marriage, neighbourhood and of an association, territorial and social, which has endured for many generations. In short, there is no impassable gap, or gulf difficult to cross, between British and independent territory ; the frontier is in reality only an arbitrary line drawn through the limits of a more or less homogeneous population. That being so, it will be readily understood what an infinity of questions, of disputes and disagreements, of business, arises from the daily intercourse of these people. This business must be settled promptly and with justice, or the peace of the border is endangered ; it is business which is quite distinct from the Imperial questions in which British and independent interests, as such, are arrayed against each other. And upon the successful administration of the daily business of the frontier it chiefly depends whether, under ordinary circumstances, the border is heard of or not.

But the discharge of local or Imperial business on the border is not the sole duty that falls upon frontier officers by whom I mean Deputy Commissioners and Commissioners. The internal government of the frontier districts is a matter of great moment, and in some districts of exceptional difficulty. I say it is a matter of moment, because I believe that the prosperity and satisfaction of our trans-Indus subjects reacts strongly upon the men beyond the border, and that discontent within the frontier enhances the dislike of the clans to come under our control and influence and gives a handle to those who preach fanaticism and inculcate hostility. Of the six frontier districts in the Punjab: Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismal Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan, the district of Peshawar is in some respects pre-eminently the most difficult to manage of all in the Province ; the revenue and irrigation systems are exceedingly complex and intricate ; crime is of the gravest nature ; and the population is exceptionally headstrong, fanatical, excitable and intractable. Next in degree with similar general features, comes Bannu. And, excluding Kohat, I think that the five frontier districts, leaving border matters for the moment out of consideration, call for administrative qualifications and capacity above the average which is requisite for Cis-Indus districts. This is undoubtedly so in the cases of Peshawar, Bannu, Hazara ; and I think of Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan also.

4. Turning now to the machinery which works the external and internal business of the frontier divisions and districts, it will be seen that the whole of the Punjab border tribes are already in the immediate and direct charge of officers who have large liberty of action and perfect leisure for personal intercourse with them, who can devote all their time and energy to the specific end of tribal management. To look after one-half of the border clans, special officers exist, appointed *ad hoc*. The tribes of Swat and the Utman Khel are in charge of the Political Agent, Dir and Swat ; the Political Officer in the Khaibar attends to nearly the whole of the Afridi tribe, to the Mullagoris and some Mohmands ; the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram deals with the Zaimusht tribe, with several clans of the Orakzais and with the Chamkannis ; the Political Officers of Northern and Southern Waziristan between them administer the whole trans-frontier population from the Kohat to the Dera Ghazi Khan District. The fact is if we exclude the Biluch tribes of the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier who are, as regards border management, in another category altogether from the Pathan tribes, two-thirds to three-fourths of the frontier is already in the hands of special officers who have no other functions, except perhaps the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram, than those of tribal management. These officers, excluding the Political Agent on the Malakand who reports direct to the Government of India, are directly subordinate to the Commissioners of their respective Divisions. In matters affecting districts they

correspond with the Deputy Commissioners or with the Commandants of Border Military Police, as may be most convenient in each case. Where we have not crossed the boundary of British India, and consequently have not been obliged to create political charges that are independent of Deputy Commissioners, the maintenance of friendly relations with the border tribes, the exercise of such control over them is feasible and expedient, and the settlement of the business, which I have sketched above, arising out of the daily intercourse and transactions of the people within and without the frontier line, is entrusted to the Commandants of Border Military Police, under the general control and supervision of Deputy Commissioners. These Commandants, one of whom is appointed to each one of the six frontier districts, who are European or Native officers, as the case may be (generally European in the more important districts), have the fullest leisure and opportunity for cultivating relations with the clans and for managing the hill men. That is their *métier*. In the discharge of their duties they are served by, and make every use of, the large establishments of Border Military Police in each district whose work consists quite as much of intercourse with the tribes as of watch and ward on the border.

Important matters and questions which the Commandants cannot dispose of are referred to the Deputy Commissioners, under whose general orders, supervision and control are also the Border Military Police establishments ; and similarly, whenever necessary by Deputy Commissioners and by the special Political Officers whom I have mentioned above, to Commissioners. And this is as it should be. I have explained how and why in the districts external cannot be dissociated from internal management, the people are much too closely connected for that ; there must be one administrative head for both branches of management ; in places where we have crossed the boundary and have undertaken the political or other administration of large trans-frontier tracts the circumstances are entirely different, and there we have officers co-ordinate with and not subordinate to Deputy Commissioners, but within a district there can only be one king in Brentford, viz., the Deputy Commissioner. In other ways also this system is right ; it is essential that the officers who are in direct and immediate charge and control of tribes should enjoy the fullest and most unrestrained intercourse with them ; but for senior officers it is in my opinion a mistake to see too much of the tribesmen. By the time an officer has reached the rank of Commissioner he is well known to, and has a thorough personal knowledge and acquaintance with, the jirgas and clansmen, acquired during the period when as Assistant Commissioner, or Political Officer, or in charge of the Border Military Police, and as Deputy Commissioner, he has had constant and daily dealings with them. To my mind, the present system ensures the requisite amount of touch between the senior officers and the clans, without sacrificing any of the respect and awe which the hillmen should entertain for relatively high office. On the other hand, the officers actually in charge of them have nothing else to do than to deal with them. I cannot help thinking that the feeling that officers are not now in touch with the clans as they were formerly is based on a misconception. The officers in charge of the tribesmen are very much more in touch with them than they were before or after the Mutiny. It will be remembered that in the early days of the Punjab there were neither special Political Officers nor Commandants of Border Military Police ; the Deputy Commissioners had to do everything themselves, and I find as early as 1850 Reynell Taylor, in a note regarding the Derajat frontier which he wrote for the benefit of his successor, Nicholson, lamenting the loss of opportunities for mixing with the tribesmen, owing to increased work. Great as was the task accomplished by those men, they tolerated and perforce had to tolerate a condition of things, insecurity within the border and trouble upon it, at which we, of the present day, would be horrified. This defect in the earlier administration has been recognised and remedied by the appointment of special tribal officers in every district of the two frontier divisions and at five trans-frontier localities (Malakand, Khaibar, Kurram, Tochi, and Wana) ; that is to say of eleven officers whose sole duty is frontier management.

5. Before considering the effect of the changes contemplated in the system of frontier management, I would venture to point out, first, that all and every matter, I think I am correct in saying, of Imperial interest on the border, however

ever small it may be, is instantly referred by the Punjab Government for the information and orders of the Government of India ; and that no measure or step whatever which is of general bearing or of any importance in border policy, no organic change of any kind, is undertaken by the Local Government without the previous sanction and concurrence of the Supreme Government. This has been so since 1882, if not from an earlier time. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the Punjab frontier is as already as much under the Government of India as if Commissioners reported on frontier matters direct to that Government. The elimination of the Punjab Government will, however, have a profound effect in other ways, which I will submit further on.

The other point to which I would invite attention is that, save in matters of the purest routine, the Commissioner of Peshawar can hardly be said to correspond direct with the Government of India. So far as I know the affairs of the Khaibar Pass have never been directed by the Government of India through the Commissioner omitting the Punjab Government. Since 1881, and I think practically for the past 20 years, the duties of the Commissioner in connection with the Government of India have consisted of reporting to that Government (generally by the same telegram in which the Commissioner reports to the Punjab Government) the occurrence of any serious border event ; and of transmitting to Kabul urgent communications intended for the Amir and telegraphed to Peshawar, and similarly of telegraphing to the Government of India the contents of urgent letters from the Amir. He also occasionally arranges for the transit of employés or goods belonging to the Amir. In fact, so purely ministerial is this branch of his duties that during his absence from Peshawar the Duputy Commissioner performs them. His present position therefore in respect of serving two masters, if it can be so described, is utterly different from that which is contemplated for the future. I do not think he can be said ever to have been under two masters. In the early days of the Punjab, the medium for the execution of the Imperial policy in regard to Afghanistan was the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, who naturally employed the Commissioner of Peshawar, *e.g.*, in the negotiations and correspondence which preceded the Afghan treaty of 1856, concluded by Sir J. Lawrence. Subsequently, the work of the Commissioner in connection with the Government of India was confined to translating and transmitting the Kabul correspondence and supplying news ; I remember just before the Afghan war that this work devolved upon Sir L. Cavagnari, then Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar ; and since then, the Commissioner's duty direct under the Supreme Government has been always purely ministerial it appears, and in no way administrative.

6. At first sight the proposed alterations in the system of frontier management seem to affect no appreciable change in the present arrangements ; there are the special tribal officers already at hand : the frontier is already practically under the Government of India, the elimination of the Punjab Government will accelerate the transit of orders and the receipt of reports, and the whole difference in the conduct of affairs apparently will be almost nominal. But if we go into the matter, it seems to me that there are very great difficulties in the way ; in practice if not in theory. These I will now submit :

7. It is not a question on which I can venture to offer an opinion, whether the Government of India ought or ought not to deprive itself of the weight, the experience, the knowledge, the long training, of the Punjab Government in matters concerning the border tribes. It is suggested that the Commissioner of Peshawar will send copies of his reports to the Local Government, and no doubt copies of letters from the Government of India to the Commissioner would similarly be communicated to the Local Government. But this is a very different thing from what obtains now ; from the beginning the Lieutenant-Governor has personal knowledge of a case, if it is of any importance he has probably discussed it with the local officers, he has gathered information on all points which are obscure or have been neglected, in short he is in a position to form a full and carefully-weighed judgment. Precluded from personal discussion with officers on the spot and from eliciting information, and confined to an opinion upon papers drawn up without the Lieutenant-Governor's intervention, it is inevitable that the views of the Local Government will not possibly

have the great intrinsic value that they now possess, and that the Lieutenant-Governor will drift farther and farther from touch with the border. Yet, seeing that local officers cannot avoid as a rule dealing with matters solely from a local point of view, that they are in the heat and dust of the battle so to speak, the opinion and judgment of a high officer of State who approaches the consideration of a question with a dispassionate mind and yet with local knowledge, who looks at it from a broad standpoint that embraces the whole frontier and yet is not wholly centred in the frontier, and who moreover has full leisure and opportunity for going into these matters, on the spot, must be of inestimable value to the Supreme Government. Moreover, it is unavoidable that the local officers will be deprived of the benefit of personal communications with their Government. To this benefit I think due weight is not always given, it is a factor of great importance in administration. It is of course practicable for a Commissioner to visit Simla or Calcutta, but of necessity the occasions for doing so must be far more rare, and the meetings will be of a different character from those that take place when the Lieutenant-Governor marches along the frontier, or officers go to Lahore. The element of personal supervision on the spot and of personal influence on part of the governing authority must disappear, unless the Commissioner is raised to, or almost to, the position of the Lieutenant-Governor. But even then the Commissioner's views will necessarily be narrower and more circumscribed than those of the Local Government, possibly also less prudent and circumspect.

8. If the Commissioner of Peshawar is appointed by the Government of India, it is almost impossible that there should not be difficulty arising from the then divergent interests of the Supreme and of the Local Government. The Government of India will then want the best frontier officer it can get ; on the other hand the Lieutenant-Governor must think of the internal administration of the frontier divisions of revenue, police, crime, &c., &c. ; it does not follow that a good Political Officer has good administrative abilities, or *vice versâ* ; and it will not be easy for both Governments to unite upon the same choice. Moreover, the Commissioner is only one man, he can not work without his subordinate staff in each district, and the dual control will and must run through the whole administrative establishment. The Commissioner will emphatically serve two masters (which he does not do now) and where the head of the administration is under dual control, the body must necessarily follow. I do not see how under those circumstances, men being what they are, a break down can be escaped.

9. I have explained that there is a mass of daily business transacted in connection with the border management of districts, with the political charges and their administrations, with the border establishments, &c., this is all disposed of by the local officers under the orders of the Local Government. What that amounts to, a glance at the printed and manuscript Foreign Proceedings of the Punjab Government will show. The whole, or very nearly the whole of this, never reaches the Government of India. If the Punjab Government is dissociated from frontier management, it is plain that the Commissioner must be raised to the position and powers of a Local Government, on the analogy of the Agent Governor-General at Quetta, otherwise this burden of detail will devolve upon the Supreme Government, which would obviously be undesirable.

10. This brings me to the last difficulty. It is suggested that the tribal officers should not be subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion, it is evidently anticipated that the rank and pay of the Commissioner may have to be raised (and if my conclusions in the preceding paragraph are correct, they will have to be raised very considerably), and concessions made to his subordinates. As a frontier officer myself, I should welcome anything that adds to the inducements and attractions of service on the frontier. Compared with what I remember 20 years ago, there is a reluctance to cross the Indus among the junior officers. The reasons are not far to seek. In former days rapid promotion compensated for the responsibilities, hardships, discomfort, unhealthiness, solitude and actual danger of frontier service, which conditions still remain ; but Mackeson, Ross, Edwardes, Reynell Taylor, James, Becher, Pollock, Macnab, Monro, were all substantive

Commissioners within 20 years of entering the Punjab Commission and often in advance of their contemporaries Cis-Indus. Of later years, however, promotion has gone in due course, and men weighing their future, naturally, prefer to remain where life is easier and where their chances of a Commissionership are equal, and some of them may moreover rise to the higher appointments from which frontier officers are in practice debarred; at any rate to which only two officers from the frontier have obtained in 50 years. But I am afraid nothing will reconcile officers to spending their whole service at Wana, in the Tochi, in several of the worst districts trans-Indus, or even in Kurram and on the Malakand, if that is what is meant by men not being subjected to removal. They are willing enough to spend some years under arduous and trying conditions, but I do not think any prospects we could hold out would tempt the stamp of man we want, to serve permanently in some of these frontier charges. In the interests of Government, it is not advisable to keep men too long in any particular post. The majority of the frontier stations are far too unhealthy for prolonged residence, save in cases of exceptional physique or adaptability to the climate. A change from time to time is healthy to all concerned.

With a minute service, such as the proposed class of officers will be, it is difficult to understand how it will be feasible to arrange for proper promotion. If the Commissioner of Peshawar in future has higher pay and rank than other Commissioners, say than the Financial Commissioner also, where is he to go to? Unless the Government of India are prepared to open high political appointments for him, he must remain where he is till he retires, since there is no further place for him in the Punjab and a transfer to another Division will operate as a penalty. It may so happen that an officer obtains the post at a comparatively early stage in his career; if so, his juniors will be hopelessly blocked. Or the man next to him may be a relatively young officer, in that case all below him must stagnate. Each in regulating promotion varies in proportion to the size of a service, and with the dozen or at the most two dozen officers who will compose this special frontier service, it is certain that very soon insuperable difficulties of promotion will arise. Additions to pay will not suffice, for men want variety of work after a time. Nor will it be possible to utilize them elsewhere, since after a man has spent 10 to 15 of the best years of his life on special work, he becomes an expert in that particular line, and experts are rarely fit for other duty than in their own sphere. Altogether, however desirable it is to attract and to retain the best type of officer for the difficult task of tribal management, on the principal that the best system of administration that can be devised is made or marred by its *personnel*, I fear the specialization of the frontier service will result in grave difficulties, unless indeed all frontier officers are included in the political service, but this is apparently not intended and would be going far beyond the scope of the present scheme which is to place officers of the Punjab Commission jointly under the Supreme and Punjab Government.

11. On the whole, I venture to conclude, that the scheme discussed in the Secretary of State's despatch virtually is already in existence, but without those obstacles to the successful working of the frontier administration which I apprehend from the modifications suggested. The frontier tribes are already under the Government of India and eleven special tribal officers are already at work everywhere. The recent frontier troubles were not, I submit, the consequence of the present arrangements. One might otherwise argue with equal justice that because they started in the Tochi and culminated on the Malakand and in the Khaibar, all of which are distinct political units under special officers, therefore it is a mistake to place officers in exclusive political charge of trans-frontier tribes, whereas the contrary is the case.

Annex III.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., Officiating Commissioner, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 17th October, 1898.

I have the honour to submit the opinion on the suggestions for the future management of the Punjab frontier contained in paragraphs 7 and 8

of the despatch of the Secretary of State, Secret, dated August 5th, 1898, called for in your endorsement, dated September 29th, 1898. The proposal contained in paragraph 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch is that the Commissioner, Peshawar, and through him his several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the various tribes on the frontier of the Peshawar Division, should, in respect of such matters, act directly under the Government of India. The Government of India in forwarding the despatch ask for information as to the way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border could be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government, and as to the changes in system which would be entailed by giving effect to the scheme proposed by the Secretary of State.

2. I apprehend that practical suggestions for carrying the Secretary of State's proposal into effect are what is asked for in this reference. At the same time as the question is admittedly one of considerable practical difficulty, and as it is not easy to make suggestions for carrying the new scheme into effect without pointing out and considering the difficulties which are involved in the change in system, I consider myself justified in briefly indicating some of these difficulties. As a Punjab frontier officer who has spent his service under the old system, it is difficult to approach the question without prejudice, but I shall attempt to examine the question with impartiality.

3. The first point calling for remark in the Secretary of State's statement of the scheme contained in paragraph 8 of his despatch is the assumption that something similar to what is now proposed is already in existence, namely, that the Commissioner of Peshawar in a large measure serves two masters in times of peace. That the Commissioner of Peshawar discharges any administrative functions under the orders of the Government of India direct, is, I believe, not the fact. He is the servant exclusively of the Punjab Government, through whom he receives the orders of the Government of India. He is the medium no doubt through whom a certain amount of urgent communications between the Government of India and the Amir of Kabul passes, but in this connection he is a translator and conveyor of letters only. The system which it is now proposed to introduce is an entirely new one. It has not been tried before, and it is not correct to claim for it the prestige of a tried and proved success.

4. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, as things now are, frequently visits and tours along the frontier. He is in close contact with frontier affairs and frontier officers. He is able to acquaint himself personally on the spot with what is passing on the frontier. At the same time he is by his experience, training and position as the head of the Punjab administration, able to form dispassionate judgments on difficult questions, and give invaluable advice on all questions of policy. There can be no doubt, I think, that one effect of the proposed change of system will be that the matured judgment and advice of the Lieutenant-Governor will not be so available on trans-frontier questions as it now is. This, I should think, will be a loss to the Government of India: it will certainly be a severe loss to the Commissioner of Peshawar.

5. A strong objection has been taken to the scheme under discussion on the ground that the Commissioner of Peshawar would be in the position of serving two masters, and the control of affairs on the British side of the border would be divorced from the control of affairs on the further side. No doubt it is difficult for one man to serve two masters of equal status and authority, and the difficulty would be enormously enhanced if these two masters followed opposite or divergent policies. In the present case, however, the two masters stand in the relation of supreme and subordinate, and the policy of the latter must subordinate itself to the policy of the former. The proposed arrangement would no doubt give rise to difficulties, but it does not appear to me to be impracticable. As regards the divorce of control mentioned above, it is no doubt true that the population in parts of the border is homogeneous within and without, relations between cis-border and trans-border tribes are intimate and the spheres of control must cross at points. It is practicable, however, in most matters to draw a fixed line between trans-border and cis-

border affairs and cases, and as one officer will have direct control of both, it is my opinion, though I state it with all deference, that the Commissioner of Peshawar being an officer of the Punjab Commission could, without serious difficulty, exercise his control over trans-border tribes under the direct orders of the Government of India, while at the same time administering cis-border tribes and districts under the direct orders of the Punjab Government.

6. It is suggested in connection with the new scheme that arrangements should be made, whereby officers who are entrusted with the duties of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes should have ample leisure for personal intercourse with them. This is no doubt most desirable, but there are now special Political Officers along the whole frontier who have the desired leisure for full and free intercourse with the tribes, and who are little encumbered with the regular work of district officials. So far as my experience goes, there is little left to be done now in this direction.

7. It is also suggested that the political staff which has to deal with trans-border tribes should not be subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution. It has been the practice of the Punjab Government of recent years to keep its frontier staff on or across the frontier, to restrict the frontier Commissionerships to frontier officers, and to discourage transfers to non-frontier districts. Service, however, on and across the frontier is not generally popular for various reasons. It is difficult now to induce officers to serve fer any length of time across the border. They will be still less willing to so serve if they experience stagnation in promotion which will surely follow the introduction of the proposal now suggested. I do not think that the Government could go much further in this direction than the Punjab Government have gone in the past.

8. I pass now to the consideration of the advantages of the new scheme. The Commissioner of Peshawar in the first place as the only intermediate authority between the tribesmen and the Supreme Government will under the scheme gain a greatly enhanced status in the eyes of the former, and this will increase his power and influence with them and will render them more amenable to his control. The Pathans have an intimate acquaintance with our administrative grades, and will fully understand the difference between an officer who is in direct communication with and who acts directly under the orders of the Government of India, and an officer of the Provincial Government. They will have more respect for the former in virtue of his superior authority and more independent position. This seems to me a very important consideration when weighing the merits and demerits of the new scheme.

9. There can be no doubt, I think, that the new system will save much correspondence, as the Commissioner of Peshawar will correspond direct with the Government of India. It will also reduce discussion in the disposal of questions which are not of first rate importance and accelerate the introduction of any changes which the Government of India may consider it desirable to introduce in prosecution of its present policy of extending our influence over the trans-border tribes. Moreover, it is obvious that under the proposed arrangement the Government of India will exercise a more direct control over the external relations of the trans-frontier tribes than it has hitherto exercised. On the Peshawar border these relations are intimately involved with our relations with the Amir of Kabul and other Chiefs ; it is an argument in favour of the new scheme that it will bring all these relations more directly under one Imperial control.

10. It will also be an advantage, I think, for the Commissioner to be directly under the Supreme Government in connection with other departments such, for example, as the Military Department. It will strengthen his hands in dealing with matters, such as the employment of the military forces in support of the Political Officers in checking raids and promoting peace and order. At present all such matters have to follow a very circuitous channel before anything is done, and it is desirable to shorten this channel.

11. It will be seen from the views expressed above that while the new scheme seems to me open to serious objections, it at the same time has certain

advantages. The Secretary of State points out that, in giving practical effect to the scheme, it will be necessary to make a change in the status of the Commissioner of Peshawar. It will be necessary, I consider, to considerably enhance the status of the Commissioner as regards trans-frontier affairs. He must be empowered to dispose of many matters which he has now to refer for orders to the Punjab Government. To enable him to have as wide a view as possible of what is passing across the frontier of the division, it will be advisable to place under his control the Chitral and Dir Agency and the relations with the tribes under that Agency. His status would be advantageously raised to something like that of the Governor-General's Agent for Baluchistan as regards trans-frontier affairs. This arrangement need not, I think, interfere with his status as Commissioner under the Punjab Government as regards the districts and tribes of the Peshawar Division which may remain as it is. The position of the Commissioner of Peshawar will thus become one of great responsibility, and much additional work will be thrown on his shoulders. A considerable increase in his salary must accompany the enhancement of his status, and no doubt he will require the assistance of a Personal Assistant to assist him in the disposal of much of his routine work.

Annex IV.

Note by Sir Mackworth Young, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

I am asked for my opinion as to the way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border could be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government in the despatch from the Secretary of State, dated 5th August, 1898, and as to the changes in system which would be entailed by giving effect to the scheme therein indicated. The scheme is thus described in the despatch : " Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India." And in directing my attention to this scheme, the Government of India further define it to consist in " making the Commissioner of Peshawar and, through him, his several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the tribes directly subordinate, in respect of such matters, to the Government of India."

2. The objection to such an arrangement put forward by the Government of India, viz., that it " would put the Commissioner of Peshawar in the position of serving two masters, and would divorce the control of affairs on the British side of the border from the control of affairs on the further side, while the two directing authorities would work through the same officer," is held to be formal rather than substantial, and it is argued that the Commissioner of Peshawar even now serves two masters in times of peace, while on various occasions of frontier disturbances he has corresponded direct with the Government of India.

3. The main ground of dissatisfaction with the present system appears from the passages above quoted to be that the Punjab Government is interposed between the authority of the Government of India and that of the Political Officers on the Punjab frontier. Further grounds for this dissatisfaction appear to be based upon the opinion that the officers entrusted with the delicate and difficult duties of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes have not sufficient liberty of action and leisure for personal intercourse with them, and cannot devote much time and patience to these special objects ; and that they can hardly combine such duties with the regular work of district officials, and that it is inconvenient that they should be subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion.

4. It is above all things necessary in a qustion involving such important issues that the facts should be correctly understood, and before going any

further I find it necessary to state, with the utmost deference, that the passages above quoted seem to me to indicate several misconceptions as to the facts. I may draw attention, with reference to this subject, to the opinions stated in an article of "The Times" of 23rd August last, for which high authority was claimed, but which have been shown to be based upon similar misconceptions. The most important of these opinions were traversed in an excellent letter signed "Expertus" which appeared in a later issue about 13th September. I regret that, owing to the necessity for replying at an early date to the reference from the Government of India, it has been impossible for me to obtain in time the opinions of several officers of extended frontier experience, but I have received an able letter from Mr. Merk, C.S.I., well known to the Government of India as a distinguished frontier officer who, though at present officiating as Commissioner of the Derajat Divison, has been for 21 years almost continuously employed in the Peshawar Division, and who is intimately acquainted with the administration of that frontier and with the races, customs, languages and locations of its various inhabitants. I invite a careful perusal of his excellent paper, which also brings out several of the misconceptions to which I have alluded.

5. I shall now, in order to be as brief as possible, make definite statements relating to the matters on which, as it seems to me, misconception exists—

First.—*The position which the Commissioner of Peshawar occupies or has from time to time occupied bears no resemblance to that which he would occupy under the present proposal.* It is true that the Government of India communicate direct with the Commissioner of Peshawar in regard to matters relating to the Amir. I draw attention, however, to Mr. Merk's remark that "so purely ministerial is this branch of his duties that during his absence from Peshawar the Deputy Commissioner performs them." To this I may add that, except in regard to the collection and formulating of information regarding the affairs of Afghanistan—in fact, compiling his weekly diary—the duty performed by the Commissioner in this respect consists mainly of translating and forwarding letters between the Government of India and the Amir. But the most noteworthy fact in connection with this subject is that these duties have very little connection with the administration of the border, and do not involve the employment of the services of any other officer under the orders of the Punjab Government. The orders communicated direct to the Commissioner of Peshawar with reference to the Amir do not, as a matter of fact, relate to any questions with which the Punjab Government and the officers serving under it are directly concerned, and no possibility of conflict can arise so long as the Commissioner corresponds with the Government of India direct only on such matters. I shall show later on how different would be the effect of placing the Commissioner of Peshawar and his subordinates in direct relation with the Government of India in respect of border management. For the present it is sufficient to state that there is no analogy between the two cases, and that the employment of the Commissioner of Peshawar in the manner above described affords no precedent for the success of the proposal to control the trans-frontier tribes through officers under the orders of the Punjab Government without the intervention of that Government, unless it can be shown that the management of the trans-frontier tribes has no connection with the management of the British border. I deal with this question further on—(paragraphs 10–11).

6. Second.—*It is not the fact that on various occasions of frontier disturbancs the Commissioner of Peshawar has corresponded direct with the Government of India.* I cannot find any instance of this. The Commissioner of Peshawar, as will be explained hereafter (paragraph 14), has to submit certain information on urgent matters direct to the Government of India; but I cannot discover that he has ever corresponded direct with the Government of India, otherwise than as provided in the orders on that subject.

7. Third.—*Speaking generally, it is a fact that the frontier officers who are entrusted with the duty of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes, have large liberty of action and leisure for personal intercourse with them, and are able to devote much time and patience to these*

special objects. It is notorious that the two frontier Commissionerships of Peshawar and the Derajat are far the lightest worked in the province. In the reorganisation scheme of 1884, when the number of cis-Indus Commissionerships was reduced, and the number of districts included in them increased, the Peshawar Commissionership, notwithstanding that the Commissioner was relieved of sessions work, was not enlarged, and only one district was added to the Derajat charge. The number of districts in each Commissionership is now as follows :—

Delhi	7	districts.
Jullundur	5	„
Lahore	6	„
Rawalpindi	6	„
Peshawar	3	„
Derajat	4	„

Since 1884 the following outlying political charges have been added ; Kurram in 1892 to Peshawar, and Tochi and Wano in 1895 to the Derajat, but this does not seriously affect the propositions that the two frontier Commissioners have ample leisure for political work. Their communications on the questions which arise in connection with border politics have always been full and well considered. From long experience of the subject, I maintain that no branch of work entrusted to Commissioners is more efficiently performed. Whenever their personal presence or supervision has been required for interviewing jirgas on special occasions or for watching the development of trans-frontier events, their services have been freely available. There is absolutely no ground for the idea that they have insufficient leisure for patient dealing with trans-frontier tribes, though it is by no means always desirable that an officer of the standing of a Commissioner should personally interview the jirgas. I am not sure that I understand the desire of the Secretary of State that Political Officers on the frontier should have large liberty of action, but I apprehend that what is meant is that they should not be hampered by other duties, not that their power of independent action should be increased. The latter would be quite inconsistent with the centralisation of authority implied in the present proposals. In the earlier days of Punjab Administration, Frontier Commissioners undoubtedly enjoyed large liberty of action, but trans-border politics having become matters of Imperial concern, this liberty has of necessity been curtailed.

8. Passing from Commissioners to Deputy Commissioners and Political Officers, there is perhaps something, though still very little, to be said for the position that local Political Officers have not always sufficient leisure for tribal management. As pointed out by Mr. Merk, two-thirds to three-fourths of the Punjab frontier is in the hands of officers who have nothing else to do. The Political Agent, Dir and Swat, already under the direct orders of the Government of India, is of course an instance of the system desired by the Secretary of State, and the remarks regarding want of leisure, &c., do not apply to him. But apart from him the Political Officer in the Khyber, and the Political Officers in the Tochi and at Wano are solely engaged in tribal management, while the administrative duties of the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram are not so onerous as to hamper him in his discharge of the same duty. The creation of these appointments, all within the last 18 years and most of them within the last eight years, has had the effect of reducing the responsibilities for tribal management attaching to the Deputy Commissioners of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. The power to appoint an additional District Magistrate for districts to which the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1887, applies, conferred upon the Local Government by Section 5 of that Regulation, was designed to lighten the work of the Deputy Commissioner and set him more free for political duties. With the same object the strength of the staff in frontier districts has from time to time been carefully revised by the Local Government, and special officers have been appointed to the command of the Border Military Police in several frontier districts. The Deputy Commissioners of Hazara and Kohat have ample leisure for their political duties. The Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar has an onerous charge, but he has few political duties left. Buner, the Khudu Khel and

Gaduns are managed by the Assistant Commissioner in charge of the sub-division of Yusafzai; Swat and the Utman Khel, except the Laman Utman Khel, a small section, are in the hands of the Political Agent for Dir and Swat; the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber corresponds direct with the Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioner is not concerned with its political management; and the tribes of the Kohat Pass are managed by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat. The only tribes which remain under the control of the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar are the Mohmands on the north-west, and on the south-west the Aka Khel Afridis and the Hassan Khel section and two other small sub-sections of the Adam Khel. As regards the Mohmands proposals have been made for transferring them to the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber, and probably this should be done when the Khyber settlement is completed. During recent years, while the settlement with the Mohmands was in progress, the work was largely done by the Commissioner in person. The charge of the Peshawar district is undoubtedly quite enough for one officer, and the attention of the Punjab Government has long been directed to the necessity for relieving him of political work or of strengthening his hands in the district administration, so as to permit of his giving more time to such work. The measures taken have been to a great extent effectual. What remains to be done is only a matter of time and thought. It is possible that, if the political management of the Mohmands had last year been in the hands of an officer with more leisure than the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, he might have succeeded in persuading the Commissioner of Peshawar that a raid on Shabkadar was imminent, though I am not inclined to attribute our unpreparedness to his being overworked. Be this as it may, I am prepared to admit that the political management of the Mohmands is a matter which requires further consideration in connection with the settlement of the Khyber Pass, and any redistribution of political functions which may result from the present correspondence. And if the Secretary of State or the Government of India consider that the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar or any other frontier Deputy Commissioner requires further relief to enable him to bestow more time upon the management of the tribes on his border, I shall be quite prepared to make proposals with this object, but such proposals would necessarily involve considerable extra expense, which the Provincial Government would not be in a position to meet without assistance.

9. I do not enter into details regarding the districts of the Derajat, as this is not desired by the Government of India, but in regard to the Peshawar Commissionership I am decidedly of opinion that, with the exception perhaps of the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar whose onerous duties have long engaged and will continue to engage the attention of the Punjab Government, there is no foundation for the conclusion that the local Political Officers have not ample leisure for tribal management.

10. The fourth statement that I make is this—

The duty of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes is inseparable from that of managing the tracts within the British border. The grounds for this statement are so well put by Mr. Merk that I reproduce his words:—

"Thousands of our subjects are constantly visiting independent territory, many thousands of the hillmen regularly migrate to our districts, whole clans live for half the year on this and for the other half of the year on that side of the border; where the residents within and without the frontier are not men of the same clan or of the same tribe, they are connected by the intimate ties of common race, of marriage, neighbourhood and of an association, territorial and social, which has endured for many generations. In short, there is no impassable gap or gulf, difficult to cross, between British and independent territory; the frontier is in reality only an arbitrary line drawn through the limits of a more or less homogeneous population. That being so, it will be readily understood what an infinity of questions, of disputes, and disagreements of business arises from the daily intercourse of these people. This business must be settled promptly and with justice, or the peace of the border is endangered; it is business which is quite distinct from the Imperial questions in which British and independent interests, as such, are arrayed against each other. And upon the successful administration of the daily business of the frontier it chiefly depends whether, under ordinary circumstances, the border is heard of or not."

11. There are tracts in regard to which separate political charges have been framed to which the above remarks apply only to a minor degree. But

they apply with special force to the whole of the Peshawar and Kohat border from the Malakand to the Kurram, including the Khyber Pass and the Afridi and Orakzai tribes. The political management of the last-named tribes is closely bound up with the management of the British border. And, although there are tracts in regard to which the position is less clear, this is more or less true all along the border. And Mr. Merk touches the point when he says that the business which arises in consequence of the close connection between the people on either side of the border is quite distinct from the Imperial questions in which British and independent interests are arrayed against each other. There are numerous references in regard to such matters in which a decision of the Local Government may be called for, but a pronouncement of the Foreign Department of the Government of India would be unnecessary and out of place. In short, a great deal of our management of the trans-border tribes is carried on in the daily course of border administration, and it is not expedient that it should be magnified into a Foreign Office question. On the other hand, the separation of the trans-frontier from the cis-frontier aspect of many questions now disposed of by our frontier officers is impossible. This was fully realised by Lord Lytton when proposing the creation of a Frontier Chief Commissionership, in the words :* "Mixed up as are the tribes within and beyond our border, he (the Chief Commissioner) must evidently have charge of the immediate frontier districts as well as of all our trans-frontier relations. I confidently affirm the inseparable connection of portions of British territory with trans-frontier tracts and the necessity of entrusting the control of both to the same local officer."

* Minute of 22nd April 1877.

12. My fifth statement is—

That frontier officers in the Punjab have been much less liable to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion than other officers of the Punjab Commission; and that a special service constituted with the object of furnishing officers solely for controlling the trans-frontier tribes would be a failure. I do not suppose that the above proposition will be seriously challenged. The writer of the article in "The Times" of 23rd August, in support of his assertions that frontier officers are now frequently changed, that they are no longer specially selected for frontier work, and that the ablest of them look upon such work as a stepping-stone to pleasanter posts, alluded to the fact that between 1st April 1894 and August 1898 there had been 13 changes in the office of Commissioner of Peshawar. But as he was obliged to record, though there were 13 changes, there were only four officers, and the changes were in no single case brought about by the removal of any of those to pleasanter posts, while each of the four officers was a thoroughly experienced frontier officer. It is sufficient to mention their names, and record their total service and the length of their frontier service :—

	Years.	
	Total Service.	Service on Frontier.
Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I.	29	21½
Mr. Cunningham, C.I.E.	26	15½
Mr. Merk, C.S.I.	23	15¾
Mr. King, C.S.I....	20	9½

These officers, all of them bearing the marks of approved service in the decorations they have earned, are undoubtedly the best men that the Punjab had to give for the office of Commissioner of Peshawar. That their names should have been cited by "The Times'" writer in support of his extraordinary

assertions seems to me singularly unfortunate for his argument. I should not have gone out of my way to deal with this instance, but that I am at a loss to find any ground for what is implied in the suggestion contained in the Secretary of State's despatch that it will not be found convenient that the officers entrusted with the duties of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes, should be "subject to the removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion." The officers employed on the Punjab frontier are very rarely moved to charges in the interior of the province when they have once established their reputation as frontier officers. I think I may say that the only circumstances under which such transfers have been made are those which relate to the health of the officer or some other disqualification for frontier service. On the other hand, it will, I think, be readily admitted that a small service is difficult to man properly; that the pick of a large Commission is likely to be far superior to the best outturn of a limited number of specialists, and that a small corps of Punjab frontier politicals would not be in any respect a success. I am not arguing here against a Frontier Commission large enough to deal with a considerable tract of British territory added to the control of trans-frontier tribes, nor against a Department of the Foreign Office with a political contingent forming part of the political service; but a limited service of a dozen or even two dozen politicals recruited *ad hoc* to be retained *ad hoc*, and to be precluded from transfer otherwise than on promotion to higher spheres under the orders of the Government of India, would be a thorn in the side of the latter, and is doomed to failure. And it may, I think, be confidently asserted that the best field for selecting Punjab frontier officers is the Punjab Commission, and that, while as hitherto it is desirable that transfers from the interior of the province to the frontier and *vice versâ* in the higher grades of the Commission should be sparingly made, it would be undesirable to separate the two services in such a manner as to preclude transfers, where they are manifestly for the advantage of the public service.

13. I have thus endeavoured to clear away what I cannot but regard as misconceptions in respect of the existing state of affairs, and I now crave permission to say a few words regarding the Secretary of State's proposals. The first and most prominent feature of those proposals is the elimination of the Punjab Government in the chain of correspondence in regard to trans-frontier management between the Punjab local frontier officers and the Government of India. It is proposed to put the subordinates of the Local Government into direct communication with the Supreme Government on this subject. The advantage of this change is not stated, but I think I may assume that the main object is to get rid of what is rightly or wrongly held to be the Punjab view in regard to our trans-frontier management. What that view is has been well described by "Expertus" in the letter above quoted, and I cannot do better than give an extract from his remarks:—

> "I think I may claim for the Lieutenant-Governor and his officers that they have always been most loyal to the Government of India and have done their utmost to carry out the policy of that Government as if it was their own. What has from time to time occurred has been simply this—that when the Government of India has directed some forward move, the Lieutenant-Governor and his officers being in immediate contact with the tribes have felt more impressed than the Government of India seemed to be with the difficulties and risks, with the amount of force required at starting and to be permanently locked up, and so forth, and have represented this to the Government of India."

I need not say much on the value of the opinion of an officer in the position of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on questions relating to the control of the trans-frontier tribes. It is for the Government of India to estimate the value of such an opinion. As remarked by "Expertus," "the exclusion of the Punjab Government from all share in the frontier administration would undoubtedly simplify matters in two ways, viz., by abridging discussion and removing opposition to forward movements, and by doing away with the supervision and control which the Lieutenant-Governor, who spends a good deal of time on the frontier and is in close contact with frontier affairs, now exercises. Whether the results of this simplification would be good or bad, I leave others to say." Although these remarks were directed to the

proposal to separate the frontier entirely from the Punjab Government, they deserve, I submit, respectful consideration with reference to the proposal to control the trans-frontier tribes without the advice of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

14. The second objection to the proposal is that as above stated the management of trans-frontier tribes is so much mixed up with that of the adjoining British frontier, that their complete separation is impossible. Thus many matters will be reported direct to the Government of India which affect the responsibility of the Local Government, but in regard to which the Local Government will have no voice. This is to my mind absolutely fatal to the scheme. I do not think the inconvenience and impossibility of the arrangement would be fully apparent for some time, as the frontier officers of experience would retain for some time their old ideas of subordination to the Local Government, but a few years would, I feel sure, be sufficient to reveal its impossibility. The Lieutenant-Governor will find his authority over the frontier districts impaired and will be of little assistance to the Government of India in the task which will have devolved upon it. In support of this view I appeal to opinions held on previous occasions with reference to the same subject. The orders* of the Government of India directing the submission by all officers in the Punjab exercising political functions of information of a certain class to the Government of India direct were regarded by the late Sir Henry Durand as involving a radical change in the position and powers of the Local Government. He represented† that :

* Foreign Department, dated 20th July 1870.

† Punjab Government, dated the 22nd August 1870, paragraph 6.

"a very little consideration of practical working must convince any one acquainted with the system of the administration hitherto in force that subordinate officers, when they shall cease to be confined to direct communication with the Local Government, and shall acquire the practice of direct correspondence, both written and telegraphic, with the Government of India, will *ipso facto* be invested with a power of initiating through the superior Government their own views. These may or may not be consonant with those of the Local Government, and when opposed to them there will be no corrective. The superior Government, acting on first impressions, may find itself committed to the issue of instructions from which it may be difficult to recede, however little in harmony with the deliberate views of the Local Government, which can only reach subsequently. The latter would thus be fettered by the action of its nominal subordinates and be placed in a very false position.

"Besides the above element of weakness, there is the fact which obtrudes itself upon general observation, and is already the subject of comment, namely that there is no announcement that similar orders have been promulgated to the Bombay Government with regard to its officers on the Sind or Rajputana frontiers; nor to the Bengal Government with regard to its Assam and Arracan frontiers; nor to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma with regard to the Burmese, Karan, Shan, and Siamese frontiers. The contrast is held to indicate a change of policy reflecting distrust of, and want of confidence in, the Punjab Government and its officers."

It will be observed that Sir Henry Durand's apprehensions were based merely upon the direct transmission of information. A division of responsibility in the actual management of frontier affairs was not contemplated by him as a possibility. An instance of the effect of the orders regarding direct reports to the Government of India will be found in the correspondence marginally noted. Sir Robert Egerton represented that direct communications not of the urgent character mentioned in the correspondence of 1870 between the Commissioner of Peshawar and the Government of India had resulted in different orders being communicated to the former by the latter, and by the Punjab Government. He represented that such procedure was anomalous and might lead to confusion ; that he knew "of no reason why the Commissioner of Peshawar should hold a position in regard to the Government of India independent of the Punjab Government." The Government of India entirely shared Sir R. Egerton's views "that the correspondence in question should be strictly limited to matters regarding which it is important that the Government of India should receive the earliest information," though it held the position of the Commissioner of Peshawar to be

Punjab Government, dated the 9th November 1880.
Government of India, dated the 3rd February 1881.

exceptional, as he was the sole agent of the Government of India for very important and usually urgent correspondence across the frontier, and that as regarded that correspondence it was unavoidable that he should continue to communicate direct with the Foreign Office. The correspondence for which the Commissioner of Peshawar was sole agent to the Government of India was, of course, correspondence with Kabul. It may, I think, be concluded that the Government of India on this occasion realised the justice of Sir Robert Egerton's contention that divided responsibility in the control of the Commissioner of Peshawar would result in confusion.

In 1892 there was some talk of separating off the political work of the Punjab Frontier Districts and placing it in the hands of officers who would be directly under the Government of India. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick denounced the proposal in very strong terms, and pronounced it simply out of the question. I appeal to universal experience in support of the view that the authority of the Punjab Government would be dangerously weakened by such a measure. Punjab frontier officers have larger opportunities of attracting the notice of the Government of India under existing conditions than other officers—these opportunities would be greatly increased by a definite portion of their work being specially controlled by the Government of India to the exclusion of the Local Government, and, human nature being what it is, the tendency to play to the superior gallery would be irresistible.

15. The third objection to the proposal is that it will throw upon the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India a mass of work with which the Local Government is competent to deal, and the submission of which to the Government of India is quite unnecessary. How would the distribution of work be made in practice? I imagine by some such order as this, "All matters affecting our relations with trans-frontier tribes which Commissioners are unable to dispose of will be referred by them to the Government of India direct and not to the Local Government." I cannot suggest any other distribution. It would not do to say that all matters of importance should be so referred. The Local Government might pass an order in the initial stage which would hamper the Government of India later on. Nor would it do to say that all matters affecting the peace of the border should be so referred. Many matters occur in frontier administration which are unimportant at first, but assume importance as they develop. There are numberless possibilities of the peace of the border being affected by matters which are apparently totally unconnected with trans-border tribes, and which at first sight ought not to produce such an effect. Half the causes of trans-frontier unrest might be embodied in correspondence with the Local Government, and that part of the correspondence which was sent direct to the Government of India might be quite incomplete without it. I am really quite unable to make any suggestion for defining what matters should be referred to the Government of India which would not be open to one of two serious objections, viz., that it would either swamp the Foreign Office or afford insufficient material for forming an opinion. The only possible method is that the reporting officer should be responsible for communicating intelligence of importance in sufficient detail to enable the Government of India to form an opinion. This is what the Local Government now does, and I do not understand what advantage is gained by placing the responsibility on a subordinate of the Local Government.

16. I have not been able to do what I was asked to do, viz., to give an opinion as to the way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border could be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government, or to discuss the changes of system which would be entailed by giving effect to the scheme above indicated. I do not think those relations can be regulated in the precise manner indicated, without introducing chaos into the frontier administration. If what is desired is to eliminate the Punjab Government from trans-frontier control, this can only be done by removing the frontier districts, or such portions of them as are closely connected with trans-frontier tribes, from the control of the Punjab Government, and forming this tract into a separate administration under the direct orders of the Government of India. I am not called upon to say anything on this subject, as it has been

negatived after the fullest consideration both by the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government, and I entirely concur in the reasons which have led to this conclusion. At the same time, it would, in my opinion, be far better to encounter all the objections urged to that scheme than to disintegrate the existing administration and introduce confusion where there is, at all events, order and discipline.

17. As I am concluding these remarks, I have received a telegram from Sir R. Udny and a letter from Mr. Anderson, both of which give a partial assent to the Secretary of State's scheme. Sir R. Udny approves of the elimination of the intermediate responsibility of the Local Government, but adds that there are minor points which have required a good deal of consideration. His opinion will be forwarded when received. Mr. Anderson, while expressing his opinion that the new scheme is open to serious objections, thinks that it has certain advantages. I need not notice his objections, as they have been fully stated in this note. The advantages he considers to be—

(1) That the status of the Commissioner will be enhanced in the eyes of the tribesmen, and they will thus be more amenable to his control.

(2) That correspondence will be saved and discussion reduced.

(3) That the relations of the trans-frontier tribes with the Amir of Kabul will thereby be brought under more direct control of the Government of India.

(4) It will be an advantage for Commissioners to be more directly under the Supreme Government in connection with other Departments, such, for example, as the Military Department.

I do not think the tribes will know the difference between a Commissioner who gets his orders direct from the Government of India or intermediately from the Local Government. But no doubt the status of the Commissioner would have to be raised if he were entrusted with more authority than at present. The question is whether the Government of India is prepared largely to raise his status and make him practically a Chief Commissioner. If so, I am afraid he will be difficult to control in regard to his other duties. The Financial Commissioner who is his superior officer in revenue matters holds a position only a little higher than that of Commissioner as it is. I have dealt with (2) above. I think (3) is already fully provided for. Every item of news regardiug Kabul is already sent to the Government of India, and the Local Government never attempts to decide questions affecting the Amir. No. 4 shows, I think, what complications are likely to arise. It is not contemplated, I presume, to allow Commissioners to correspond with the Military Department of the Government of India direct in regard to "the employment of the military forces in support of the Political Officers in checking raids and promoting peace and order."

18. In conclusion, I can only state my conviction that, unless and until Her Majesty's Government decide to separate the frontier and place it under a Chief Commissioner or other officer in direct subordination to the Government of India, the existing machinery cannot with any advantage be altered. The Local Government at present works in loyal subordination to the Government of India, and while, on the one hand, submitting for its orders, together with the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, all matters of importance with regard to trans-frontier matters as well as matters arising in other Departments, stems the tide of correspondence by assuming responsibility in regard to matters within its competence. Though the views of the Local Government have not always been in accord with those of the Government of India, I confidently assert that it has never failed in loyal co-operation with the declared policy of the latter. I am not aware that the Government of India has made any complaint in regard to this matter, and I appeal to the present correspondence to show that, as regards the former management of trade affairs in the pass, the Government of India considered the Punjab management satisfactory and desired that it should be reproduced. If the Punjab Government has in the past practically acted as

a drag on the suggestions or proposals of the forward school of frontier politicians, the most strenuous advocates of which will be found in military ranks, I venture to suggest that the elimination of its counsels will not strengthen the position of the Government of India with whom rests the responsibility of deciding between conflicting views according to the best interests of the Empire, and to whom the views of the head of the local administration can hardly be a matter of indifference. But the view which under a strong sense of duty I feel bound to urge in connection with the present case, is that to place the Commissioner of Peshawar and District Officers in the Peshawar Division in respect of trans-frontier matters under the direct control of the Government of India would indicate a want of confidence in the Government of the Punjab and would introduce confusion into its administration.

19*th October* 1898. (Sd.) W. M. YOUNG.

Enclosure 3 in No. 8.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esquire, Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab and its Dependencies, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 7th November 1898.

IN continuation of my letter, dated 23rd October (Confidential), I am desired to submit the letters noted on the margin, which contain the opinions of Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I., and Mr. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., on the question of the future administration of the Punjab Frontier, and to convey the following remarks.

Letter, dated 20th October 1898, from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.

Letter, dated 21st October 1898, from Mr. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., on Special Duty.

2. As regards the first four paragraphs of Sir R. Udny's letter the Lieutenant-Governor has nothing to add. He proposes a distribution of the work, but does not deal with any of the objections to a dual system of frontier management which Sir Mackworth Young has endeavoured to explain in his memorandum dated 19th October 1898.

The remainder of his letter is a plea for—

(*a*) A specially selected body of Civil Officers for service in districts on the Afghan border.

(*b*) A largely increased staff of European assistants in the same districts.

3. Sir R. Udny's scheme for (*a*) is practically what has for some years been accepted by the Punjab Government, with the exception (1) that the inducements for frontier service in the shape of extra emoluments consist in the extra allowances for political charges, for the outposts of Mardan, Thal, Tank, Rajanpur, Mianwali, and Bhakkar, and the Pashtu and Biluchi allowances, and it has not been found necessary to ask for salaries graduated with reference to contemporaries Cis-Indus; (2) that the demarcation between service Trans-Indus and Cis-Indus has not been quite so final or distinct as Sir R. Udny wishes, for the reason that officers sometimes develop special aptitude or the reverse for frontier service after a longer period than three years, and, as in the case of the judicial and executive separation, it is better for the service that there should not be such finality at an early stage of an officer's career. Sir R. Udny's list of officers serving on the frontier does not include the names of several officers who have served on the frontier, and who might serve there again. Their removal has been due to various causes. Sometimes to health, sometimes to

the desirability of giving the officer a training in the more regulated procedure of a Cis-Indus district, sometimes to the fact that an officer has been proved not sufficiently equipped for special work on the frontier, sometimes to the requirements of the Government of India, as in the case of Major Deane, C.S.I., and Major MacMahon, C.I.E., C.S.I., but rarely or never has the transfer been made in the interest of the Cis-Indus as contrasted with the Trans-Indus administration. Speaking generally, however, His Honour entirely concurs in the principles which Sir R. Udny advocates for regulating service on the frontier.

4. But the great difficulty with which we have had to contend of late, a difficulty which lies beneath all Sir R. Udny's strictures and the removal of which must be a work of time, is the paucity of officers of a certain standing in the Commission. The circumstances which led to this depletion have frequently been brought to the notice of the Government of India, and I am now to enclose for facility of reference a copy of paragraphs 13 to 15 of Mr. Tupper's letter, dated 1st July 1889, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, which will explain the state of affairs then existing. Up to 1878 the recruitment was fairly regular, but thereafter it fell off seriously. No less than seven junior civilians, who had been recruited under the new system by which candidates of the ages of 17 to 19 were admitted to the open competition, died also shortly after their arrival in the country, and some of the Statutory civilians did not prove a success and left the service. The result is that between 1880 and 1884, a period five years, there are now only nine officers in the Commission instead of about 31 which under the normal scheme of recruitment we should have obtained. A proposal to mend matters by drafting in competent men from other branches of the Government service was not accepted by the Government of India, and in consequence for the past ten years the greatest difficulty has been experienced in manning the posts in the Province. The frontier has suffered least as it has always been recognised to be a matter of vital necessity to keep competent officers there, but elsewhere all sorts of expedients have been resorted to, and the districts have been filled temporarily by Provincial Service men and officers of two and three years' service. Since 1893, however, the number of recruits has risen to 11 and 13 a year, and many of these are officers of great promise, so that in the near future it will be a simpler matter to adequately fill all the posts in the Province.

5. I am to point out that Sir R. Udny's second proposition in favour of a largely increased European staff on the frontier is nothing new. The question engrossed the attention of the Government of India and this Government in 1891, and the measures then taken are detailed in the despatch, dated 23rd June 1891, from the Government of India, Department of Finance and Commerce, to the Secretary of State. The following extract, paragraph 3, of Mr. Fanshawe's letter, dated 17th November 1891, to the Frontier Commissioners clearly explains the aims which the Punjab Government then held in view. These are almost identical with those of Sir R. Udny, and Sir Mackworth Young considers that they still embody all that is really necessary, and that when they are attained a fully efficient frontier staff will always be available :—

3. The strength of the staff of the districts of your division will be in future as shown in the accompanying statements, in which also the *personnel* of the staff for the present cold weather is entered. For the reasons given in the notes annexed to my letter No. 129 of 20th March last, Sir James Lyall considers that this staff will be found sufficient in all cases, and will enable Deputy commissioners to devote a proper share of their time to political and frontier work without detriment to their control and share of the general work of district administration. Deputy Commissioners will doubtless bear in mind that it is a necessary part of the revised scheme of frontier administration that they should trust all their subordinates specially appointed for this work with a good deal of responsibility and power. Unless this is done the relief which it is desired to give to District Officers themselves will be less than it should be. In particular the officers in charge of the Border Military Police should, if proper use is made of their services, be able to relieve the Deputy Commissioners of much unimportant work connected with border offences and tribal administration, and proposals should be submitted for investing them with the necessary magisterial powers for this work. A European assistant will be attached to the headquarters of all frontier districts whose staff does not include one at present so soon as the recruitment of the Commission will permit of this, and it is to be hoped that this will be arranged for by the commencement of next hot weather at latest. Similarly, all outposts will as far as possible be held by a European officer in future.

6. That these results have not been fully realized up to the present is entirely due to the general depletion of the Commission explained above. When the Commission is properly manned it will be a comparatively easy thing to provide suitable officers for frontier service, and to increase the staff of European Assistants in Frontier districts. Meanwhile the Punjab Government has done its best to provide substitutes from other Branches of the service, and the names of Messrs. Hastings, Donald, Waterfield, are not unknown to the Government of India as efficient Frontier officers. A scheme for securing the full training of Frontier Political Officers in the management of the Border tribes by placing junior officers of the Commission in command of the Border Military Police in Frontier districts is under consideration, and its submission to the Government of India is only delayed pending the development of the scheme for a Frontier Militia which has been referred to the Punjab Government for consideration. If so desired, a proposal to throw open the command of the Border Military Police to Assistant Commissioners as well as to the Assistant District Superintendents of Police and Tahsildars, noted in the Government of India despatch above quoted, can be submitted for sanction at once.

7. In conclusion, I am to intimate that the Lieutenant-Governor has no remarks to offer on Mr. Cunningham's letter, as all the subjects therein discussed have been already dealt with in this letter or in Sir Mackworth Young's note dated 19th October 1898.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) L. W. DANE,
Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Annex A.

Letter from Sir Richard Udny, K.C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Nathiagali, 20th October 1898.

IN reply to your endorsement of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to say that I am strongly in favour of the proposal "to make the Commissioner of Peshawar, and through him several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the tribes, directly subordinate in such matters to the Government of India"; and after much consideration I am unable to see why the carrying out of this proposal should entail any change in the existing system.

2. As far as *purely external* relations with the trans-frontier tribes are concerned, I think it would be a distinct advantage for the Commissioner to be in direct communication with the Government of India, and it seems to me that, on the border of the Peshawar Division at any rate, the elimination of the intermediate responsibility of the Local Government would give rise to no practical inconvenience, provided that copies of the correspondence were furnished simultaneously to the Lieutenant-Governor in the few cases which might appear to affect the interests of our cis-border subjects, *e.g.*, where residents of British India had been maltreated in independent territory. The sending of such copies might safely be left to the discretion of the Commissioner, and the Government of India would doubtless note the omission to send them in any case in which they considered it necessary that His Honour should have an opportunity of offering his opinion.

3. Our other relations with the tribesmen, which are not purely external, are generally in respect of one or other of the following matters :—

(i) Raids or other offences committed in British territory either by trans-border tribesmen themselves or by British outlaws residing with them;

(ii) Difficulties which occasionally arise in consequence of men who have homes on both sides of the border mixing themselves up with trans-frontier affairs or going across the border to commit offences there while residing in British territory, *e.g.*, in the case of the Mohmands on the Shabkadar frontier and Wazirs in the Bannu District ;

(iii) Offences committed upon trans-border men in independent territory by purely British subjects who return to our side of the border afterwards ;

(iv) Disputes between cis and trans-border men about the boundary of British India ; and

(v) Disputes arising out of civil transactions between men of independent territory which are not taken into the ordinary Civil Courts, but decided by jirga under Section 10 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation.

4. In serious offences of class (i), which under existing orders are already reported both to the Local and Supreme Governments, all correspondence should go in duplicate to both Governments, though the cases would be settled under the directions of the Government of India alone. Minor offences of this class are ordinarily disposed of by the local officers without any report to Government at all, but any periodical statements of such cases which at present go to the Punjab Government would, I presume, in future be submitted to the Government of India.

In cases under class (ii) it would generally be unnecessary to send the Punjab Government copies of the correspondence, as the men concerned, though sometimes resident in British territory, are in respect of such matters practically trans-border tribesmen.

Cases of classes (iii) and (iv) are very rare, but it would probably be advisable that any correspondence about them should be in duplicate, the final decision under class (iii) being left to the Local Government, and under class (iv) to the Government of India in communication with the Local Government, as would be done in disputes of the same kind between a Native State under the Foreign Department and the conterminous Local Administration in British India.

Statements of cases under class (v) might, if desired, go to the Government of India, though there seems no reason why they should not be submitted, as they have been hitherto, to the Local Government along with the other quarterly statements under the Frontier Crimes Regulation.

I have not referred to cases of male or female refugees from independent territory because the only notice we take of them is to require such refugees under Section 35 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation to reside at a distance from the border if any attempt upon their lives is apprehended from across the frontier, and this is a matter of internal administration.

5. As the whole question of frontier management is now under discussion, there are two other points upon which I should like to take this opportunity of saying a word, *viz.*—

(*a*) The necessity of a specially selected body of Civil Officers for service in districts on the Afghan border ; and

(*b*) the necessity of largely increasing the staff of European Assistants in the same districts.

6. As regards (*a*), I have always held the strongest opinion, and my views are still the same as I expressed demi-officially in 1891 or 1892, *viz.*, that no officer should be sent to the frontier till he has received his full ordinary training—*i.e.*, until he has passed all his Departmental Examinations and gone through the usual course of Settlement instructions—that all officers thus qualified should be allowed to volunteer for the frontier provided that they must do so while still under three years' service, and that only those volunteers

should be accepted who appear likely, from their physique, strength of character, and power of associating with natives, to prove adapted for the work before them. Such volunteers should be enrolled on a special register, and warned that they are electing for *permanent* service on the frontier, where promotion must necessarily be slow because the body of officers will always be comparatively small, and because they will not be considered eligible for transfer to promotion cis-Indus; but I would make up for this to some extent by allowing Assistant Commissioners in border districts to draw higher pay when officers of their own standing in the Commission or junior to them were officiating as Deputy Commissioners in the Punjab, and this, with the knowledge that they belonged to a "*corps d'élite*" with more interesting and responsible work and with greater possibilities of advancement and distinction than ordinarily fall to the lot of the cis-Indus official, should be sufficient to keep men who have voluntarily chosen this line of service fairly contented. Hitherto I believe junior officers have not unfrequently been sent trans-Indus, and again withdrawn to the Punjab, without regard to their own inclinations. The result has been in some cases that they have managed to return cis-Indus on the first opportunity, while in other cases men who would gladly have remained on the frontier have been recalled either for the Secretariat or because their turn had come for promotion to charge of districts elsewhere; but according to my idea no officer once selected for the frontier should ever be withdrawn except for proved unfitness or for neglect to pass the Pashtu Examination within a reasonable time.

7. In this connection I append a statement* of all Civil Officers who are either serving on the Afghan frontier at present or who may be reckoned upon as available for work on this border though absent on furlough or (as in the case of Colonel Leigh) posted temporarily to a cis-Indus district; and by Afghan frontier I mean the five districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, where the trans-border tribesmen are of Afghan race, as distinguished from Dera Ghazi Khan, where the people are Biluch and the conditions are very different. From this statement it will be seen at once how irregularly the supply of frontier officers has been maintained, and that, if the six men of longest border experience (not counting myself as I am retiring immediately) were removed, we should have no one left of much more than six years' frontier training, while the great majority are very junior. In the period of 13 years from February 1878 to February 1891 only five men were sent to the frontier who still remain there. From 1891 to 1895 we have one officer per year, and eight in 1896–1898, but under the existing system most of the latter would propably be recalled cis-Indus before long.

8. As regards the second point (*b*), it must be understood, as in the preceding paragraph, that I am speaking only of what (to use the old expression) may be called Covenanted Officers, *i.e.*, Covenanted Civilians or Military Officers in Civil employ, for Uncovenanted Officers can never, save under very exceptional circumstances, be promoted to the charge of districts or divisions, and, however able they may be, their frontier experience can rarely be utilised in these higher posts. Except therefore for purely judicial work or the charge of treasuries, Uncovenanted Officers on the frontier fill positions which might otherwise be more usefully occupied by Covenanted men in training for higher service, and no Uncovenanted Officer (European or Native) should ever be placed in charge of a frontier sub-division, or in posts like those of the Political Officers in the Khaibar, Kurram, Tochi or Wana, which also afford excellent training for the political duties of a Deputy Commissioner. Yet at the present moment we find a European Extra Judicial Assistant (Mr. Homan) officiating as Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, while a Native Extra Assistant Commissioner (Sardar Mahsud) is at Tank, the frontier sub-division of the same district, and a European Police Officer, Mr. Donald (though this is probably only a temporary arrangement), is in the Khaibar. Not long ago, too, we had Mr. Hastings (another Police Officer) in the Kurram, and at the time of the outbreak last year the Political Officer of the Khaibar was a Native. Lastly, there have been occasions within my recollection when the important sub-divisions of Mardan

* Not printed.

and Thal were held either by a European or Native Extra Assistant Commissioner, and all these instances have been due to the impossibility of providing officers of sufficient standing and experience from the Covenanted line. Even the posts of the Commandants of Border Police, who usually act as Political Assistant to their Deputy Commissioners, are valuable for frontier training, and I think that in future these two might be held with advantage by regular officers of the Commission; but such officers ought never to be left long enough in them to forget, or acquire a distaste for, the ordinary work of interior district administration, and this, I may add, is a remark which applies equally to the Political charges in the Khaibar, Kurram, Tochi and Wana.

9. If these views are accepted, it is evident that the number of Covenanted Assistants in the Afghan border districts must be largely increased. Even as it is the number is too small to allow of a fair proportion being always absent on furlough or leave. The result is that at the present moment three of the five districts are temporarily in charge of officers of less than two years' frontier standing (Messrs. Mant, Down and Grant), while in another—Dera Ismail Khan—the Deputy Commissioner, as I have said already, is not a Covenanted officer at all. As regards Assistant Commissioners the case is still worse, for in four of the five districts there is no such officer at head-quarters, and in Peshawar, so notorious for its crime and lawlessness, there is but one (Mr. Gracey) who came up from cis-Indus two or three weeks ago. To remedy this state of things, and to secure a properly graduated service of trained men, there ought to be at least two Covenanted Assistants (or three, if one is to be Commandant of Border Police) at the head-quarters of every district, and four in Peshawar, a corresponding diminution of course being made in the number of European and Native Extra Assistant Commissioners. The permanent Covenanted staff on the Afghan frontier would then be constituted as follows:—

Commissioners	2
Deputy Commissioners	5
Political Officers in Khaibar, Kurram, Tochi and Wana...	4
Assistant Commissioners in charge of the Mardan, Thal and Tank Sub-Divisions	3
Commandants of Border Police in Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan ...	4
Assistant Commissioners at head-quarters ...	12
Total	30

and this would allow of a reasonable number of officers being absent on furlough or leave without necessitating the constant bringing up of new and untrained men from cis-Indus, which is at present unavoidable.

It may be urged that, if the number of subordinate officers is so much increased, and they are debarred from advancement cis-Indus, promotion to Officiating Deputy Commissionerships will be so slow that we shall have no men offering themselves for the frontier. This would no doubt be true if no steps were taken to remedy such a grievance, and it is therefore essential, as I have already pointed out, that a sliding scale of pay should be introduced giving an Assistant Commissioner the pay of a Deputy Commissioner whenever an officer junior to him is officiating in charge of a district cis-Indus.

It may also be said that to keep men out of the charge of districts and in subordinate positions for 7 or 8 years would tend to disgust them, and to dwarf their power of accepting responsibility; but, though they would take some time to rise to Deputy Commissionerships, they would not be all this time mere Assistants; and it is a point of great importance to have men of a certain standing for Political charges like Kurram, &c., which on this account it has often been very difficult to fill from the Covenanted line. In the ordinary course an officer on first coming to the frontier should have two years of the usual work in Cutchery, which is the best of all schools for learning the language, and after that he might be put for a year in command of the Border Police. Then would

come a term of two or three years in charge of a sub-division, followed by perhaps a year or two in an independent charge like the Khaibar or Kurram, by which time, if not before, a permanent district vacancy would probably be available. All this would give such ample variety of experience and responsibility that I think no man with a liking for border service would find it compare unfavourably with the life even of a Deputy Commissioner cis-Indus, and still less so with the duties of an Assistant Commissioner who is often little better than a Cutchery drudge.

Extract paragraphs 13 *to* 15 *of a letter dated Simla*, 1*st July*, 1889, *from C. L. Tupper, Esquire, Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.*

13. Enclosed will be found a statement (Enclosure III.*) from which it will be perceived that, whereas according to the prescribed figure of recruitment, viz., 6·21 per annum, the Commission should have received 68·31 recruits in these years, the actual number of recruits was 52 only, and of these, owing to resignations, transfers to other Provinces and employments, and to deaths, only 32 remain. In the years 1885–1888, as will be perceived from the same statement, the recruitment has been sufficient or fairly so.

14. The Lieutenant-Governor would take this opportunity to beg that the services of the following officers now employed away from the Punjab may be restored to this Province when practicable, viz. :—

(1) Mr. R. G. Thomson, Officiating Postmaster-General, Punjab.

(2) and (3) Messrs. Drew and Cappel, transferred to Bombay in 1882.

(4) Mr. L. W. King, now serving under the Government of India in the Political Department and just at present on furlough.

The Lieutenant-Governor would like to add to this list the names of Mr. Hurry and Lieutenant Martindale, now serving in Burma, but he does not wish to be pressing upon this point as he believes that it would be very difficult for the Chief Commissioner of Burma to spare their services. I am to add as additional reasons for this request that the European strength of the Punjab Commission is at a dangerously low ebb, and that undoubtedly one of the reasons for the defects in the criminal administration which are under discussion is the want of a sufficient number of European Magistrates.

15. It remains to consider the measures which should be adopted to keep the future strength of the Punjab Commission up to the mark. This matter has been very fully discussed in personal consultation with yourself, and the result is that it is now proposed to raise the number of charges to which recruitment should be adjusted from 104 to 119. The reasons for this change are very fully explained in the annexed memorandum (Enclosure IV.*) by the Secretary to this Government, showing in detail the results of the recent conference with yourself. In accordance with those proposals the figure of recruitment should be raised from 6·21 to 7·105. The Lieutenant-Governor hopes that this proposal will be sanctioned. He has also requested that the next supply of Covenanted Civilians may be five instead of four, the number previously intimated to you ; and he thinks it would be an excellent thing if two Military recruits could be given to the Punjab as soon as possible.

Annex B.

Letter from F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., Commissioner (on Special Duty), to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Peshawar, the 21*st October*, 1898.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of a copy of a letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 19th September, about alterations proposed in the present system of managing relations with tribes beyond the Peshawar border, so as to bring the conduct of these affairs more directly under the control of the Government of India.

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* Not printed.

2. The despatch of the Secretary of State announces that generally "Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory," and that, with special reference to the Khyber, it is "not desirable merely to restore arrangements which were in force before the outbreak." Some change is, therefore, called for. There can be no question that of late, and especially in the year 1897, the fruits of the present system have not been all that could be wished; how far this is due to defects in the administrative system, and how far to difficulties inherent in recent frontier policy and to deep-rooted antagonism between feeling beyond the border and the aims of government is a question well worthy of consideration, though its discussion here would be out of place.

The decision of Her Majesty's Government calls for a change in the administrative machine, and the immediate question is whether as regards the Peshawar border that direct control, which is desired, can be secured by removing the Commissioner and the officers below him from subordination to the Punjab Government in respect of political matters, and by placing them to that extent under the direct orders of the Government of India.

The proposal has the obvious objection of weakening the control of the Local Government over its principal Revenue Officers and Magistrates in the Division. I should be sorry to say it would be unworkable; Indian officials are accustomed to serve many masters; the Deputy Commissioner in the Punjab is controlled in some Departments by the Commissioner, in other by the Sessions Judge and Chief Court, and he is answerable to a variety of other authorities. It is said this dependence on many masters is practicable because all are under one head, the Local Government; so that the Deputy Commissioner cannot excuse deficiencies on one side by pleading press of work on another. To this it may be replied that, whatever other changes are introduced, assuming that the Deputy Commissioner is left in charge of the clans on his own border, as I hope to show he must and ought to be, he would still for both internal and external work be under the Commissioner; and though the Commissioner would serve two masters, yet ultimately all are under one supreme authority, the Government of India.

At the same time, though I think the proposal is not wholly unworkable, it has in it many tendencies to produce friction, and from the point of view of the Local Government may well be thought impracticable.

The Lieutenant-Governor would no longer look on officials in Peshawar as his servants, and it might happen that a transfer desired by him in the interest of the Revenue or Judicial administration would be vetoed by the Government of India. This again does not seem to me an insuperable objection, for analogous cases arise under the Provincial Government where Revenue and Judicial authorities take different views of the efficiency of the individual.

Nevertheless it is impossible to deny that the proposal has in it certain seeds of friction and will put the Local Government in a very difficult position. Moreover, it will not be easy in practice to define the two spheres. To distinguish on paper relations with border clans from district work is easy, but many questions affecting directly the ryots within our border may indirectly concern their trans-frontier cousins.

To go no further back than the last year the Kohat salt duty, the Agror Border Regulation, and matters connected with the Border Police are cases in point.

3. But from the concluding part of paragraph 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch, I gather that, coupled with this change in the position of the Commissioner, it is suggested that the District Officer should be divorced from the management of political business on his own border.

I do no know whether this is an essential part of the proposal under discussion; if it be, I venture to think the scheme needs careful reconsideration. Speaking with a long experience—nearly a quarter of a century—of frontier work, I make bold to say that, whatever changes may be introduced above, the fundamental principle of Border administration should be to retain in one hand

executive control within, and the management of relations with clans on the fringe of hills beyond the frontier. Any other system must involve immense loss of influence and waste of power.

The geographical line which marks the boundary is no barrier; in many parts the men beyond are of the same clan and race as our subjects within the border; in some they live on both sides, migrating with the seasons; in all parts foreigner and subject, whose villages and grazing-grounds adjoin, are closely connected by ties of interest, business, tenancy or marriage. Many trans-border clans have "jagirs" in our districts; all down the frontier the great families have assignments or pensions representing allowances granted by former Rulers—Moghal, Durrani or Sikh—to secure their loyalty and assistance. Though the heads of these families are no longer regularly employed as middlemen, yet they still have influence, and take care to maintain it; in every frontier trouble they are called in to assist, and often do most valuable work.

All these and many similar conditions give to the officer who is Magistrate and Collector, who is locally supreme in matters connected with Police, Criminal Justice and the administration of the Land Revenue system, a power to get work out of Chiefs and Khans within our border, to check intrigues starting in our territory, and to influence clansmen on the immediate "hinterland" of his district, such as no other official can exert.

Leisure to sit all day and every day with jirgas and men from across the border will not make up for want of power to decide their petitions about assessment of wells, suspension of revenue demand on lands owned by them in Peshawar, or to take action under the Frontier Crimes Regulation on their claims about debts due or broken engagements of betrothal and marriage.

These remarks refer to the clans who march with British territory; the further you go from our border the less does this argument apply. The fact that there are Political Agents in charge of Wano, Tochi, Dir and Swat, &c., and that they can manage those tracts successfully without having jurisdiction within our districts does not prove the contrary, as their charges include clans far removed from the border line, and in any case the Khans of Dera Ismail Khan or Bannu understand that they may some day see the officer who is now Political Agent in Wano or Tochi come back to be Deputy Commissioner in the adjoining district.

4. It seems, however, to be anticipated that, with the creation of a set of Political Agents, separate from the District Officers, there will be less change of *personnel* due to "removal or transfer to other appointments under the exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion." This is possible; but at the same time it is probable that there is no part of any Indian province in which men have been kept longer within narrow limits than on the Punjab frontier. It is notorious that once on the frontier, always there. I have known men who did not wish to stay purposely neglect to learn Pashtu, on the ground that, if they once passed the examination, they would be kept for life in a part of the province from which they wished to escape. Take the Peshawar Division as an instance: the three officers* who have last held charge have been practically all their service on or beyond the frontier, and have at least as much knowledge as the experience of a quarter of a century can give.

* { Sir R. Udny. Myself. Mr. W. Merk.

Of the changes of tenure of this office since 1891, when Sir R. Udny became Commissioner, not one has been due to "exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion;" they have been caused solely by the removal of an officer to special political work outside, to furloughs, ill-health, or privilege leave. And under no system can changes for these causes be avoided.

5. It seems to me, however, very doubtful whether the control of the Government of India will be increased to the extent expected merely by eliminating the Punjab Government and by drawing the Commissioner, Peshawar, into direct relations. If the Punjab Government had any frontier

policy of its own, or, having one, if it had authority to pursue it, if it had power to give orders in any but the most trivial matter, I could understand that by removing it from the chain the control of the Government of India would be increased in reality as well as in name. But I venture to think that, whatever their position in constitutional theory may be, the Lahore Government have not for many years past given orders in any but the most petty matter, affecting trans-border clans or politics.

With the exception of a few years in the Secretariat, the whole of my service of 26 years has been passed on or beyond the North-West Frontier, and for the past 13 years in the Peshawar Division. Speaking of that part of the border, I cannot remember any question sufficiently important to be reported to the Commissioner by the Deputy Commissioner, which in its turn the Local Government did not think necessary to refer to Calcutta. Under the present system the real authorities that issue orders are the Deputy Commissioner and the Government of India. The Deputy Commissioner as the local Political Officer disposes of many claims against trans-border men by reprisals or arrests in British territory, or by his influence with clans outside, and he settles these cases without report to the great advantage of Government. But when he thinks action on his part will not summarily dispose of a case, he may report it for orders, and in cases of this description I think that in practice the Commissioner and the Local Government give advice and not decisions; the final order even now comes from Calcutta.

The charge proposed will certainly eliminate one office, the function of which in these matters has become advisory rather than administrative, will so far tend to quicken despatch of business and the issue of orders, and will bring the Government of India nearer to the work to be done.

It is, however, clear that between the local officer on the spot and the Supreme Government there must be some authority interposed high enough to pass orders in small matters disposed of on general principles or in accordance with the declared policy of Government, and of experience and knowledge sufficient to give weight to his advice and conclusions.

If between the Deputy Commissioner and Government there is to be only the Commissioner, clearly his responsibility will be largely enhanced, and if the change is to work to advantage, his position must be raised, and he must be invested with powers beyond what he now ventures to assume.

6. To sum up, I am of opinion that the proposal to remove the Commissioner and his subordinates in political matters from the control of the Punjab Government and to place them directly under the Government of India is practicable and not unworkable, but that it has the grave disadvantages of risk of friction, and of impairing that control which is a condition of discipline and efficiency.

But I have no hesitation in saying that it would be a grievous mistake to divorce the Deputy Commissioner from the management of the border clans who march with his district.

Assuming that the reasons given in paragraph 3 are accepted, and that authority within and without the border is kept in one hand, it remains to be considered how the local Political Officer himself is to be directed and controlled. That between him and the Supreme Government some authority must be interposed is evident, otherwise the Foreign Department of the Government of India which should deal with large questions, and with cases likely to cause complications, will be inundated with trivial business.

I venture to think that there are two solutions, and that either of them would in effect be better than that of making the Commissioner of Peshawar an official Janus with one face to Calcutta and one towards Lahore.

These are either—

(i) to give the Punjab Government real authority and power to issue final orders in respect to affairs with clans on the immediate border fringe, and in all but matters likely to lead to serious results or to hostilities on a large scale; or

(ii) to remove the frontier districts* from the Punjab Government, and to place in charge of them an officer with the powers of Chief Commissioner for the interior, and the position of Agent to the Governor-General for the clans and countries beyond.

* Excluding of course the cis-Indus parts of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu, and the whole of Dera Ghazi-Khan.

The first of these two plans would work, but at this date it seems useless to suggest what would at once be ruled out of court as "retrograde," and, moreover, it does not fulfil the condition laid down by the Secretary of State, and is therefore out of the question.

The second would bring the management of the border under the Government of India in the most direct manner practicable. The population, revenue, trade and wealth of the province have so increased since the question of a separate Frontier Commissionership was mooted some 20 years ago under the Government of Lord Lytton, that what would be left to the Punjab after removing Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, and a strip of the Derajat, is still sufficient to constitute an administrative area of the first class.

Towns have grown, Municipalities have been created under new and complex laws, the whole machinery of Local Self-Government has been started, hundreds of miles of railway and canals have been opened, the cultivated, and, what is more important, the irrigated area has been enlarged by scores of thousands of acres,—in a word development in all directions has been so great that it is questionable whether there is not enough cis-Indus to occupy the full energies of a great administration.

I am writing without access to an office, and therefore do not attempt to give figures, but a comparison of the chief statistics of the province for 1878 with those of to-day would, I think, show that no "territorial rectifications or compensations" would be required, and that this supposed objection to the radical and effectual remedy does not in reality exist.

If, then, a strong administration directly under the Government of India is desired, in which frontier questions can be fully taken up on one consistent line without detriment to the needs and requirements of the greater part of a large province, this can best be secured by placing the frontier districts under a separate Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General. The Punjab Government would benefit by being relieved of an incubus, by the gain of time and power to devote to the administration of a rapidly growing province, and it would be rescued from what to many has appeared the invidious position into which it has been relegated by the course of events in the past ten or twenty years in regard to affairs on the North-West Frontier.

7. While I believe that this would be the better alternative, I am not prepared to say that the other proposal put forward, to split the Commissioner of Peshawar into two persons, responsible to the Local Government in things internal, and to the Government of India in external matters, is unworkable. But there can be no doubt that it would make the position of the Punjab Government very difficult, and probably within a short time they would be constrained to ask the Government of India to take over the entire responsibility for the frontier districts, and for officials over whom the Lieutenant-Governor would no longer have that full control which alone can secure discipline and efficiency.

Even if the other alternative be ultimately accepted, and the border districts be separated from the Punjab, there remains the question whether the unsatisfactory position of to-day on the North-West Frontier is wholly the result of the administrative system, and how far it may be caused in part at least by the natural opposition of tribesmen of independent territory to the policy of these later years. It is the duty of servants of Government to carry out the policy of Government whatever it be, not to criticise unless their views are asked, and I have no intention of suggesting criticism, for Government best

knows its business and its ultimate aim. After all, if difficulties exist, they must be overcome; it is constant advance in spite of opposition which has created an Empire:

> "Et dubitamus adhuc virtutem extendere factis"
> "Aut metus Ausoniâ prohibet consistere terrâ"?

But when it is a question of condemning and altering an existing administrative system, it will surely not be out of place to note with proper deference that, in the policy which has led to the occupation and, as the tribesmen view it, to the practical annexation of Wano, Tochi and Malakand, there are elements so contrary to the feelings, traditions, and aspirations of the clans thus conciliated, so likely to arouse their fear of loss of independence, that this alone would account for some at least of the difficulties experienced in carrying out the aims of Government on the North-West Frontier, besides any that may have been created by the machinery of administration, which no doubt is capable of reform and improvement.

As the discussion has arisen out of a despatch upon the management of the Khyber, it is specially appropriate to remember that the arrangements started under the Punjab Government, when I had the honour to be the first Political Officer in charge of the Pass, worked with success for nearly twenty years.

They broke down in the end, but under stress of a storm whose origin was unconnected with the Punjab or its Government. But twenty years is a long time in the history of any political system; the map of Europe rarely outlasts it unchanged; and the system to be reformed has at least this to its credit that during that time the Khyber Pass was kept as safe as any part of the Grand Trunk Road from Peshawar to Calcutta.

Enclosure 4 in No. 8.

Minute by the Viceroy on the Management of the Punjab Frontier dated November 6th, 1898.

1. At the end of August we received from the Secretary of State his reply to the despatch in which we communicated our proposals for the final settlement of outstanding questions with the Afridis, and for the future management of the Khyber Pass. The nature of the decision arrived at by Her Majesty's Government made it necessary for us to differentiate even more than before in our treatment of these two branches of the subject. So far as concerned the communication of the terms on which peaceful relations with the tribes might be re-established, we were authorised to act so soon as our definition of the terms had been approved by the Secretary of State. On the other hand, so far as future management was concerned, Her Majesty's Government came to no determination, but forwarded to us certain suggestions on which they invited our opinion.

2. Naturally the first branch of the subject, as the more pressing, first engaged our attention; but I am not dealing with it in this Minute, and it will suffice to record that on September 12th we were able to inform the Punjab Government of the nature of the terms, and of the manner in which we proposed to communicate them to the tribes. It was impossible to refer to future arrangements until this letter had gone; but a week later, *i.e.*, on September 19th, it was followed by another in which we requested the Local Government to supply us with the information necessary to determine how far the suggested alterations in existing arrangements were practicable. I mention these dates to show that there was no delay on our part in taking action along both the lines indicated in the Despatch from the Secretary of State. Nor, in my opinion, has there been any undue delay on the part of the Local Government. It was essential that the Lieutenant-Governor should consult his officers who were actually in charge, or were well acquainted with the

circumstances, of the frontier districts. He warned me at once that this must take time, and I am indebted to him for pressing his enquiries so energetically as to be able to submit his report within little more than a month. The propositions which he had to consider were calculated to affect the Province for which he is responsible in many ways, and it would have been unreasonable to expect an opinion upon them without full time for consultation and deliberation. It is not, therefore, on account of any delay, which could have been avoided, that a difficulty has arisen in our determining before we leave Simla the conclusions on which the further observations desired by the Secretary of State might be founded. It was only on one supposition that the short time at our disposal might have sufficed. If the Lieutenant-Governor had seen his way to make proposals by which the objects aimed at in paragraph 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch might be attained, it would, perhaps, have been just possible for the Government of India to consider those proposals and forward them with observations to the Secretary of State. But the reply of the Lieutenant-Governor is that he cannot suggest any alterations in the directions indicated; on the contrary, that, in his opinion, they would introduce chaos into the frontier administration.

Under these circumstances we have nothing to work upon. The Government of India will now have to decide on one of two courses: either to endorse the verdict of the Lieutenant-Governor, or to formulate proposals of its own. It can do neither hastily, and any attempt to arrive at a premature pronouncement without careful sifting of the information already available, or which may be collected, would be unfair to hon. members, and could not be expected to yield results of any value.

4. This, however, leaves me in a position which differs in one essential respect from that of my colleagues. When the case comes before them hereafter, as it is bound to come, I shall not be in a position to offer any opinion. It appears to me that, while it is my duty to abstain from inviting any formal or final discussion at this moment, it is equally my duty not to shirk my responsibility, but to submit to the Government of India and the Secretary of State, in a form which can be used officially, a statement of the reasons which in my judgment justify the policy which I have advised, and which on my present information I should still recommend. But I desire to speak for myself alone, and to make it clearly understood that the transmission of this Minute, and of the documents necessary to explain its argument to the Secretary of State, implies no approval by the Government of India of either it or them, but expressly reserves the whole case until it can be maturely and deliberately considered and determined.

5. Her Majesty's Government have affirmed that in their opinion "the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India." Unfortunately very little is said of the grounds on which this opinion is based. When, after defining the duties of frontier officers in terms to which no exception can be taken, the Despatch proceeds to say, "They can hardly combine such duties with the regular work of district officials," the assumption of course is that under present arrangements this combination is the rule. The Lieutenant-Governor challenges this assertion, and shows (1) that on a large portion of the frontier the combination does not exist at all, there being political officers for the political work, separate and distinct from, indeed not even subordinate to, the district official, *i.e.*, the Deputy Commissioner; (2) that where the combination does exist it is in parts of the country where the interests of the residents on the two sides of the border are so closely intertwined that it is impossible to deal with them separately; and (3) that where under the circumstances aforesaid the work becomes too heavy for the district official, assistance has been given, and can be given, and at any rate the political work is not allowed to suffer. In connection with this subject the Lieutenant-Governor has examined in detail the statements found in an article in *The Times* newspaper, an avowed and, so far as I know, the only formulated indictment of the present system

which has yet appeared. I do not propose to follow him, and will content myself with saying that, so far as my own experience goes, it corroborates his presentation of the facts of the case, and that I feel bound to perfer the authority of the responsible head of the Province writing officially to that of any anonymous correspondent.

6. A similar argument might be used with regard to the sentence in the despatch following next to that already quoted. The Lieutenant-Governor denies, and gives chapter and verse to show that it is not true, that frontier officials are transferred to other appointments in a manner that interferes with efficiency. There is nothing on the other side but assertion, and assertion by itself is not proof. Until therefore evidence to the contrary is adduced, it is but reasonable to believe that of the Lieutenant-Governor. But one is tempted to go a step further. Is it not possible to rate too highly the absence of removal or transfer? On the contrary, is there any worse evil in a service than stagnation? Mr. Anderson's remarks on this subject deserve consideration. Even Sir R. Udny, who avows himself a strong supporter of a special service for the frontier, clearly recognises that there would be difficulties, and proposes to meet them by arrangements, of which one thing is quite certain, *i.e.*, that they will be very costly. This paper has come in late, and there has been no time to examine it in detail; but it must be remembered that a similar state of affairs to that brought out by the statement annexed is by no means unknown elsewhere in India, and that one of the causes which contributes to it is a block in promotion, or, in other words, one of the phases of the stagnation to which I take objection; and one which would be still more likely to arise in a small special service. What is wanted on the frontier is personal influence, but not necessarily the influence of the individual. No doubt instances could easily be quoted where a strong and sympathetic individuality has dominated the ruder natures with which it has been brought in contact. But we cannot predicate characteristics like these for all frontier officers, and it is only too probable that an officer, set down in a remote district for the best years of his life, will imbibe prejudices from his surroundings, or perhaps tend to fossilize, at any rate lose the versatility of resource and promptitude of action on which success in dealing with Native races so much depends. We escape from much of this difficulty if we look to the service rather than the individual officer, and aim at a service so organised as to receive a constant supply of officers well equipped for the duties they have to perform, rather than the mere selection of special officers for special posts. People sometimes talk as if all we had to do was to find the man to fill the post. It is by no means to under-rate the initial difficulty to point out that it is often the smallest of the series; for once the post is established on certain lines, specially if the first incumbent is a man with special characteristics, the field of selection is still further limited in the case of his deputy or successor. Apart altogether from casualties or resignations, temporary vacancies must be comparatively numerous in an arduous service like that on the frontier, for it is impossible to deny men so placed opportunities of rest and relaxation. The difficulty therefore of replacing specially selected officers is no remote one, but may occur immediately, and recur constantly.

7. Leaving out of sight for the moment all questions of the official who is to control the whole system, two classes of officers are required for frontier work. For the actual dealings with the tribes young men are wanted whose activity of mind and body predisposes them to a life which, if isolated and monotonous, has a spice of adventure and of danger, and who are free from the ties which, *e.g.*, for a married man, render residence in the wilds irksome and expensive. But as it is impossible to combine these qualities with a mature experience, it is necessary also to provide local supervision, or in other words, the presence at local centres of officers of sufficient standing and knowledge to be able to direct the junior officers on the spot in cases of difficulty, especially in those which must be disposed of promptly, and where reference to a distant authority is impracticable. In the long narrow strip of tribal country stretching along the Punjab frontier from the Gomal northwards, it would not be easy to find an agency so effective for

this kind of local supervision as the men who attain to Commissionerships under the Punjab Government. The younger men might be recruited from the Staff Corps or elsewhere, though when that is advocated it is fair to remember that the Punjab Commission is already largely recruited from Staff Corps officers, the rule being that one Staff Corps officer is appointed to the Commission to every three of the Indian Civil Service. Two things seem perfectly evident—(1) that if a new Staff, separate and distinct from the Punjab Commission, is to be established, it must at the outset consist principally, if not entirely, of officers drawn from that Commission, because in no other way can the local experience be obtained; and (2) that, even if hereafter it is sought to cut adrift from Punjab influences, the ultimate source of supply must be practically the same for the new service as for the old.

8. The geographical configuration of the tribal country to which reference has been made above has no doubt contributed to the formation of an administration such as that just described, and makes it difficult to suggest any workable alternative. In a compact tract of comparatively open country like Baluchistan, inhabited by a number of tribes which, though differing from each other in some respects. are neither fanatical nor strong, it is possible to prescribe a general policy for the country as a whole. But that is not so with the tribes along the Punjab frontier, and the fact was very clearly brought out in the correspondence between the Government of India and the Local Government in 1896. The attitude of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick was that there ought to be no attempt to generalize where there is no room for generalisation, but that the circumstances of each bit of the frontier must be separately considered with reference to its peculiar circumstances. The Government of India fully accepted the proposition that different parts of the frontier were in different states of development,—*vide* paragraph 6 of Mr. Barnes' letter of August 14th, 1896,—but Sir D. Fitzpatrick thought it so important that he dealt with the whole subject in great elaboration and detail in his reply dated October 26th, 1896.

9. If it be argued that, admitting the necessity of different treatment in different tracts, some of the sub-division of the executive staff might be avoided by making each tract self-contained, the answer is to be found in paragraph 11 of the Khyber Despatch of June 23rd. Of each one of the districts into which the tribal country would divide itself could it be said, as of the Khyber, that "we could not afford to station there an officer of the standing and experience to be trusted in cases of importance and emergency. The district is too small for an expensive staff, and too important for any other than a thoroughly reliable authority." We cannot dispense with any of our outposts, Wano, Tochi, Kurram, Kohat, Khyber, and so on; each must be in charge of a British officer; doubling up is impracticable, and without it the cost of senior officers is prohibitive. It may be said that the conclusions of Her Majesty's Government do not necessarily involve the displacement of the subordinate machinery, but only the transfer of the control to the Government of India. That may or may not be so; much depends on the working out of details. But it seemed necessary to examine present arrangements from the foundations, and to show that the guiding principles are intelligible and practical; for, as pointed out, the language of the Despatch is vague and general, and it is impossible from it to say for certain how far their retention in whole or in part in a new system is contemplated, and the area of controversy thereby restricted.

10. Proceeding now to the question of the transfer of control, it cannot be said that the reasons which have influenced Her Majesty's Government here are much more distinctly defined than their reasons for condemning the present system. The objections stated in our Despatch to placing the Commissioner of Peshawar under the Government of India are quoted,* and the comment is that these objections appear more formal than real. But from what follows it is evident that there is some misapprehension as to the true position of the Commissioner of Peshawar. The Secretary of State maintains that the policy he suggests is not an untried one, because the Commissioner of Peshawar even now serves two

* This plan "would put the Commissioner of Peshawar in the position of serving two masters, and would divorce the control of affairs on the British side of the border from the control of affairs on the further side, while the two directing authorities would work through the same officer."

masters in time of peace and corresponds direct with the Government of India on the occurrence of disturbances. The Lieutenant-Governor does not admit the correctness of this allegation, and he is strongly supported by Mr. Merk. The events of the last five years have again and again drawn my attention to the position of the Commissioner of Peshawar, and it is right that I should record my personal opinion that it is a mistake to suppose that the Government of India has exercised over him any control which could differentiate him from other officers under the Punjab Government. By arrangement they have made use of him for certain purposes, *e.g.*, in their correspondence with the Amir, but it would be most misleading to represent him as in consequence in charge directly or indirectly of any part of our relations with Afghanistan. It is true that at present the Commissioner of Peshawar is the channel through whom certain communications go to the Amir. He corresponds on local matters on his own responsibility, and he forwards by messenger certain communications which we send to him by telegraph. But in the latter case he is not consulted, unless we see fit to do so, on the nature of the message ; and we only use him at all to secure secrecy and despatch. It cannot be intended to give this officer, however much his importance may be increased, a right of corresponding independently with the Amir. We have never allowed the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan to do so, and it would be most dangerous not to keep this correspondence entirely in the hands of the Foreign Department.

11. So, again, in regard to direct correspondence on the outbreak of disturbance. The object then is that stated in the letter from the Government of India of February 3rd, 1881, quoted by the Lieutenant-Governor, *i.e.*, that the Government of India should receive the earliest information. It has always been recognised that so soon as military operations are undertaken or are even in prospect, it is necessary that the Government of India should obtain all important information direct, and the dual relation is then by no means confined to the Commissioner of Peshawar. It has been customary of late in the larger expeditions to entrust the chief political control to the General Officer Commanding, who thereupon corresponds with the Foreign Department as well as with his own military superiors, and the Chief Political Officer attached to the expedition acts under the orders of the General, though with a right reserved to him of submitting a statement of his individual opinion to the Government of India, should he think fit to do so on any special point. But the case of Mr. Bruce, who was Political Officer in Waziristan in 1894–95, is perhaps the best illustration. As an officer of the Punjab Government he began by sending information through the Local Government in the ordinary manner. The acute stage was reached while the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief were on tour, and Mr. Bruce was then instructed to correspond direct with the Foreign Department. Here, as in the case of the Commissioner of Peshawar, the object was that in urgent matters information should reach the Government of India by the speediest channel, and early information is so essential that the Government of India must reserve to itself the power of employing any officers of Government to supply it. But it is a wholly different matter to assume control of an official under a Local Government in his administrative action—or to consult him without reference to the Local Government on questions of policy. That has not been the practice with the Commissioner of Peshawar, and I can best show how strongly it was impressed on my mind by mentioning an incident which occurred last year. I deemed it expedient on a certain question of policy to make a communication to the officers on the frontier on whom we chiefly relied for political information. I had no difficulty in acting on my own initiative except in the case of the Commissioner of Peshawar, but in his case I thought it right to confer first with the Lieutenant-Governor, and explain what it was that I proposed to say. It need scarcely be added that the Lieutenant-Governor took no objection, and I addressed Sir R. Udny accordingly ; but in my judgment to obtain the previous concurrence of the Lieutenant-Governor was both technically correct and in itself advantageous.

12. It does not of course necessarily follow that because the Commissioner of Peshawar has not hitherto been under the control of two masters he might not be so placed for the future. It would be more of an experiment

than the Secretary of State seems to imagine, but the experiment might be worth trying. Before, however, it is tried we must examine carefully its chances of success. And I confess it is a plan which has had attractions for me. In 1896, when we had the management of the frontier under consideration, I myself put forward the proposal for the extension of the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Peshawar, which was suggested to the Lieutenant-Governor in paragraph 7 of Mr. Barnes' letter of August 14th, with the addition, which was not adopted, that "this Commissioner might perhaps correspond direct with the Government of India on tribal affairs within his jurisdiction;" but I did so because I thought that thus "we should have secured most of the advantages of a separate province while avoiding the difficulties inseparable from dividing the tribes from the settled districts that adjoin them." In the course of the discussion various arguments were adduced against the division between the different functions of the Commissioner of Peshawar. It was pointed out with great force that the idea of separating the ordinary civil administration of a district from the political charge would inevitably lead to friction amongst the officers themselves, as they would have to treat the people from different standpoints. It would also cause a want of finality in settlements of cases. Suitors would go backwards and forwards from the civil authority to the political authority, hoping that a later interview or petition might bring about a ruling more acceptable to them. The theory is that the political officer would be the medium of influence, and that, divorced from more routine civil duties, he would have leisure to push that influence. But influence over border men is not an abstract political entity; it is closely concreted with the incidents and conditions of their daily life, such as the settlement of their quarrels, the management of their land, disputed rights to water, grazing claims, love intrigues, and the numerous domestic incidents that make up life on the frontier, and which, when settled under normal conditions, lead to violence and blood feuds; and it is in the settlement of disputes that would result in bloodshed if left to tribal custom that our frontier officers, if of the right sort, get openings for spreading their influence. If a frontier man wants to describe his model of a frontier officer, he says of him—"*He knows all our affairs.*" Such influence and such knowledge will not bear breaking up into different elements of paternal government—one political and the other civil. Arguments such as these seemed fatal to the idea of placing the Commissioner in direct correspondence with the Government of India on tribal affairs only.

13. Now, again, the method which is suggested for bringing about a change is that the Commissioner of Peshawar, and through him his several subordinates, who are employed in conducting external relations with the various tribes on the frontier of the Peshawar Division, should, *in respect of such matters*, act directly under the Government of India.

14. The Lieutenant-Governor in his Note shows, I think, so clearly that it would be vain to go over the ground again, that the Commissioner and the Government of India cannot deal thoroughly and conclusively with external relations with the tribes without including some administrative work within our border. What the extent of that must necessarily be has not been defined, because the Lieutenant-Governor pronounces against the practicability of the system proposed; but whatever its extent, administrative work dealt with directly between the Government of India and a Commissioner of Division would be something different from what is done in any part of India. In all India there is between the Government of India and the administration of the country a Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, or Chief Commissioner, and if this is necessary elsewhere, no reason has been advanced for thinking that it will not be necessary on the frontier.

15. It is difficult to give instances of the sort of work which is referred to the Local Government in frontier matters, but which with a Local Government need not come to the Government of India; but, in order to give it as

far as may be in detail,* an examination has been made of the Proceedings of the Punjab Government in the Foreign branch or section for the year 1896, that year being selected as an ordinary one, undisturbed by any special frontier rising.

16. It is more than doubtful whether the Secretary of State, in entrusting to the Government of India "a wide discretion in framing the arrangements,

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* On the very first page of the B papers (Frontier) for January, 1896, will be found five cases, dealt with by the Punjab Government, which, if frontier management were removed from the Lieutenant-Governor's control, would presumably have come to the Government of India. The subjects of these cases were—

Complaints to Colonel Warburton against the Sartip of Dhakka.

Portion of land acquired for military purposes at Para Chinar allotted for building sites and other purposes.

Proposal to call one of the gates of the "City" of Para Chinar the Fitzpatrick Gate.

Petition to the Lieutenant-Governor from prisoners in the Kohat Jail.

Sanction granted to a Kurram Militia Drill Instructor to return to his regiment.

A further examination of the Frontier Proceedings shows numerous references disposed of by the Punjab Government. To cite a few of the different subjects of such references :—

Details connected with Khyber tolls.

Border Military Police establishment. Questions of their equipment, pay, allowances, &c.

Same class of questions as regards Kurram Militia and Khyber Rifles.

Reports on British military officers with such corps.

Correspondence between the Amir and Commissioner, Peshawar, on *unimportant* local matters. (There are occasionally such cases which the Punjab Government dispose of.)

Permits for rifles imported by British officers on the frontier.

Numerous petitions from tribesmen and Frontier Chiefs; also miscellaneous petitions relating to the frontier tracts, not one in twenty of which now comes before the Foreign Department.

Statements of cases decided under the Frontier Tribes Regulations.

Peshawar, Kohat, Hazara, Khyber, and Kurram monthly political contingent bills.

Expenditure from District Funds.

Reports of death of leading men in the frontier districts.

All questions of the grant of pensions to families of deserving jagirdars and such like. (At present the Foreign Department only gets these when the Local Government supports them. Under the proposed arrangement the Foreign Department would have to get all applications which the Commissioner supported.)

Questions relating to expenditure by frontier officers of an unusual nature. (Many such are within the competence of the Local Government to dispose of.)

Permission to Afghan refugees to visit Peshawar.

Payment of compensation to persons (other than Government servants) who suffer loss from petty tribal offences in cases where fine money is levied from offenders. At present Punjab Government has discretion.

Disputes between British and Afghan subjects at Peshawar.

Appeals from prisoners under sentence of death. The disposal of these has just been transferred to the Home Department. Would not these have to come back to the Foreign Department as local Government under the new arrangement?

Questions relating to leave, promotion, &c., of local native officers, such as Tahsildars, &c.

The Commissioner's budget for frontier expenditure would have to be taken up in this Department, and all questions connected with it. (This would mean a lot of trouble.)

All matters connected with the Mohmands, the Black Mountain, Buner, the Nawab of Amb, Kohat Pass Afridis, Orakzais, Afridis, Kurram.

Grant of *khilats*.

The above headings have been taken from the Punjab Foreign Proceedings volumes for three months. The Home, Financial, and Revenue Proceedings have not been examined; but it is clear that all questions now referred to the Lieutenant-Governor under those heads would also have to come up to the Foreign Department unless the Commissioner's status were altered.

financial and executive, which may be found necessary," contemplated the separation from the Punjab Government of so much administrative work, or that the Commissioner should have the financial powers of a Local Government. Granted that this is necessary, the question must sooner or later resolve itself into one whether it is better to have as an intermediate Local Government the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, or a Commissioner who will be a Chief Commissioner on the frontier.

17. Mr. Anderson thinks it possible for the Commissioner to be a Chief Commissioner as far as his duty lies directly under the Government of India and to remain a Commissioner of Division in his relations with the Punjab. To my mind his position has only to be so stated in order to show the impossibility of it. Sir R. Udny seems to contemplate an elaborate system of duplicate reports which would certainly end in confusion.

18. The Lieutenant-Governor, as the responsible head of the Province, declares that the changes suggested would introduce chaos into the administration. Having been for five years in charge of the Foreign Department of the Government of India, I think I am entitled to speak for it, and I do not hesitate to say that the consequences there would be equally serious. The Foreign Department, as things stand, has no reason to fear attack; it will bear comparison with any similar department in the ability and diligence of the officers by whom it is manned, the accuracy of its information, or the promptitude and prudence with which the varied and complicated mass of business is despatched; but the staff, from the Viceroy and Foreign Secretary downwards, are not chosen for knowledge of administrative details, and to employ them to deal with business of the kind described above would be a useless waste of their time. This is no theoretical opinion, for we have gained a considerable experience in Baluchistan. Matters are now on a more sound and regular footing in that Agency, and since the revenues have been in a manner provincialised the detailed work has decreased. But the Foreign Department used to be greatly occupied with details of revenue, police, and levy establishments, and I assert emphatically that the result was not satisfactory. If the Lieutenant-Governor is unable to suggest how the necessary changes can be effected on the frontier, I am equally unable to make any proposals for so reinforcing the Foreign Department as to enable it to cope with this addition to its labours. It is not merely a question of amount of work, for that might be overcome, but it is a class of work for which the organisation is absolutely unfitted. Recognising as I do the supreme importance of an efficient Foreign Department, I feel bound to deprecate any step that would overweight it, as I am sure the allotting of administrative work to it would do.

19. Sir Mackworth Young, in paragraph 16 of his note, states that, while he entirely concurs in the reasons for rejecting the proposal to form a separate administration for the frontier districts, he would prefer even that scheme with all its disadvantages to the disintegration of the Punjab administration. Any support, therefore, which he gives to the idea of a separate administration is given from a consideration of provincial interests, and is given only if these interests cannot be preserved otherwise. But for the purposes of this Minute it is necessary to examine the question from the point of view of Imperial interests. No one of course can deny that occasions have arisen, and may arise again, when the formation of a new charge, or agency, or province, either becomes a necessity or has overwhelming advantages. It may be necessitated by the increasing development or opening up of the country, which has made the burden too heavy for the shoulders on which it has hitherto rested, or by the adoption of a new and energetic policy which it is desired to push by the undivided attention of a special officer. It may be justified by the fact that the tract in question marks itself for separation by the physical features of the country, or by characteristics of its inhabitants which distinguish them from their neighbours and facilitate their collective treatment. It may come about by one of those accidents which bring us face to face with the hour and the man. Reasons like these could be found for placing Assam under a Chief Commissioner or Baluchistan under an

Agent to the Governor-General; I can find none in the circumstances of the tribal country on the Punjab frontier. The Punjab Government is a busy Government, as all Governments are in India, but it is not true that it is overburdened, and, if necessary, it could be strengthened by methods adopted elsewhere. There is no question of opening up the country, or inaugurating an active policy therein; such things are excluded by the despatch of January 28th. As already pointed out, geographical conditions and the tribal characteristics and animosities unite to make combination impossible. I hesitate to say much of individuals, but with a full sense of responsibility I affirm that, having watched closely the events on the frontier during the last five years and the actors in them, I can select no one who in my judgment has by his experience, natural ability, standing, or performance approved himself beyond dispute the right man in the right place if this difficult task has to be undertaken.

20. But it will be said that there is here a special reason in the traditional policy of the Punjab, the "close border" system of which so much has been written. It is not necessary to stir the embers of an ancient controversy, and to debate whether the cautious policy of former Lieutenant-Governors was right or wrong in the circumstances as they then existed. It should not be forgotten that those circumstances were not the circumstances of to-day, that our knowledge of the tribes, and their knowledge of us, was very different, and, above all, that the sphere of the Amir's interference was undefined and his attitude aggressive. It is perhaps not surprising to find that those who chafed at what they deemed a timid and ineffectual policy should have rooted in their minds the belief that officers under the Punjab Government must pursue the course and maintain the attitude which that policy imposed upon them, but it is none the less a mistaken belief. The officers serving under the Punjab Government are drawn from the same classes as other officers in India, and those from amongst them who rise to positions of authority, and the men who fill the post of Lieutenant-Governor, do so by the same process of selection which is in force throughout India, and which has made the British rule in India what it is. There is in reality one difference only between the training of a Punjab officer and that of his brethren elsewhere, and that is that he can, if he will, acquire a knowledge of the tribes living on the borders of his province. I could give numerous instances from my own experience of Punjab officers who had no inclination to hang back, and I am prepared to endorse most emphatically the claim that the Local Government has loyally co-operated in the declared policy of the Government of India. The late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab once said to me, when discussing this subject, "You have only to lift your finger and the break will be taken off in any place you think this desirable." That remark is more than an expression of personal loyalty; it contains in a few words a correct exposition of the only principle on which we can rest our arrangements, *i.e.*, that it is the business of the Government of India, and the Government of India alone, to formulate and prescribe a policy outside the borders of British India. People sometimes talk as if it was for the Lieutenant-Governor, the Agent to the Governor-General, the Commissioner, the Political Agent, to manage the district assigned to him, and that he must be "given a free hand." Statements of this kind cannot be accepted without qualification. It is possible to limit too strictly the intercourse of political officers with the tribes, and our letter of 1896 was designed to show how more intimate relations were perfectly consistent with management by the Punjab Government. It is also very desirable to give each political officer full opportunities of expounding his views, which are the result of his local knowledge, and to follow his advice so far as that can be safely done. But it is essential that over all there should be the general control and the general policy of the Government of India, to which all officers alike must conform, whether they agree with it or not.

21. This seems so self-evident a proposition that when Her Majesty's Government declare "that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India," it is reasonable to suppose that there is no suggestion that the control is not now supervised by

the Government of India, though it is exercised indirectly and through the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. I pass therefore to the consideration of the comparison between a control exercised indirectly through the Lieutenant-Governor and a similar control exercised through an Agent to the Governor-General. It may be admitted that in both cases the Foreign Department is relieved from a mass of administrative detail; but, as already stated, the relief is by no means as complete in the case of the Agent to the Governor-General as in that of the Lieutenant-Governor, for the simple reason that the full machinery of a Local Government is not available. The Baluchistan agency was fairly on its legs before I knew it, and is still more firmly established now, and yet it affords overwhelming proof of this proposition. If so, one can only conjecture what would be the result of a new agency on the Punjab frontier. But besides this there are two other matters on which it is my duty to speak frankly; and if it be thought that I magnify my office I can only say that I describe circumstances as I myself have found them. The closer supervision and control desired by Her Majesty's Government must be largely exercised by the Viceroy himself, both in his capacity as head of the Government and as having charge of the Foreign Department. It is of the highest importance that the relations between the Viceroy and the officer who, under his supervision, directs the control of their external relations should be close and personal. The Agent to the Governor-General from the mere fact of his appointment is expected to reside in his district; he may be called to Simla or Calcutta, or the Viceroy may, during his five years, meet him once, perhaps twice, on tour, and that is all. The Lieutenant-Governor resides several months every year at Simla, and is in constant communication with the Viceroy. The Agent to the Governor-General of a district, such as that now under contemplation, would of course be a selected officer, deserving the fullest confidence, but the Lieutenant-Governor is an officer in the very highest grade, both by seniority and position. Now it is at the point where Imperial interests must override local considerations that the Viceroy's hand must be felt upon the reins. A certain course of action may be proposed which, looking to local circumstances, is beyond doubt the best; and yet Imperial policy may require that it should be abandoned. If at that moment the officer who must be overruled is one with whom there are opportunities of personal conference and consultation, the chances of friction and misunderstanding are infinitely less than if he is one with whom there can only be communication from a distance by letter, and who must on that account, and perhaps by reason of his standing, be addressed rather as a subordinate than as a colleague and friend.

22. It is probably only practical experience that can enable any one to realise the full advantage that can be secured, or the loss of influence that may result, from differences such as this in the arrangements whereby control is exercised. But there is one more difference between the Agent to the Governor-General and the Lieutenant-Governor which is fundamental, and which vitally affects the question, which of them is to be preferred for the present purpose? It has been objected that the Lieutenant-Governor has too many interests inside his province, and that it cannot be expected that he will be able to devote sufficient attention to affairs on and across the border. But is there not another side to that question? If we create this new post, choosing for it, as we are bound to do, a man of energy and ambition, what outlet is he to find for his activity? The career of a Sandeman, the creation of a new Baluchistan, is debarred to him; for the policy which he must carry out is essentially one of *quieta non movere*. It was a policy of non-annexation, of non-interference, which was declared by Her Majesty's Government in the despatch of January 28th, and was expounded on their behalf by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State, and the future Viceroy. It is a policy of which I heartily approve, and which I claim has been pursued during my administration. Expeditions have been undertaken, and our advanced posts have been still further advanced, the former having been sent, and the latter established, in consequence of obligations which, so far as I am concerned, were inherited. We have assumed the protection of the Dauris in the Tochi valley against their turbulent neighbours, at their own request long and urgently preferred, but no tribe or section of a tribe

has been compelled against their will to surrender the local self-government which they formerly possessed, and which it is their desire to retain. It is because I wish to see this policy acted upon in the future, and because I regard it as the best hope of a peaceful and permanent settlement, that I deprecate the establishment on the frontier of an authority which from the nature of things must, in my judgment, endanger its continuance, and that I still prefer to rely on such an adaptation of the machinery we already possess as we proposed in our despatch, believing that by so doing we can with less risk and greater efficiency secure the objects which Her Majesty's Government have in view.

(Signed) ELGIN.

November 6th, 1898.

No. 9.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 24th November, 1898.

I have received and considered your Excellency's military despatch* of the 4th August last, in which you submit your views as to the military position to be maintained on the Miranzai border, in the Tochi valley, and at Wana, and the adjacent portion of the frontier.

2. I may assume generally that the proposals contained in this letter are concerned, not immediately with ulterior strategical necessities, but with the protection and pacification of the Punjab frontier; and from this standpoint I proceed to pass some observations upon them. In regard to the Miranzai border, you are of opinion that the retention of some regular troops is at present essential for the protection of this part of the border, and that though their eventual withdrawal may be on some grounds desirable, it cannot now be considered. You therefore appointed a Committee to report upon the question of the defence of the Samana range, with the objects of protecting the Miranzai valley against tribal incursions, and of supporting the police posts in that region. Of the two schemes submitted by the Committee, your Government adopted one (A), which contemplates holding the range in such strength (concentrated at Fort Lockhart) as would admit of a small moveable column being at once available to support the police posts, the force being dependent on Kohat for its main support. You recommend this scheme generally for my approval, leaving the details to be further examined, and reserving for submission hereafter any point that may need my sanction, with exact estimates of the cost.

3. In the Tochi valley you are of opinion that the entire withdrawal of troops would be impracticable in the existing circumstances; but you believe that it may be possible before long to diminish the garrisons, and to concentrate the regular troops, placing the main garrison at Miranshah. In my telegram of the 14th September I informed your Excellency that I approved the selection of Miranshah for that purpose.

4. Having regard to the general peace of the country in the vicinity of Wana, you think that the withdrawal of the troops from that post should not at present be undertaken; although you desire to follow out the principle of the concentration of regular troops, if and when you are able to provide an efficient substitute in the subsidiary posts.

5. I have, therefore now before me, in outline and in anticipation of details and estimates, a sketch of the military position which your Government are prepared to establish for the protection of a very large area of tribal territory. The general purport of your letter is to recommend the retention for the present

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* See above, page 66.

of strong garrisons in fortified posts on the Samana range, in the Tochi valley, and at Wana. The important question of holding the minor posts by levies, or by militia, is engaging your attention, with the object of organising them, if necessary, in the future.

6. In regard to the general principles which should govern these military arrangements for frontier defence, your Excellency refers to a statement made in paragraph 4 of your Military Letter of 23rd June, 1898, which affirms and accepts the leading principles laid down in my Despatch of the 28th January, 1898, as underlying the frontier policy to which Her Majesty's Government are determined to adhere. The first of these principles, as given in paragraph 18 of the Despatch, was that no new responsibility should be undertaken unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the British Indian border. And the two main objects to be borne in mind were indicated to be the best possible concentration of your military force that would enable you to fulfil your responsibilities and the limitation of your interference with the tribes, so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory. With the question of concentrating your troops your Excellency's letter now under reply has dealt carefully and comprehensively; but the second of the two objects which I have just mentioned is not of such a nature as to bring it adequately within the scope of a scheme for military defence. The measures which you submit for my approval must be regarded as a part of the arrangements necessary for the control and protection of the frontier, while these again must depend mainly upon the general policy of your Government towards the tribes, which, as you are aware, is now under consideration; and I wish to be assured that this side of the whole question has been thoroughly examined. Accordingly, before deciding finally upon proposals which, if approved, might bring a large extent of trans-frontier country under the permanent protection of the British Government—a step which can hardly be taken without some material increase of our responsibilities—I think it best to remit the case again to your Excellency for full consideration, upon the political and military principles laid down in my Despatch of the 28th January last.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 10.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 10th August, 1899.

IN our Military despatch of the 4th May, 1899,* we informed Your Lordship that we had finally decided that the force holding Landi Kotal and controlling the Khyber should be, as heretofore, a local force, and that it should have a strength of 1,200 men in two battalions under a single Commandant and Adjutant, with two other British officers to each battalion. It was added that Your Lordship would be separately addressed as to the organisation of this force, and as to the political arrangements for keeping open the Khyber route. Subsequently, in our telegram of the 14th July, we asked Your Lordship's sanction to proceed at once to raise the Khyber Rifles to the strength proposed, and this was accorded in your telegram of the 2nd August.

2. We now have the honour to enclose copies of the correspondence cited in the accompanying list, showing in detail the arrangements sanctioned for the reorganisation of the corps, and the cost entailed.

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* Not printed.

3. We have decided to maintain the existing arrangements for the kafila traffic, *viz.*, that there shall be two kafilas a week each way in the cold weather, and one a week each way in the hot weather. While, however, in practice the Pass will be open for kafilas only on stated days, we retain the right to use it on any or every day of the week for any other purpose for which it may be required.

4. We invite your Lordship's attention to our Foreign Secretary's letter dated the 22nd June 1899, to the Officer Commanding the Khyber Force and Mr. F. D. Cunningham. We have in this letter laid down the principle that, in the Khyber and elsewhere along the frontier, the various corps of tribal militia or rifles, or military police, though semi-military in organization, are more than semi-political in functions and object. and, as such, must necessarily (except in time of active warfare) be under civil authority and control. While, therefore, we have reserved full discretion to invest the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles, or any other officer displaying special aptitude for the work, with political authority in the Khyber Pass, we have decided that ordinarily there will be a separate Political Officer in the Pass, to whom in all political matters the commandant of the Khyber Rifles will be subordinate.

Enclosure No. 6. Other Enclosures not printed.

5. Measures will be taken at once to raise the corps to sanctioned strength, and we anticipate that it may be possible to withdraw the military garrison from Landi Kotal before the end of the year.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) Curzon of Kedleston.
" W. S. A. Lockhart.
" E. H. H. Collen.
" C. M. Rivaz.
" C. E. Dawkins.
" T. Raleigh.
" R. Gardiner.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Letter from H. S. Barnes, Esq., C.S.I., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to Colonel N. F. Fitz G. Chamberlain, Colonel on the Staff Commanding Khyber Force, and F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., dated Simla, the 22nd June, 1899.

In the third paragraph of my letter, dated 1st June, you were informed that the question of the political control of the Khyber Pass was still under consideration, and that orders on this point and also on the question of the relations between the Political Officer and the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles would be communicated hereafter.

2. In the fourth paragraph of the same letter, it is stated that the *raison d'être* of the Khyber Rifles is political rather than military, and that it was considered important not to deprive them of their tribal character. This view is admitted throughout the correspondence, and the only point, on which there appears to have been some difference of opinion betwen General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham, was the question whether the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles under the new organization should be *ex-officio* the political authority in the Pass, or whether there should be a separate Political Officer to whom the Commandant would be subordinate.

3. The Government of India, after full consideration, desire to take this opportunity to lay down the principle that, in the Khyber and elsewhere along the frontier, the Corps of tribal militia, or rifles, or military police, by whatsoever name they may be called, though semi-military in organization, are more than semi-political in functions and object, and that as such they must necessarily (except in time of active warfare) be under civil authority and control. Sometimes this authority is exercised by a military officer in civil employ (who may also on occasion be in command of the Militia or Rifle Corps as well). Sometimes it is exercised through an officer of the Civil Service. In either case, the principle is the same. In the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, there can be no doubt that the principle is a correct one, and it should be adopted and acted upon along the entire length of the North-West border.

4. In these circumstances, the principle being admitted, the selection of the officer by whom the civil control is to be exercised is a matter of personal fitness. I am therefore to say that, while retaining full discretion to invest the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles, or any other officer displaying special aptitude for the work, with political authority in the Khyber Pass, the Government of India have decided that ordinarily there will be a separate Political Officer in the Pass, to whom the Commandant will be subordinate. As regards the relations between the Commandant and the Political Officer, I am to add that the Government of India are of opinion that the rules suggested in paragraph 5 of General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham's letter of the 14th March are suitable and may be adopted.

5. I am to remind you that no time should be lost in submitting the proposition statement called for in paragraph 6 of my letter of 1st June. As soon as the additional defence works which are to be constructed at Landi Kotal and in the Pass are completed, the regular troops now in the Pass will be withdrawn. It is, therefore, important that there should be as little delay as possible in passing the final orders to raise the Khyber Rifles to the strength now desired.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) H. S. BARNES,
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 11.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. Dated Simla, the 26th October, 1899.

Your Lordship's despatch, dated 25th November 1898, acknowledged the receipt of the letter from Lord Elgin's Government, of the 4th August 1898, containing proposals in regard to the military position on the Miranzai border, in the Tochi valley, at Wana, and in the adjacent parts of the frontier. In commenting on the plans submitted, Your Lordship referred to the leading principles of policy laid down in your despatch, dated 28th January 1898, and pointed out that, while the proposals made dealt carefully and comprehensively with one of the main objects which Your Lordship desired us to bear in mind, *viz.*, the best possible concentration of our military force that would enable us to fulfil our responsibilites, the measures to be undertaken must also be devised with due attention to the principle that our administrative control over tribal territory was not to be extended, and must harmonise with the general policy that it is decided to pursue towards the frontier tribes. Your Lordship, therefore, remitted the case to us for full consideration in connection with this general question.

2. We have lately, as desired by Your Lordship, discussed the position on this part of the frontier in connection with, and as part of, the definite policy which we have already initiated in the Chitral Valley and in the Khyber Pass, and which has received Your Lordship's sanction. In the course of this discussion, we have arrived at certain conclusions which have been briefly communicated to Your Lordship in the Viceroy's telegram of the 2nd July, and which have met with Your Lordship's general approval. We now propose to set forth in greater detail the scheme which we recommend, and to explain the principles by which we have been guided.

3. The first principle laid down by Her Magesty's Government in Your Lordship's despatch of the 28th January 1898 was that no new responsibility should be undertaken on the frontier, unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the British Indian border. At the same time, as already stated, our attention was more especially directed by Your Lordship to the concentration of our military forces, and to the avoidance of unnecessary interference with the tribes. On the other hand, by their previous recommendations, the Government of India at the end of last year were more or less committed to a policy, which involved the construction of fortifications and the retention of the existing garrision in Chitral, the expenditure of several lakhs of rupees on a new fort at Landi Kotal, and on other fortified works in the Khyber, the construction of the bed for a light railway from Jamrud to Landi Kotal, the maintenance of a military garrison on the Samana range and in the Kurram valley, and an expenditure on forts and posts in these two places which under the scheme A recommended in the despatch of 4th August, 1898, and including the additional lines required at Kohat, amounted to Rs. 6,89,958. Certain additions to this scheme since recommended by the present Commander-in-Chief would have raised this expenditure to over eleven lakhs of rupees. In the Tochi valley it was considered necessary to maintain a considerable, though diminished, garrison, and it was proposed to establish a central cantonment at Miran Shah which could only have been constructed at a heavy cost. Similarly it was proposed to maintain a military garrison at Wana in Southern Waziristan for the protection of the Gomal route from Afghanistan. It is true that it was proposed in time to withdraw the regular troops from Landi Kotal in the Khyber, but with this exception there was to be little reduction in the number of troops cantoned beyond our administrative border. The principle of the concentration of our regular forces would, in these circumstances, have been imperfectly applied, and there was the further risk that the maintenance of regular garrisons in tribal territory would inevitably tend to increase, rather than to diminish, the extent of our interference.

4. Upon the reconsideration of the whole position to which we were invited by Your Lordship, we came to the conclusion that the recommendations previously submitted were susceptible of some modification in order to bring them into greater harmony with the principles that had been laid down. Accordingly, early in the present year, we prepared and forwarded revised proposals in regard to Chitral and the Khyber Pass, which, with Your Lordship's approval, are now in process of being carried out. These proposals were not made without due regard to our position and our impending arrangements elsewhere on the frontier. We endeavoured in framing them to make them conform to a definite and preconceived plan of general application, and they may be regarded as initiating a positive course of policy and action on the North-West Frontier, which, we hope, will be continuous and which rests on principles applicable in our opinion along the entire border. These principles are in accordance with the general axioms laid down in Your Lordship's despatch of 28th January, and they may be specifically defined as follows :—

(i) We desire to avoid locking up regular garrisons in costly fortified positions, at a distance from our base, where the troops themselves are practically lost to the offensive strength of India, and in time of emergency, would probably require additional forces to be detached from the Indian army to their assistance. It is for this reason that we proposed to withdraw or reduce our

existing garrisons in Chitral and Landi Kotal, and have decided not to proceed with the fortifications at those places on the large scale at first proposed.

(ii) Inasmuch as after withdrawing or reducing our garrisons we cannot leave these positions or districts—all of which have been taken in a greater or less degree under our control—without military protection, we propose in each of them, as far as possible, to interest the inhabitants of the locality in their own defence, at the same time that we establish a lien upon their loyalty, by enrolling them as a tribal force to supply the local garrisons. In different parts of the frontier, according to the state of development of our relations with the tribes, or to the character of defence required, different methods will be adopted. Thus for instance in Chitral, we have decided to utilise native levies, already existing under a system of feudal service, and to pay them a salary for holding small posts, in our interests, on the road between the Lowarai Pass and Chitral. Their organisation and equipment are entirely native. This is the most primitive and rudimentary system, and is only supplementary to a military occupation in which it has been resolved on wider grounds to persist. In the Khyber Pass, we have reached a more advanced stage. Here the Khyber Rifles will replace the troops, and, as recently reorganised, they will consist of a body of men, recruited in certain proportions from the tribes, disciplined and equipped on more military lines, and commanded by British military officers. Nevertheless they are not a purely military body, and they are under the control of the civil power.

In all these cases the principle is the same, and is, we think, one of general application along the frontier, as well as of practical wisdom. By relieving the Indian army from the task of garrisoning and defending these outlying positions, it will be possible, when war breaks out on or beyond the frontier, to concentrate the majority of our troops upon the principal lines of advance. By enrolling the local garrisons as levies, or militia, or police, we reduce the publicity and exaggeration inseparable from proceedings of the regular army upon the frontier, while in the event of any contretemps, we escape the commotion and reproach that are apt to be excited by military disaster. Finally, we take into our pay, and thereby acquire a hold upon the allegiance of the tribesmen, who, while their local patriotism is conciliated by employment as the guardians of their native hills, develop at the same time under the influence of a quasi-military discipline an ever increasing loyalty to the British Government.

(iii) Having withdrawn our regular garrisons from these advanced posts, and having substituted for them tribal forces, we cannot allow the latter to be imperilled or destroyed by local risings or by external attack. Accordingly at bases within or contiguous to the administrative frontier of India, we propose to maintain moveable columns ready to march to the relief or defence of the advanced positions, and, where possible, to connect the frontier cantonments with the military resources of India by light railways pushed forward from already existing railway systems. Thus for the support of the Chitral position, we keep a garrison at the Malakand and for the present a moveable column at Khar. It has also been decided to construct a light railway from Nowshera to Dargai. In support of the Khyber there is a movable column at Peshawar, and we have decided, with Your Lordship's sanction, to extend the railway on the standard gauge as far as Jamrud.

We have stated these principles at some length, because, if they are approved, their record may be of use for future guidance. It is also desirable that Your

Lordship should clearly apprehend the objects at which we desire to aim, and the unity of plan which underlies both our past and present recommendations.

5. We now propose to apply these considerations to that part of the frontier which is dealt with in Your Lordship's despatch of the 25th November 1898. We have carefully re-examined the proposals made by Lord Elgin's Government, and we see no reason why this part of the border should be dealt with on different principles from those which we have adopted in the sections of the frontier which have already come under our notice. There are also indications in the despatch of 4th August 1898 that a policy of progressive withdrawal and the substitution of tribal militia for regular troops had already been in the background of the intentions of our predecessors. We have therefore, after full discussion, come to the following conclusions :—

(i) That it is possible and will be safe at an early period to withdraw the military garrisons from the forts on the Samana range.

(ii) That the troops shall be replaced by a battalion of military police about 460 strong, to be called the Samana Rifles, and to be commanded by police officers. This form of tribal militia or military police will be intermediary between the native levies of Chitral and the more military organization of the Khyber Rifles. In our view precise uniformity of system is not essential on a frontier, so long and with such varying conditions both of local population and the degree of British control as the North-West border, and we think it far from undesirable that different experiments should be made in different parts. This police battalion will be largely recruited from the Orakzai tribesmen, who will thus be enlisted on our side in guarding their own border.

(iii) That similarly there will be no serious difficulty or risk in withdrawing the regular troops from the Kurram valley, where we have a loyal population to deal with ; their place being taken by an increase to the existing Kurram Militia. It is proposed that this increase should take the form of a second battalion, 400 strong, under police officers, the existing battalion being given a more military organisation, and being provided with additional officers.

(iv) That for the support both of the Samana position and the Kurram valley a new cantonment be established in Miranzai, the position which has been recommended as most suitable being the open plain at an elevation of over 3,000 feet, which lies between Doaba and Torawari. The establishment of this cantonment is, we consider, a necessary condition of the withdrawal of the regular troops from these two advanced positions. Indeed, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief considers that such a cantonment would have been necessary even if we had decided to adhere to the scheme A which was recommended in our despatch of the 4th August last. Its construction will have the further advantage of obviating the demand for the additional Native Infantry lines which it would otherwise have been necessary to build at Kohat.

(v) That while the obligations into which we have entered render it impracticable to consider the question of a total withdrawal from either the Tochi valley in Northern Waziristan, or from Wana or the other obligatory positions in the Gomal and Shahur valley in Southern Waziristan, a prolonged or permanent military occupation of these places by the troops of the Indian army is not necessitated by political or strategical considerations.

(vi) That, in pursuance of the policy initiated elsewhere on the frontier, the troops may be gradually withdrawn from all these places at as early a date as is consistent with safety and expediency.

(vii) That to replace the troops, two new Militia Corps, similar to the Khyber Rifles and the Kurram Militia, shall be raised under British officers and largely recruited from the local tribes. One of these corps will hold the Tochi valley, the other will have its head-quarters at Wana, and will hold the necessary posts on the Gomal and Shahur routes. It is proposed not to maintain the present system of Sillahdari levies, but to absorb into the militia most of the men who are now engaged, employing a small portion of the new corps for civil and political duties, and continuing only such allowances to the local Maliks as the Local Government may think necessary, in order to enable us to count on their support and good-will in maintaining the peace of the country.

(viii) That in consequence of these arrangements, it will not be necessary to proceed with the proposed fortified cantonment at Miran Shah, but for the support of the Tochi position a moveable column will be maintained at Bannu.

6. We have been in communication with the Government of the Punjab in connection with these proposals, and they have on the whole met with the concurrence of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor. We enclose, for Your Lordship's information, copies of the correspondence as detailed in the accompanying list. In the case of the militia for the Samana and the Kurram, we have not yet received the final conclusions of the Local Government, in the form of the necessary proposition statements, though the arrangements are in an advanced state of preparation. Our Foreign Secretary's letters to the Punjab Government of the 14th and 18th July explain the points on which we still await information. The estimated net cost of the Samana Battalion is Rs. 78,507, and of the additions to the Kurram Militia Rs. 1,29,126 a year. These totals may be slightly increased in the final proposals which we shall receive, but the net cost of the two schemes will not, we think, exceed Rs. 2,20,000 a year. In accordance with the general sanction given in Your Lordship's telegram of 25th July, and as soon as we receive the replies of the Punjab Government, we propose to sanction these two schemes, and to proceed without delay with the enlistment of the Samana Rifles and of the additional militia for the Kurram valley. We anticipate that it may be possible to withdraw the troops from the Samana range and the Kurram in about nine months from the date of sanction to these two schemes. As regards the new cantonment which it is proposed to place at Torawari, we think it desirable to test the suitability of the site before incurring a large expenditure on buildings and other works. We have decided, therefore, to place there in camp a modeaate force consisting of not less than one regiment of Native Cavalry, one Native Infantry regiment, and a Mountain Battery. These troops will be provided later on with adequate shelter during the hot weather, and, if the site proves to be satisfactory, we will proceed gradually to construct permanent barracks and other buildings.

7. Our proposals in regard to Waziristan are in a less advanced state, and will take a longer time to complete. Our Foreign Secretary's letter to the Government of the Punjab, of 7th August, explains our views in detail, and before we can furnish Your Lordship with more precise and detailed proposals, it will be necessary to await the report of the Committee which we have directed the Local Government to convene. But the information given in the papers which we forward will, we think, be sufficient to enable Your Lordship to form an approximate estimate of the cost of the scheme when completed. Assuming the absorption in the new corps of the greater number of the existing Sillahdari levies, the nett cost of a militia corps in the Tochi of a strength of 700 rifles and 50 cavalry is estimated at Rs. 87,452 a year. The nett cost of the larger scheme of 1,000 rifles and 60 cavalry suggested by the Commissioner of the Derajat would be about Rs. 1,35,000. We must await the proposals of the Committee and the Local Government as to the exact strength which may be required, but assuming the strength of each of the two corps in Waziristan to be not less than 800 or more than

1,000 rifles, the nett cost for both will be from 2 to 2¾ lakhs per annum. We would ask Your Lordship's permission to sanction such a strength for each corps, as in communication with the Local Government we may find to be necessary, within a limit of 3 lakhs a year nett increase of expenditure. The initial expenditure in connection with these corps cannot be large, as it is assumed they will take over the buildings now occupied by the troops.

8. It will be convenient at this stage to furnish Your Lordship with some estimate of the difference in cost of the arrangements now proposed, and of those which were in existence or were contemplated in January of this year. Such an estimate can, from the nature of the case, be only approximate, but the figures which we have been able to collect, and which are given in the three statements* herewith enclosed, are sufficient to demonstrate that the policy now contemplated must result at once in a very considerable, and in the long run in a permanent, relief to the Indian exchequer. Excluding the cost of the new cantonment in Miranzai, which will be dealt with hereafter when we are satisfied as to the most suitable site, and also the cost of the temporary camp, which it is impossible at present to estimate, but which should not be large, the difference in the initial expenditure on posts and fortifications, which we now propose, and that of the larger programme of military works contemplated last year, is no less than 26½ lakhs of rupees.

* Enclosures not printed.

The saving in the recurring expenditure will also be substantial. If we find it possible to carry out to the full all our present proposals, the withdrawal of troops from the advanced positions which they now hold, and the substitution of militia corps and levies will result in the end in an annual saving of 2¾ lakhs. A large portion of this saving will accrue at once, or within a very short interval, inasmuch as one regiment is now being withdrawn from Chitral, the troops at Landi Kotal will, we anticipate, return to India before the end of the year, and as already stated the withdrawal of the Kurram and Samana garrisons will, we hope, be possible within about nine months from the present time. We have already referred to the other obvious advantages of the present proposals, viz., the addition to our defensive strength on the border by the enlistment of the tribesmen in local corps for the police of their own hills, and the increase to our offensive power by the recall and concentration of the troops of the regular army. The extent of the relief which will be thus afforded may be measured by the fact that, without counting the two battalions which would in any case have been withdrawn from Landi Kotal, they will set free for service elsewhere about five battalions of native infantry.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
„ W. S. A. LOCKHART.
„ E. H. H. COLLEN.
„ A. C. TREVOR.
„ C. M. RIVAZ.
„ C. E. DAWKINS.
„ T. RALEIGH.

[Enclosure not printed.]

No. 12.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 4th January 1900.

North-western Frontier. Military arrangements for Samana, Kurram, and Waziristan.

I have considered in Council your Excellency's Letter No. 208, of the 26th October last, in which you explain the principles by which you have been guided in formulating your recommendations for the concentration of your military forces on the North-western Frontier, and set forth in detail the measures which you propose to adopt.

2. In my telegram of the 13th October, 1897, I expressed the view that "the present opportunity should be used for defining our permanent position and policy"; and in the 18th paragraph of my Despatch of the 28th January 1898, I pointed out that one of the main objects to be kept in view should be the "limitation of your interference with the tribes so as to "avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory."

3. Subsequently, in reply to your predecessor's Military Letter of the 4th August 1898, I again referred to the question of the limitation of interference with the tribes as having an important bearing on your military proposals, and remitted the recommendations of the Government of India for further consideration upon the political as well as the military principles laid down in my Despatch of January 1898.

4. In your letter now under reply you report the military arrangements made upon an important section of the North-western Frontier, and you explain that they have been framed upon a definite plan intended for general application, which you desire to carry out as representing the continuous policy to be followed in dealing with questions of the protection of our own territory and the police of the border. The main object of these arrangements is the withdrawal of garrisons of regular troops from fortified positions beyond the frontier, or their reduction as circumstances may allow; and the substitution of militia recruited from the tribes of the country, disciplined and equipped to a certain extent upon military models, and usually commanded by British officers. In some cases untrained native levies are to be employed in maintaing posts of communication.

5. These measures, and the policy upon which they are based, appear to me to be in accordance with the principles laid down in my Despatches to you on the subject, particularly in the 18th and 19th paragraphs of my Despatch, dated 28th January 1898, in regard to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities devolving upon the British Government in its relations with the frontier tribes.

6. I sanction the proposals submitted to me, and the expenditure which is estimated to be necessary, and I have pleasure in conveying to you, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, their recognition of the judgment, ability, and promptitude with which your Government has taken up and dealt with these important questions.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 13.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 13th September, 1900.

In your despatch of August 5th, 1898, in which you discussed the future administration of the North-West Frontier of India, as affected by the war of the preceding year, Your Lordship used these words: "Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab Frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India." Your Lordship, in inviting the attention of Lord Elgin's administration to certain suggestions for the attainment of this object, went on to remark: "The matter is too important for me to arrive at any final decision without giving to it the fullest consideration. I shall receive with interest any further observations which Your Excellency may desire to make on the suggestions of this despatch."

2. The proposals alluded to, relating to a change in the political control of the tribes on the Peshawar Border, by an alteration in the position of the Commissioner of Peshawar, were referred to the Punjab Government in the autumn of 1898. The replies of the Lieutenant-Governor and of the principal Frontier officers of the Local Administration, together with a Minute by the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, were forwarded to Your Lordship in a despatch dated the 10th November, 1898. Lord Elgin explained in his Minute that, while anxious before leaving India to submit his own opinions in an official form, he desired to speak for himself alone, and not in any way to pledge the Government of India, for whose mature and deliberate consideration the whole case must be expressly reserved.

3. This consideration we have now, in the light of further experience, and of a most careful examination of all the factors of the problem, given to it; and we submit to Your Lordship the conclusions at which we have arrived.

4. We are even more profoundly convinced than was Your Lordship of the unsatisfactory nature of the present position. It is as unsatisfactory from the point of view of the Punjab Government as it can be from that of the Government of India. The former is called upon to carry out a Frontier policy for which it is not in the last resort responsible, and with which it is not specially qualified to deal. The latter is responsible for a Frontier policy which is not carried out by its own agents, and is to a large extent removed from its direct supervision. Labour without responsibility is the experience of the Local Government; responsibility without control is that of the Government of India. This situation, which is equally invidious for both parties, has been aggravated in recent years by the circumstances that have brought a larger number of the Frontier tribes under the influence of the Government of India, and have compelled the institution of political relations with them, not always or easily to be adjusted to the scope and capabilities of a Provincial Administration. Some radical change in the existing system of Frontier management appears to us to be required, if there is to be either firmness, promptitude, or continuity of Frontier policy in the future.

5. The entire question has for some time engaged the close attention of His Excellency the Viceroy, who has personally visited the Frontier in order to examine the situation upon the spot. He has now submitted his views and proposals in an exhaustive Minute, which has been considered by us, and which we forward to Your Lordship with an expression of our unanimous and hearty agreement with its main propositions.

6. The problem is one which is capable of being dealt with in one of three fashions. It might be possible to reduce the difficulties and dangers of the present situation by conferring a considerably larger measure of independent authority and control over the Frontier administration upon the Punjab Government. We could not ourselves recommend such a proposal, for the reason that any addition to the powers of the Local Government must involve a corresponding subtraction from those of the Government of India; and that to increase the responsibility of the former at the expense of the latter would defeat the entire object that we have in view. But in auy case we are precluded from even considering this alternative by the express injunction of Your Lordship, already quoted, which postulates a closer and not a more perfunctory control by the Government of India in the future.

7. Of the various compromises that are capable of being suggested between such a scheme, and that of the creation of a new administration, we will only observe that we are in complete agreement with the Lieutenant-Governor and the officers of the Punjab Government, in their rejection of the particular proposal that was indicated in Your Lordship's despatch of August 5th, 1898, and with His Excellency the Viceroy in the criticism that he has passed upon other and cognate suggestions in his Minute.

8. There remains only the third alternative; that of the construction of a new Agency or province, to be under the immediate control of the Government of India, and to be created out of those Trans-Indus districts of the Punjab, in which British officers are brought into direct contact with, and become

responsible for, the management of the Frontier tribes. We are convinced that our duties, whether towards them, or to our own subjects on this side of the border, are more likely to be discharged with the resolution, despatch, and freedom of personal discretion that are essential to success in dealing with such questions, by an Agent to the Governor-General, acting in direct touch with the local officials on the one hand and the Government of India on the other, than will be possible so long as the more complex mechanism and the stereotyped procedure of a first class Provincial Government continue to be interposed between the Frontier and ourselves.

9. His Excellency the Viceroy has worked out with much care the suggested scope and character of the new administration. We concur with him in thinking that the main desideratum to be borne in mind, consistently with the root principle of our policy, is the least possible disturbance of existing arrangements. His scheme appears to us to have been devised with this object, and to be capable of execution not only without detriment, but even with advantage, to the interests of the existing province and its officers.

10. Should the project, in its general outlines, meet with the approval of Your Lordship and of Her Majesty's Government, we would not propose to carry it into effect without the fullest consultation with the Punjab Government. It might be susceptible of modification and improvement at their hands. It should not be regarded, even from our own point of view, as fixed or finite, until it has been subjected to the scrutiny of those who, from their local knowledge, will be better able than ourselves to advise upon details, both administrative and geographical. The exact boundaries and sub-division of the detached districts, the constitution of the political, civil, and judicial service of the new Agency, and the effect produced upon the Punjab Commission, are all matters upon which we should desire to enter into friendly discussion with the Lieutenant-Governor. Should we receive your Lordship's permission to do so, we entertain little doubt of being able to submit to you, with no great delay, the full and final details of the projected reform.

11. As regards its financial cost, we call to mind that your Lordship, in your despatch of August 5th, 1898, conceded to the Government of India "a wide discretion in framing the arrangements, financial and executive, which may be found necessary for giving effect to the considerations" to which you had invited our attention. It is too early at the present stage to pronounce with any definiteness as to the outlay that is likely to be entailed by still inchoate proposals. We are not without hopes, however, that, even when they are fully developed, we shall not be called upon to profit by the latitude which has been so generously allowed to us, but shall be able to commend our scheme as consistent with the interests of economical as well as efficient administration.

12. Finally, in submitting these proposals, we desire to impress upon Her Majesty's Government that we regard them as essential to the prosecution of the larger scheme of Frontier policy upon which, with their approval, we have lately embarked: that they are put forward, not in any experimental interests, but with the firm conviction that they will be conducive to a consistent and peaceable continuance of our present harmonious relations with the majority of the border tribes; and that, while, if accepted, they will emphasise the due responsibility of the Government of India for Frontier policy and concerns, they will also be the means of investing the officers who conduct those affairs on the spot with that wider liberty of action and leisure for personal intercourse with the Pathan peoples, which have long been recognised as an indispensable condition of Frontier success.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
" E. H. H. COLLEN.
" A. C. TREVOR.
" C. M. RIVAZ.
" T. RALEIGH.
" E. F.-G. LAW.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Minute by the Viceroy on Frontier Administration.

During the year and-a-half that have elapsed since January, 1899, the Government of India have matured, and are now carrying into execution a new policy for the military charge and control of the North-West Frontier. We have reduced the regular garrison in Chitral, have concentrated our troops at Drosh, in close proximity to the British end of the Dir-Chitral line of communication, and have supplemented our military strength in the country by native levies, raised from the Mehtar's subjects. We have at the same time strengthened the Malakand position by the construction of a rail-road from Nowshera to Dargai.

2. In the Khyber we have successfully withdrawn the whole of the regular troops, both British and Native, from all positions in the Pass; and have replaced them by two battalions (1,250 in all) of the reorganised and enlarged Khyber Rifles, with an increased number of British officers, and an improved scale of pay. We have abandoned the costly and extensive fortifications which it was at one time proposed to build in the Pass and at its further extremity; and have, at a greatly reduced outlay, constructed the additional or improved defences that are required for the Afridi garrison. We have desisted from the plan of laying either the bed of a railway or a railway itself up the Khyber Pass, and have contented ourselves with a modest extension of the existing North-West Railway for the distance of 10 miles that separates Peshawar from Jamrud. Flying columns, maintained beyond the Malakand and at Peshawar, provide for the rapid reinforcement of these two sections of the frontier.

3. Between Peshawar and Kohat we have arranged peaceably for the construction of the long desired cart-road through Kohat Pass, a work which is about to be undertaken with the consent and co-operation of the Pass tribes. We further contemplate, at as early a date as our resources will bear the outlay, the linking of Kohat by railway with Kushalgarh upon the Indus, at which point connection by rail already exists with the military base of Rawalpindi.

4. South of Kohat a force of tribal militia, 450 strong, largely recruited from the Orakzai tribesmen and entitled the Samana Rifles, has been raised under British officers as an extra battalion of the Border Military Police, and is intended, as soon as the conditions permit, to replace our regular garrisons now maintained on the Samana Range.

5. In the Kurram valley, the Kurram Militia have been augmented in numbers and reorganised in two battalions (1,250 strong) under British officers. It is believed that the high state of efficiency which they have already attained will very shortly admit of the withdrawal of the regular garrison which has been maintained in the Kurram valley since it was taken over in 1892. Both the Samana and the Kurram positions will be supported by the light railway which it is in contemplation to build from Kohat to Thal.

6. Further to the south measures are now being taken for the realisation of a similar policy. Two battalions of Waziristan Militia of 800 each are in course of being raised, the one for the Tochi valley or Northern Waziristan, the other for the Gomal valley or Southern Waziristan. They are intended, as soon as the requisite degree of discipline and efficiency has been attained, to replace the large garrisons of regular troops which have been kept in those valleys since 1895.

7. The principle that underlies all these dispositions is the same. While entailing no abdication of the responsibilities, military or political, which have been assumed by the Government of India at an earlier date, and which could not, either with safety or in honour, be now repudiated, they are intended to extricate from advanced positions the large numbers of regular troops who have for some years been stationed there; to consolidate instead of diffusing our military strength upon the border; and to promote a spirit of local harmony and co-operation by the enlistment, in the service of the British Government, but in the defence of their own country, of the wild but not intractable inhabitants of these regions. It is hoped, if the scheme be given a fair start, that its

possible risks may be more than compensated by its unquestioned advantages, of reduced outlay, of increased tactical mobility, and of tribal contentment. Above all, the scheme which I have sketched, which has been inspired, not by a Local Government, but by the Supreme Government, and which is under the control not of the military authorities, but of the Foreign Department, *i.e.*, of the Viceroy, is intended to emphasize the responsibility, which the Government of India has assumed and of which it cannot ever safely divest itself. for the pacification and control of regions, which lie upon the borders of the Empire, and which, if any part of the Indian frontier be at any time exposed to attack, will in all probability be the immediate focus of military and political danger.

8. I now desire to supplement these plans, which have so far been attended by consequences as favourable as could possibly have been hoped for (though I shrink from any dogmatism as to the future), by submitting the proposal, which is their natural complement and climax, and upon which they are in my judgment dependent for the prospect of continuing success, viz., the constitution of a form of administration in the tracts in question which shall bring to bear upon them the authority and influence of the Government of India in a manner more prompt, more imperative, and more direct, than will ever be found possible, so long as the elaborate organisation of a Local Government of the first class intervenes between it and them. I have not brought forward this scheme until I have satisfied myself, by more than a year and a half of patient enquiry and observation in this country and in the Departments of Government, of the complexities, the anomalies, and, as they appear to me, the ineradicable flaws of the existing system; nor have I ventured to indicate what in my opinion should be the keystone of the frontier arch, until I have endeavoured securely to lay the foundations upon which its piers must rest.

9. This is by no means the first time that the proposal has been made to create a new and separate administration for the North-West Frontier. On the contrary, schemes of varying character and magnitude have been submitted to and debated by the Government of India throughout the last quarter of a century; and it may safely be said that there is no frontier authority of any eminence during that period who has not discussed, while there are but few who have not approved the principle of, such a change. This remarkable unanimity* testifies to the depth and range of the conviction upon which the desire for reform has been based and effectively relieves any fresh disputant from the charge either of rashness or of innovation. On the other hand, the fact that all previous endeavours have proved abortive, and that the existing system, though so widely and authoritatively condemned, has continued to survive, suggests that the problem itself is far from easy of solution, and that before it be again approached a brief survey of earlier efforts, and, if possible, an analysis of the causes of their failure, may be helpful to the present argument.

* Among those who have at different times held these views, I may mention Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Henry Durand, Lord Roberts, Sir James Browne, Sir Robert Warburton, Sir Robert Sandeman, Sir William Lockhart. I exclude those whose views have been formed independently of Frontier experience, such as Lord Lytton, Sir Charles Aitchison, Sir George Chesney, Lord Lansdowne.

History of Past Attempts.

10. From the date of the Mutiny until 1899 the discussion of a separate Frontier province and administration was invariably mixed up with, and arose in the first place out of, the proposal to incorporate Sind with the Punjab. Sind had been conquered in 1843, when—the Punjab not having as yet been annexed, and Bengal, which embraced administratively the whole of the north of India, being too remote—it was added, in spite of the distance and the intervening sea, to the Government of Bombay. Even when the Punjab was annexed in 1849, and when, after the Mutiny, it was constituted a Lieutenant-Governorship, it was decided by the Secretary of State not to attach Sind to it, owing to the excellent administration which the latter province was at the time receiving from its Commissioner, Mr. Bartle Frere, under the Government of Bombay. In later years, in 1863 and in 1876,

Sir Bartle Frere himself became one of the strongest advocates of the fusion which his own abilities had successfully availed to postpone. During the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook the incorporation of Sind with the Punjab was, in April 1876, formerly recommended to the Secretary of State, and was accepted in principle by him, though a final expression of opinion was deferred until the newly-appointed Viceroy, Lord Lytton, had visited the frontier.

11. The result of this visit was the appearance of Lord Lytton's well-known Minute of April 22nd, 1877, which at once raised the question on to a different level by suggesting the creation of a separate Trans-Indus District, under a representative of the Viceroy, as the sole exponent of Imperial policy in India. The anomalies and drawbacks of the existing situation were vigorously delineated, and the outlines of the new administration were clearly sketched. The province was to consist of the six Frontier Dictricts of the Punjab, viz., Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu (except the Cis-Indus tracts), Dera Ismail Khan (with the same exception), and Dera Ghazi Khan, and also Trans-Indus Sind (with the exception of Karachi). At the head was to be a Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier and Agent to the Governor-General, to reside at Peshawar, with the powers of a Local Government, and with a Judicial Commissioner possessing the powers of a Chief Court. Under him were to be two Commissioners, one for the Punjab Frontier Districts, except Dera Ghazi Khan (*i.e.*, for the Pathan population of the border); the other for Baluchistan, Dera Ghazi Khan, and Trans-Indus Sind (*i.e.*, for the Baluch population). Into the constitution of the lower grades of the administrative hierarchy, which was to be furnished, with an increased scale of pay, from the Punjab Commission, I need not enter. The covering despatch which was sent with this Minute to the Secretary of State, dated May 17th, 1877, recommended the adoption of its proposals, and the compensation of Bombay for the loss of Sind by the administrative absorption of the whole or part of the Central Provinces—thereby introducing an element of discord which effectually ruined this and all similar proposals for many years to come.

12. The Secretary of State in replying, on November 29th, 1877, accepted the main proposals of Lord Lytton's Government, remarking that the conditions under which the Frontier had been given to the Punjab were obsolete, and that the proposals themselves were "measures of defence and security, not of aggression." Nevertheless, looking to the heavy financial cost of Lord Lytton's complete scheme and to the desirability of not embarking upon too large a change, he recommended, as a smaller and less ambitious proposal, the elimination of the Chief Commissioner or single supreme authority, and the creation of two Commissionerships for the Trans-Indus Districts of the Punjab and Sind (the one for the Pathan, the other for the Baluch tribes). The incumbents of both posts were to be appointed by the Viceroy, but in respect of all internal affairs were to take their orders from the Punjab Government. The Northern or Pathan Districts Commissioner was to be the superior in status, with the rank of Agent to the Governor-General and Frontier Commissioner, and with the right to correspond directly with the Viceroy. The Southern Commissioner was to be subordinate to, and to correspond with, his northern colleague.

13. I call special attention to this proposal, as to which it was admitted that it involved "a duplicate responsibility which is in theory objectionable and may be attended with occasional inconvenience," because it was the first suggestion of a form of compromise which has re-appeared at intervals since, which possesses undoubted superficial attractions, but which has invariably been condemned by those enjoying the closest practical acquaintance with the Frontier. Sir C. Aitchison, who was at that time Foreign Secretary, and who subsequently became Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, noted that "it would probably be difficult to devise a scheme more full of the seeds of future misunderstanding, confusion, and divided responsibility." Sir R. Egerton, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, remarked—"It is almost impossible to exaggerate the inconvenience which might arise from this division of authority. It would have the worse effect upon the internal administration of the Frontier Districts." Other members of the Government described it as quite unworkable and as radically bad.

14. Lord Lytton, however, thinking that half a loaf was better than no bread, was prepared, with certain re-adjustments, to accept the modified scheme. A correspondence ensued with the Punjab Government as to the best methods of carrying it out. The arrangements were nearly completed, and Sir F. (now Lord) Roberts had even been designated as the first Northern or Chief Commissioner of the Frontier when, in the winter of 1878, war broke out with Afghanistan.

15. In the ensuing year, when the war was apparently ended, the project was revived. Then came the Cavagnari massacre and the second Afghan expedition. When peace had been re-established, and the future administrative dispositions required to be made, Lord Lytton had left India. His successor, Lord Ripon, recommended to Her Majesty's Government the abandonment of the entire scheme, both for the separation of the Trans-Indus Districts from the Punjab Government and for the transfer of Sind ; and both projects accordingly disappeared from view.

16. Some years elapsed before, in the concluding year of Lord Dufferin's and in the opening year of Lord Lansdowne's administration, either project was revived. The transference of Sind to the Punjab was then again proposed. Matters had, however, changed in the interim. With the creation of the Baluchistan Agency under Sir Robert Sandeman Sind had ceased to be a Frontier, and had become an internal province. Willing as Bombay might be to consider the exchange of Sind for the Central Provinces, the Chief Commissioner of the latter submitted an argument which, in the altered condition of circumstances, was fatal to any such proposal. Early in 1889, accordingly, this scheme, which for over 30 years had at fitful intervals re-appeared upon the scene, finally vanished from view. I do not propose, and I cannot imagine that any of my succcessors will ever propose, to revive it. The interests of Sind, now that it is no longer a Frontier Province, if they have no special connection other than a historical one, which is not to be despised, with Bombay, have, on the other hand, no connection with the Punjab other than that of geographical contiguity with the outskirts of that province. Sind is, I believe, content with its present, and rather peculiar, administration, the foundations of which were laid by Sir Bartle Frere, and I see no reason for disturbing it. Still less ground would there be for either partitioning or for handing over to another Government, the Central Provinces. That administration has, since its constitution, greatly increased in size, in numbers of population, and in importance. It has no natural connection with Bombay. It requires the undivided services of a single Governor. A series of capable administrators have established its indisputable right to an independent existence.

17. The discussion, which had been resumed in the Viceroyalty of Lord Lansdowne, as to the desirability of creating a new Frontier Province, terminated in a decision not at present to proceed further with any such scheme, but to leave to the Punjab Government the responsibility of carrying out, in the middle or Pathan section of the Frontier, a more active policy than had hitherto been in vogue, with the view of establishing friendly relations with the tribes upon this part of the border, similar to those which were alleged already to exist in Dardistan and Baluchistan. Twelve years earlier Lord Lytton had written in his Minute :—

> "I believe that our North-West Frontier presents at this moment a spectacle unique in the world ; at least I know of no other spot where, after 25 years of peaceful occupation, a great civilised power has obtained so little influence over its semi-savage neighbours, and acquired so little knowledge of them, that the country within a day's ride of its most important garrison is an absolute *terra incognita*, and that there is absolutely no security for British life a mile or two beyond our border."

18. How little change had been effected in the interim may be illustrated by the almost exact reproduction of the same complaint in the same language in the letter, dated 17th October 1889, in which Lord Lansdowne's Government laid down its new injunctions for the guidance of the Local Government :—

> "The Government of India cannot consider its present relations with the trans-frontier tribes on the Punjab border as either suitable or satisfactory, and the absence of any friendly understanding between them and the neighbouring British officers may at any time prove a source of serious danger and anxiety. The country within a day's ride

of one of our most important garrisons is indeed almost a *terra incognita*, and there is no security for British life a few miles beyond the border. Punitive expeditions have been frequent, but have been attended with very few permanent results, and there is probably no other spot in the world where, after 35 years of peaceful occupation, a great civilised power has obtained so little influence over its semi-savage neighbours or has acquired so little knowledge of them."

19. This correspondence was not attended by any appreciable results. It was an attempt to recommend to the Punjab Government methods other than those to which it had been accustomed, and did not accordingly meet with an effusive welcome at its hands. From a perusal of many such discussions, of which this is only one, I derive the impression that any attempt, in the case either of the Punjab or Baluchistan Administrations, to indicate to the one a preference for the system followed by the other foredooms the discussion to practical sterility. It is so easy to demonstate a difference of conditions that any argument as to similarity of treatment is capable of being hotly contested and is certain to be fruitless. Much of the failure to devise any better method in the past has been due to the unconscious affront to local susceptibilities, caused by the suggestion of an analogy, which is thought to be, and perhaps sometimes is, misleading.

20. In the concluding months of Lord Lansdowne's administration a great change was introduced in the entire circumstances of the Frontier, and notably in the question which I am here discussing, by the conclusion of the Durand Agreement at Kabul in November 1893, whereby a line of division, subsequently demarcated through the greater part of its extent, was drawn between the British and Afghan possessions, from Chitral to the borders of Seistan. On the British side of the line was left, notably in Waziristan, a great block of tribal territory, with which the Amir henceforward had no right of interference, and which, without being thereby either absorbed or annexed by the Government of India, passed into its indisputable sphere of influence. The establishment of control over its people, or even of friendly relations with them, may be rapid or slow, complete, imperfect, or illusory. But the territory so demarcated has ceased to belong to any other political system and has fallen within the Protectorate of a Power which, while it may not be anxious to assume, cannot in the last resort repudiate, its paramount responsibility. So clearly was the entire change in the conditions produced by this agreement seen by Lord Lansdowne that, on leaving India, he left the following opinion on record :—

"I hold that irrespective of the objections to a system of dual control (*i.e.*, by the two Local Governments of the Punjab and Baluchistan) it is not desirable that the great Frontier region for which we have become responsible to the north of the Gomal should be administered by an already overworked Local Government, only a few of whose officers are really familiar with Frontier affairs, while all of them are overladen with routine work. All the circumstances seem to me to point to the creation of a single Frontier charge entrusted to the management of a single officer under the immediate direction of the Government of India."

21. In the early years of Lord Elgin's administration an attempt was once more made to escape from the necessities of a radical change by again suggesting to the Punjab Government the initiation of a policy of friendly intercourse with the tribes for whom we had thus assumed political responsibility, and for the strengthening of the political service on the border. Into the discussion that followed with the Punjab Government I need not enter. Suffice it to say that it was not followed, so far as I can ascertain, by any practical changes, either in the principles or in the form of administration. Then ensued the Frontier risings of 1897, and the Frontier war culminating in the Tirah Campaign.

22. At the conclusion of the war the Secretary of State, in his despatch of August 5th, 1898, summing up the situation as it then stood, used these remarkable words :—

"Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory ; and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations, with the tribes on the Punjab Frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India."

23. In order to secure this end, the Secretary of State then invited the attention of the Government of India to the suggestion that the Commissioner of Peshawar, and the officers employed in conducting external relations with the tribes under him, should act directly under the Government of India. The Commissioner should be appointed by the Viceroy with special reference to these responsibilities, and should send copies of his reports to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. In all other respects, *i.e.*, in all matters of civil administration, he and his officers would continue as now to be under the Local Government.

24. It will be observed that this proposal was an almost exact reproduction of the scheme that had been put forward by another Secretary of State 21 years before, and that had perished at the outbreak of the Afghan war.

25. The 1877 scheme contemplated the appointment of two Commissioners, the one for Baluchistan, the other at Peshawar. Both were to be appointed by the Viceroy, but in respect of all internal affairs were to take orders from the Punjab Government. The Northern Commissioner was to correspond directly with the Government of India. I have already quoted the severe criticisms which were passed in India upon the earlier scheme, even though it was accepted, *faute de mieux*, by Lord Lytton. The only material difference in the 1898 scheme was that the Southern Commissioner having already been created in the interim in the person of the Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner for Baluchistan, the proposal was restricted to the Northern or Pathan section of the border. The reception which was accorded to it may be judged from the correspondence that was sent home to the Secretary of State by Lord Elgin's Government in November 1898, shortly before I came out to India, and that contained the opinions of the Viceroy, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and the leading Frontier officers of that Government. The whole of these authorities, with one exception, were opposed to the scheme on grounds which may be inferred from the previous discussion. It was held (1) that by such a system friction would be developed between the Supreme and the Local Governments, since the former would desire, as Commissioner of Peshawar, a man skilled in Frontier politics, while the latter might prefer an administrator trained to deal with revenue, police, and crime; (2) that it would be found impossible in practice to sever the political or trans-frontier duties of such an officer from his administrative or cis-frontier work, and that in fact his influence with the tribes in their political aspect was inseparable from his administrative control over them, or their friends and neighbours, on the British side of the border; (3) that great difficulties would be encountered (in respect of recruitment, promotion, and replacement) in so small a political service as would require to be constituted in order to carry out the plan; (4) that the authority of the Punjab Government would be impaired by the inevitable tendency of those of its officers who served two masters, to play to the superior gallery; (5) that the Foreign Department of the Government of India would be swamped with work; (6) that it would be difficult to find a man for the place. With all of these arguments I do not agree, or at least not to the same extent; but I regard their cumulative effect as overwhelming; whilst after visiting the Frontier, and making special enquiries about the matter on the spot, I entertain little doubt that the first objection, *viz.*, the impossibility of severing the external relations of the tribes from their internal administration, and of placing the former under one Government, while the latter remains under another—or, as I have heard it put, of separating hill politics from plain politics—is alone sufficient to condemn the proposal.

26. Since these replies were sent home to the Secretary of State, nothing further has transpired, and we are now at liberty to make to him any proposals that we please for the removal of blemishes or the reform of abuses in the present system, and for the carrying out of his instructions to bring more directly under our own control and supervision the conduct of external relations with the border tribes.

27. The historical recapitulation in which I have indulged will, I think, have established the following propositions, as a starting point from which we may safely proceed :—

(1) Throughout the past quarter of a century there has been a steadily growing feeling that the affairs of the Frontier, which are in a peculiar degree the province of the Government of India, are not best managed by a Local Government, neither specially recruited nor exceptionally qualified for the purpose.

(2) These general considerations have been greatly enhanced in urgency and value by the political changes, which have resulted in recent years in the addition of great territorial and tribal responsibilities to the Punjab Government, and in the concentration of the main external anxieties of the Viceroy in particular, and of the Government of India in general, upon that section of the Indian Frontier, which is administered by the Punjab Government.

(3) The desired changes are not capable of being brought about by the issue of instructions to the Punjab Government to carry out the policy of the Government of India on its behalf. In no country in the world is administrative loyalty more sincere or more profound than in India; but it is from the nature of things impossible for a Local Government to carry out a foreign policy which it neither originates in the first place, nor is responsible for in the last, with the same influence, zeal, or despatch as would the authors of the policy itself. The comparative futility of the admonitions which have at various times been addressed to the Punjab Government in this context, confirms the necessity of a wider and more organic change.

(4) Such a change, if brought about, should, in view of previous experience, aim at the minimum rather than the maximum disturbance of the *status quo*.

(5) It should not be handicapped at the outset by questions of territorial or political compensation to injured parties. For this purpose such injury must itself, as far as possible, be avoided or minimised. In other words, Sind, Baluchistan, Kashmir—all of which it has at different times been proposed to throw into the crucible from which the new province was to emerge—should be treated as possessing fixed destinies, and as lying outside the present discussion.

With this prelude I will now proceed to discuss, firstly, the reasons which lead me, individually, to think that the time has now arrived when the constitution of a new Frontier administration can no longer wisely be delayed; secondly, the form which that administration should take; and, thirdly, the merits or demerits of the proposal.

Reasons for creation of a new Frontier Province.

28. The first objection that I take to the present system is one which in theory must be obvious, but the full force of which in practice no one can adequately realise who has not had direct experience of it. Under the methods of Indian Government, the conduct of foreign affairs in India is vested in the Viceroy. He is the head of the Foreign Department: or, if the Indian analogy be pursued, the Member of Council for that Department; if the home analogy be followed, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Now in India foreign affairs—while they embrace many intricate and important questions concerning Native States, and while, in the sphere of external policy, they include our relations with China in Yunnan, with Tibet, with Afghanistan, with Maskat, with the Arab tribes in the Aden Protectorate, and with the Persian Gulf—in the main arise out of, or are connected with, the Frontier tribes and problems; whilst, if we take the whole of the land frontiers of India from the Shan States on the extreme east to the borders of Persian Baluchistan on the extreme west, the most critical, most anxious, and most explosive section of the entire Frontier, is that between the Swat river and the Gomal

valley, or precisely the section which is handed over to the Punjab Government. Upon this stretch of boundary, inhabited by the most numerous, fanatical, and turbulent of the Pathan tribes, the Foreign Minister of India, who is also the Viceroy, cannot issue an order. or make an appointment except through the medium of the Punjab Government, nay he cannot—with certain exceptions, hereafter to be noted—make an appointment at all. The Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners, the Political Officers, and Commandants of Border Police, in whose hands rests the entire local responsibility upon the Frontier, are nominated not by him but by the Lieutenant-Governor. The Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government, who is the principal adviser of the Lieutenant-Governor, is selected, without reference to the Viceroy, by the latter. The Viceroy cannot even remove an indifferent or unsuitable official; since promotion in the Punjab is regulated by the conditions of a service of, which not he, but the Lieutenant-Governor, is the efficient head. If a debate arises in Parliament as to a Frontier outbreak, or a tribal expedition, it will be the Viceroy, and the Viceroy alone who will be held accountable. Public opinion censures him for failure, or congratulates him upon success. To a certain extent public opinion is right; since, owing to circumstances to which I shall presently allude, the Local Government ventures upon few steps of any importance without reference to the higher authority. But among those who hold up the head of the Government of India to praise or to blame, how many are there who know that he has been working throughout, not through his own agents but through those of another Government, that at each stage he has required to carry the assent of a subordinate, but withal most influential authority, and that in all probability in the early stages (for most frontier disturbances spring from small beginnings) he has had neither responsibility, knowledge, nor information? I venture to affirm that there is not another country or Government in the world which adopts a system so irrational in theory, so bizarre in practice, as to interpose between its Foreign Minister and his most important sphere of activity, the barrier, not of a subordinate official, but of a subordinate Government, on the mere geographical plea that the latter resides in closer proximity to the scene of action—a plea which itself breaks down when it is remembered that for five months in the year the Supreme and the Local Governments are both located at the same spot, Simla.

29. Now there might be some excuse, perhaps even some solid ground, for such an arrangement, if the Local Government and its officials, who are the intermediaries through whom the Government of India are compelled to act, were themselves deeply versed in Frontier knowledge and experience. It might not unreasonably be argued that a Viceroy and Council, recruited partly from England, partly from the different provinces of India, must know less of the Frontier than a Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Secretary who have probably been brought up in the Punjab, and have been familiar with the tribes from early manhood. But is this the case? Quite the reverse. In practice it is found that as a rule neither the Lieutenant-Governor nor his Chief Secretary knows anything of the Frontier at all; and that they are selected for their high offices, the former by the Viceroy, the latter by the Lieutenant-Governor himself, on account of their general administrative capacity, and ability to do justice to the many aspects of a singularly complex civil administration. Thus, if I take the list of the Lieutenant-Governors and Chief Secretaries of the Punjab who have held those offices during the past 23 years, since Lord Lytton first mooted his scheme of a Trans-Indus province, I find that their Frontier record has been as follows :—

Lieutenant-Governors.

Sir Robert Egerton (1877—1882) had never been in a Frontier District throughout his service, except as Additional Commissioner of Peshawar from November 1863 to March 1864.

Sir Charles Aitchison (1882—1887) had never been in a Frontier District throughout his service.

Sir James Lyall (1887—1892) had never served upon the Frontier.

Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick (1892—1897) had never served upon the Frontier.

Sir Mackworth Young (1897—1900) had never served upon the Frontier except for 16 months as a 3rd grade Assistant Commissioner of one year's service in 1865-66.

30. Thus the entire cumulative period of Frontier service which can be claimed by a succession of five Lieutenant-Governors has been 20 months, out of a total cumulative service enjoyed by these officers, at the period of their appointments to the rule of the Province, of 151 years.*

* This total is made up as follows: Length of service (upon appointment as Lieutenant-Governor) of Sir R. Egerton, 21 years; Sir C. Aitchison, 26 years; Sir J. Lyall, 29 years; Sir D. Fitzpatrick, 34 years; Sir M. Young, 35 years; or a total of 151 years.

31. If I take the Chief Secretaries during the same period, I find the following:—

Sir Lepel Griffin (1878—1880) had never served upon the Frontier.

Sir Mackworth Young (1880—1886) as above stated.

Mr. C. L. Tupper (1890—1895), previously officiating, had spent 16 months as 3rd grade Assistant Commissioner, engaged in settlement work, at Dera Ghazi Khan.

Mr. H. C. Fanshawe (1895–96) had spent 7 months, as Settlement Officer, at Dera Ismail Khan.

Mr. L. Dane (1896—1899) had been for 1 month 3rd grade Assistant Commissioner at Dera Ghazi Khan and Settlement Collector of Peshawar (1893—1896).

32. It will thus be seen that not one of the Chief Secretaries of the Punjab Government during the same period had, at the time of his appointment, enjoyed any political service upon the Frontier whatsoever. All without exception have been selected for their administrative or other abilities. It is manifest, therefore, that the plea that, in committing the charge of the Frontier to the Punjab Government, the Government of India is making up for any ignorance on its own part by special aptitudes or knowledge on the part of the principal agents whom it employs, is one that cannot be sustained. There are probably at any one moment in the Foreign Department of the Government of India men with a wider knowledge of the Frontier and its tribes than are to be found in the Punjab Secretariat in an entire decade. Moreover, even were such local knowledge forthcoming at Lahore, it would surely be open to argument that a Lieutenant-Governor or a Chief Secretary or a combination of the two, so endowed, would not necessarily be qualified to deal with the larger problems of foreign policy upon which all tribal issues in the last resort depend, and which must inevitably be more accurately gauged by the Government of India and its head, than they can be by the officers of a provincial administration. Some of the officers of the Punjab Government, in commenting upon the Secretary of State's suggested compromise, have enlarged upon the advantage to them of consulting the personal knowledge and authority of the Lieutenant-Governor when he is on tour upon the Frontier. I do not desire for one moment to disparage the results or benefits of such consultations. But from what I have said, I should imagine the advantage to be quite as often communicated to the Lieutenant-Governor as derived from him; whilst, assessing it at the maximum, how much more valuable, I feel inclined to say, would it be, were it the result of the presence of an Agent to the Governor-General, not paying an occasional visit to the Frontier, but permanently resident upon it, not ignorant of the tribes before he attained his high office, but possessing a long and intimate acquaintance with them. If, however, it be said that any lack of knowledge on the part of the superiors is compensated by the intelligent abilities of their subordinates on the Frontier itself, it may be pointed out that the services of the latter would equally be at the disposal of the Government of India, under a reformed system, without the intervening stratum of experienced but not expert authority; whilst it is unfortunately the case that, owing to the wider scope of promotion that is open to members of the Punjab Commission, who are engaged in revenue and financial work, there is an inclination among ambitious men to devote themselves to these fields of service rather than to the more irksome and less remunerative conditions of Trans-Indus existence. It was further shown by Sir R. Udny (Commissioner of Peshawar) in his letter

of 20th October, 1898, that while, under the Punjab system, the theory is that the Frontier is administered, in the lower grades, by officers of Frontier experience, in practice this is very far from being the case. Between 1878 and 1891, only five men were sent to the Frontier who still remained upon it (not having been reverted) in 1898. It was a constant occurrence that no Covenanted Officers were forthcoming for the Frontier; and that Uncovenanted Officers and even natives had to be sent in their place. The charge, therefore, of insufficient experience, which has been shown to apply in the highest quarters, is not without substance in the lower grades also.

33. I have not paused to discuss the cynical suggestion that may occur to some students of British administration, that there may be some deliberation in the policy, that constitutes as the Viceroy's chief adviser in Frontier policy, an officer who in the majority of cases has had no practical experience of the Frontier himself. If there is a case in which the conclusions of the uninformed are perilous, it is that of tribal policy. It is impossible to imagine a field of political action in which the capable outsider, relying upon general *savoir faire*, or experience of men, is likely to come to more disastrous grief. A collateral illustration of this truth may be found in the fact that all the men who have attained the greatest celebrity by their successful handling of the tribes have been men who have not come fresh to the task, but have devoted years of their life to the study and assimilation of tribal ideas and ways. I may instance Sir John Lawrence, General John Jacob, John Nicholson, Sir Herbert Edwardes, Colonel Mackeson, Sir R. Warburton, Reynell Taylor, Sir R. Sandeman.

34. Such being the character of the agency through which the Government of India is at present required to carry out its Frontier policy, I next ask what are the main features and results of this system as a working scheme. I do not hesitate to say that they are departmental irresolution, the dissipation instead of the concentration of responsibility, and long and injurious delays. Some of these consequences are inseparable from the system. Others have grown up as accretions upon it.

35. It will be admitted that in any administration the longer the official chain—and the more numerous the obligatory links of reference—the less likelihood is there of prompt and efficacious action. It will also be conceded that, if there is a field of policy in which rapidity of decision and swiftness of execution are essential, it is that of the Frontier. And yet in practice, before the pettiest affair, arising, *e.g.*, out of a border raid, can be settled, the following are the stages, and their probable duration, through which the matter must pass. The local Political Officer or the Deputy Commissioner, where the latter is the local Political Officer, reports the case in the first place to the Commissioner, who is probably at some distance, and who, if it be summer time, may be away in the hills. In former days the Political Officer was obliged to report to the Deputy Commissioner and the latter to the Commissioner. But this intervening link has, except in certain cases, been abolished. The Commissioner, upon receipt of the report, has to consider the case, to look up the recent history of the tribe, or to investigate precedents. He then sends up the original report, with his own report upon it (as a rule proposing something rather different from his subordinate), to the Punjab Government. Before it reaches the latter, in all likelihood a fortnight will have elapsed. The case then passes through the Punjab Secretariat. Precedents and policies are again examined; in a department which, as I have shown, is not as a rule rich in Frontier experience, there is an inevitable tendency to become the slaves of formulæ and of precedents; finally, after the probable lapse of another fortnight, the case, with some fresh or alternative suggestion, may reach the Government of India. If a reference has been required in the interim, as is frequently the case, to the military authorities, another three or four weeks may have been spent in a reduplication of the same chain. An enquiry will have been addressed in the first place to the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces in the Punjab. He must refer the case to the General Officer Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, and the latter to the Officer Commanding in the locality concerned. The answers must be returned through the same compulsory stages. The case having reached the Government of India, all the various papers and proposals, which have by now attained somewhat bulky

dimensions, must pass through the Foreign Department in the normal course for analysis, illustration, and annotation. Finally, orders are issued upon it by the Viceroy to the Local Government, these having to be transmitted back through the familiar chain; until many weeks, and too often many months, after the commission of the original offence, a decision arrives upon a matter which ought in all probability to have been composed on the spot in a few days. If it be said that such a history must be the exception and not the rule, I reply by admitting the charge; since in the majority of cases the delay entailed will undoubtedly be not less, but much greater, than that which I have depicted. I have dealt above with simple cases only. In the event of a complicated case, such as an increase of establishment, the raising of a new body of levies, or the shifting of a military post, what with the numerous references and cross-references, and the inseparable departmental delays, it will be surprising if the matter can be carried through in less than a year. I may instance my own scheme for a Tribal Militia in Waziristan. The original orders of the Government of India were issued to the Punjab Government on August 7th, 1899. A Committee was to be constituted to draw out the details of the scheme. Its report left matters in a state of considerably greater confusion. A mass of undigested papers, proposing something entirely different from what the Government of India had laid down, reached us in March 1900. I had to proceed myself to the Frontier in April, in order to extricate the case, by personal conference with the officials concerned, from the tangle in which it had become involved; and only now, one year, after inception, is the scheme of the Government of India beginning to take rudimentary shape.

36. That the description which I have given is applicable not to rare or isolated instances, but to the vast majority of Frontier cases may be demonstrated by a passage from the letter, dated October 21st, 1898, in which Mr. F. D. Cunningham, the Commissioner of Peshawar, and himself one of the senior Punjab officials, expressed his opinions upon the suggestion made by the present Secretary of State for altering the status of that office. He said:—

"If the Punjab Government had any Frontier policy of its own, or having one, if it had authority to pursue it, if it had power to give orders in any but the most trivial matter, I could understand that by removing it from the chain the control of the Government of India would be increased in reality as well as in name. But I venture to think that, whatever their position in constitutional theory may be, the Lahore Government have not for many years past given orders in any but the most petty matter, affecting trans-border clans or politics.

"With the exception of a few years in the Secretariat, the whole of my service of 26 years has been passed on or beyond the North-West Frontier, and for the past 13 years in the Peshawar Division. Speaking of that part of the border, I cannot remember any question sufficiently important to be reported to the Commissioner by the Deputy Commissioner, which in its turn the Local Government did not think necessary to refer to Calcutta. Under the present system the real authorities that issue orders are the Deputy Commissioner and the Government of India. The Deputy Commissioner as the local Political Officer disposes of many claims against trans-border men by reprisals or arrests in British territory, or by his influence with clans outside, and he settles these cases without report to the great advantage of Government. But when he thinks action on his part will not summarily dispose of a case, he may report it for orders, and in cases of this description I think that in practice the Commissioner and the Local Government give advice and not decisions: the final order even now comes from Calcutta."

37. This extract brings me to a secondary feature of the existing system. It might have been supposed, and it has frequently been argued, that the intervention of a Local Government between the Government of India and the frontier, involves a wise and necessary decentralisation. I have shown, on the contrary, that it results in excessive centralisation. The Local Government is apprehensive as to the issues of a policy for which, while the initial responsibility may perhaps be placed upon its own shoulders, it is not unnaturally anxious to shift the ulterior responsibility to those of the Government of India. And this apprehension is reflected in its attitude towards its own officers, to whose independence of action but slender scope is apt to be given, and who, particularly if they happen to be new to the Frontier, having perhaps been transferred thither from the charge of an inland district, are loth to assume an initiative which is certain to be discountenanced by the superior, and may bring them into trouble with the supreme, authority. Thus the first merit of a well-

ordered decentralisation, namely the graduated diffusion as opposed to the rigid concentration of responsibility, is sacrificed.

38. There is another consideration which in practice has a disturbing and in the long run a sinister influence upon the promptitude and continuity of Frontier policy. Minute and incessant as are the references from the Punjab to the Supreme Government, averse though the former be from independent initiative or responsibility, there must yet in the nature of things be a great number of cases in which the Government of India are reluctant, at any rate in the earlier stages, to intervene, partly because they have little practical alternative but to accept the advice of the Local Government, through whose officers —and through them alone—their information is derived; still more from an indisposition to be constantly overruling or dictating to so powerful and highly-placed a subordinate. If the Local Government be interfered with at each stage, it is open to it to turn round later on, and to complain that it has never been given a free hand; that it has not been trusted; and that any failure or misfortune that may have ensued has been due not to any fault on its own part, but to the fact that it has been overriden. My predecessor, in his Minute of November 6th, 1898, laid stress upon the arguments, in defence of the existing system, that it is a great advantage that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab should be resident for several months in every year at Simla, where the Viceroy can enjoy opportunities of private conference with him; and that it is less easy to overrule a subordinate than a colleague and a friend. Without dissenting from the great advantages of such consultation, I yet venture to disagree *in toto* with both propositions. It seems to me an indefensible duplication of labour and delay, that for several months in every year, the Government of India, which is the real arbiter of Frontier policy, should be compelled to issue its orders respecting the Frontier not to the officials on the spot, but to another Government, whose officers are separated by only three miles from its own; while I cannot conceive it to be open to question that, if the advice of the inferior authority be not taken, such a course of action is at once more easily adopted, and more ungrudgingly obeyed, if that authority be in direct subordination to the Government of India and to the Viceroy, than if he be a Lieutenant-Governor, and the head of a quasi-independent administration. I do not see how any Governor-General could deny that, if he desires a policy to be pursued or a step to be taken in Baluchistan, which is under the administration of an Agent to the Governor-General, directly subordinate to himself, however unpalatable such a policy or step might be to the Agent to the Governor-General, it will be carried out with incomparably less friction and delay than in a similar case in the Punjab, where the dignity and susceptibilities of a Local Government and of its head demand the most scrupulous and respectful consideration.

39. For the reasons, therefore, which have been given, I hold the existing system by which the Frontier is managed through the medium of the Punjab Government to stand condemned. It has been reprobated by all the greatest Frontier authorities for the last quarter of a century. It attenuates without diminishing the ultimate responsibility of the Government of India. It protracts without strengthening their action. It interposes between the Foreign Minister of India and his subordinate agents, not an Ambassador, or a Minister, or a Consul, but the elaborate mechanism of a Local Government, and the necessarily exalted personality of a Lieutenant Governor. If this is an influential, I have yet shown it in practice to be not an expert medium. Worked as the system has been with unfailing loyalty and with profound devotion to duty, it has yet been the source of friction, of divided counsels, of vacillation, of exaggerated centralisation, of interminable delay. Whether it has presented to the Government of India a cautious and continuous Frontier policy, whether it has saved India from Frontier expeditions and wars, whether, however imperfect as an administrative machine, it has produced meritorious political results, are questions which an appeal to history will easily settle, and which will be touched upon before the close of this memorandum.

Possible forms of new Administration.

40. Having thus argued the inefficacy of the present system, I proceed to consider how best it may be replaced, always bearing in mind my earlier

dictum as to the desirability of producing the minimum dislocation in long established methods and traditions. It has sometimes been suggested that the existing organisation of the Punjab Government might still be retained for Frontier purposes with certain improvements or alterations. The Lieutenant-Governor might, it has been urged, be specially chosen for Frontier knowledge. The answer is simple: Even if a single such officer were forthcoming in the Punjab Commission, a succession could not possibly be found. Such a system would moreover be most unfair upon the remainder of the service, and upon the interest of the province as a whole, of which the Frontier constitutes a relatively small part. The same arguments apply to the choice of a Chief Secretary, endowed with the knowledge in which his chief might be lacking. If he were useful for the Frontier, he would be less useful for the remainder, *i.e.*, for the bulk of the work. Again, if a Special Secretary or Commissioner were appointed for Frontier business, he would not diminish by a single link the existing chain. Neither would the suggestion, which has also been made, of granting much greater financial latitude and a larger staff to the Punjab Government meet the case. It might enable the Local Government to cope more rapidly and successfully with Frontier work. But it would not make it any the more faithful an exponent of the policy of the Government of India. I regard all these proposals as illusory and deceptive. They are open to the common objection that the more they give to the Punjab Government, the more they take away from the Government of India, and that they conflict with the initial proposition laid down by the Secretary of State and already quoted, namely, "that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Frontier shall in the future be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India."

41. I next pass to a number of possible comprises, which have at various times been suggested or which admit of being discussed, between the present system and that of a new and independent administration. One of these proposals, *viz.*, that which was suggested by the present Secretary of State in his despatch of August 5th, 1898, I have already examined in my review of the earlier history of the Frontier problem. It was the suggestion that the Commissioner of Peshawar and his several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the Frontier tribes, should, in respect of such matters, act under the Government of India, and that the Commissioner should be appointed by the latter, remaining, in other respects, as hitherto, under the Punjab Government. I have shown that this scheme was condemned by the almost unanimous opinion of the Frontier officers who were invited to report upon it, in the main on account of the impracticability of separating trans-frontier from cis-frontier work, amid communities who may be described as living perpetually astride of the border. I concur in these views, and I may add that the scheme possessed the further drawbacks, in my judgment (1) that it would introduce two different systems, with two different sets of officers, upon the Pathan Frontier; since it was only proposed that the Commissioner of Peshawar should be appointed by and should act under the Government of India; the Commissioner of the Derajat, under whose charge are the whole of the Waziri tribes, by far the most restless denizens of the border, being apparently left as now a servant of the Punjab Government, appointed by and reporting only to it; (2) that with the single exception of the Commissioner of Peshawar the Frontier policy of the Government of India would still be conducted by agents not its own; (3) that unless the status of the Commissioner were raised, and he were given some of the powers of a local administration, an insupportable amount of detail would (in the difficulty of deciding between the external and the internal relations of the tribes) be thrown upon the Government of India. It may be noted that any such scheme had been condemned by the Government of India as long ago as May 17th, 1877, the despatch of which date, covering Lord Lytton's Minute, contained the following emphatic declaration:—

"We are of opinion that the separation of political from administrative duties is practically impossible when these two classes of duties are interwoven as closely as they now are in the government of the Frontier. To place the Frontier officers under the local Government *quoad* their administrative duties, and under the Government of India *quoad* their political duties, is a system fraught with inconvience and one which has already proved the source of serious embarrassment to this Government."

The allusion in the last sentence was, I apprehend, to the system that prevailed in the third quarter of the century in Sind, the Commissioner of which received his administrative orders from the Bombay Government, and his orders as to foreign policy from the Government of India. This system having hopelessly broken down, the Commissioner of Sind, (Sir W. Merewether) was in 1876 relieved of all responsibility for Kalat, *i.e.*, Frontier affairs, which were handed over to Colonel Munro, the Commissioner of the Derajat.

42. A second compromise which has been suggested is that the Frontier, or the Trans-Indus portions of the Punjab, should be treated somewhat as Sind now is, being placed under a single Commissioner who might even be appointed by the Government of India, and who should remain under the Punjab Government, as the Commissioner of Sind is under the Bombay Government, but should enjoy some of the administrative and financial powers of a Local Government, being assisted by a Judicial Commissioner. He would refer to the Government of India for Frontier matters, and to the Local Government for internal and district affairs. The objections to such a scheme are the familiar and, as I think, insuperable difficulties of serving two masters, and of discriminating between external and internal affairs. There would be the further drawback that a Commissioner selected by the Government of India for his political abilities might not satisfy the standards of the Local Government in respect of capacity for local administration, revenue, and finance. Above all it must be patent that such a compromise would satisfy neither party, that it could possess no permanent vitality, and that it would only be a stepping-stone to some larger change.

43. There is a third compromise, which, in the course of my study of the present question since I have been in India, at one time possessed attractions for myself. It was to take all the trans-frontier charges, from Chitral to the Gomal, now under the control either of the Government of India or of the Punjab Government, viz., (1) Dir, Swat, and Chitral, (2) the Khyber, (3) Samana, (4) the Kurram, (5) the Tochi, (6) Wana, and to place the Political Officers for all these districts under a single high officer, who equally with them should be appointed by the Government of India, and should report exclusively to the latter upon all political and external affairs, the civil and administrative organisation of the Punjab Government remaining untouched, and the conduct of cis-border affairs continuing to be vested in the hands of its Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners. In my conversations, however, with Frontier officials, both last year and this, I could not discover a single supporter of this scheme. It was pointed out to me in the unanswerable words of Sir Alfred Lyall, written nearly 20 years ago, that "it is an established principle from Peshawar to Karachi that the Frontier can only be managed properly if both sides of it are in the hands of the same British authority;" it was said that the tribes themselves would not understand the system of two co-ordinate groups of officials, the one dealing with their external, the other with their internal relations, and that they would be disposed to play off the one against the other; and it was asserted that the result could not fail to be friction, and perhaps even worse, between the officers who served the Supreme and those who served the Local Government.

44. I have also heard it suggested that the six Frontier charges, which I have mentioned above, might be placed under Political Officers nominated by, and reporting to, the Government of India, but subordinate to no local official of superior rank. I could not recommend such a scheme. In addition to the drawbacks of possible disagreement with the Punjab officials, which were regarded as fatal to the compromise last examined, it would, by breaking up the Frontier into separate districts, under no single or common head, introduce discord, instead of homogeneousness or unity, into our Frontier policy, and would enormously increase the work that devolves upon the Government of India. It is, I think, a *sine qua non* of any new system that it should interpose between the Supreme Government and its local agents some authority possessed of high status and influence.

45. The examination to which I have subjected the various possible forms of compromise will, I think, have shown that the remedy is not to be found in

any such direction. It is of no use to attempt a patchwork reorganisation, or to dovetail into each other the features and methods of two administrations with such essentially different characteristics and objects. No natural respect for the susceptibilities of the Local Government, nor even the desire, which I have myself avowed, to pursue the line of least resistance in making the contemplated change, should deter us from looking facts in the face, or from recognising that it can only be by an organic change that evils, which are themselves not accidental but organic, can be cured. I hope, therefore, to have established the presumption that the reform which we have in view can only be effected by the creation of some new administrative unit, independent of and separated from the Punjab Government. It remains to be discussed what shape such a new administration should take.

Form of Administration Recommended.

46. Lord Lytton's scheme in 1877 contemplated an immense new Trans-Indus province, stretching from Hazara to the Indian Ocean, and including the Trans-Indus portions of the Punjab, Baluchistan, and Sind. The Resident in Kashmir, though under the Government of India, was also to correspond with the Chief Commissioner upon Frontier matters relating to Chitral, Badakhshan (*sic*), &c. Such a charge would, had it then been created, before long have proved too much for the shoulders of any single man. The idea has since been rendered obsolete by the remarkable change in the conditions of the problem. No one now proposes the severance of Sind from Bombay. Baluchistan has its own administration, which is important and self-sufficient. Moreover, its developments and aspirations lie rather on the western border, and in the direction of Afghanistan and Seistan, than on the Punjab side. The incorporation of Baluchistan with a Trans-Indus charge would be of no advantage to the former province, and would associate the latter with a partner, whose earlier start in the world would overshadow and stunt the growth of the more youthful administration. Kashmir is separately provided for; and its own Frontier problems, which extend from Ladakh in the north-east to the Shandur Pass on the north-west, are sufficient to engross the attention of the British Resident at Srinagar. It is, therefore, unnecessary to contemplate, even for a moment, any revival of the idea of a great Frontier administration, which should gather up into a single skein the many and complex threads of the whole of the North-West and West Frontier of the Indian Empire. Such an idea might still appeal to the imagination of the enthusiast, but it is not practicable in fact.

47. Even eliminating Baluchistan and Sind, I have heard recommended the creation of a great Frontier Province which should include the whole of the Trans-Indus Districts as far south as Dera Ghazi Khan, and, crossing to the left bank of the Indus, should further embrace the districts of Rawalpindi (as the military base of Peshawar and Kohat) and Jhelum. I could not endorse any such proposal. It would involve a needless dismemberment of the Punjab, would create a new province by which the older one would be completely overshadowed, and would involve the organisation of a new and extensive Commission.

48. The province which I would propose to constitute would consist, with a slight exception, of the whole of the Trans-Indus Districts of the Punjab as far south as, and including Dera Ismail Khan. The exception (subject to the approval of the Punjab Government) would be the Mianwali Sub-division of the Bannu District which is astride the Indus, the trans-riverain *tahsil* of Isa Khel being inhabited by non-Pushtu-speaking Pathans and having little or no connection with the Frontier. The Cis-Indus portions of Dera Ismail Khan, which exceed in size, and are approximately equal in population to, the Trans-Indus Districts, would be left to the Punjab Government. It might also be a matter of discussion with that Government, whether any, and if so what, portions of the Trans-Indus *tahsils* of Dera Ismail Khan should similarly be excluded from my scheme. There are three such *tahsils*, those of Tank, Kulachi, and Dera Ismail Khan. The first of these is a purely Frontier district, and

must in any case be detached. The two others contain a mixed population ; and it is possible that some division of them between the old and the new administrations may be found desirable or necessary, although a sentimental value may attach to the inclusion of the capital city, Dera Ismail Khan, in the new agency. I would also leave Dera Ghazi Khan to the Punjab—it could be grouped in a single charge with Multan—in the main because its Frontier relations arise out of contact not with Pathans but with Baluchis, and because I should prefer that the new administration should as far as possible be concerned with the former. It has sometimes been argued that Dera Ghazi Khan should preferably, by reason of its Baluchi connections, be handed over to Baluchistan. This may, perhaps, be its ultimate destination. But for the present, and as long as there is no Trans-Indus railway communication in this part, I think that Quetta and the Agent to the Governor-General for Baluchistan are too far away, and that it would be better not to sever the old established connection with the Punjab.

49. Passing to the northern confines of the proposed province, I would make it strictly Trans-Indus, *i.e.*, I would not take away from the Punjab the Hazara District, with its administrative centre of Abbottabad, even though this be a Frontier District. Its interests are very different from those of the north-west border, as commonly understood ; its inhabitants are of different origin ; and the Kaghan valley, which is its main northern prolongation, is now thoroughly pacified.

50. It would be a matter for consideration whether the Black Mountain tribes, which are Cis-Indus, should continue as now to be managed by the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, under the Punjab Government, or should pass with their Trans-Indus neighbours, the Bunerwals and the tribes of the Mahabun, to the charge of the Political Officer at the Malakand. Expediency should be the test of this decision.

51. The Mohmands and any other tribes who are now under the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar should probably, with the exception of those who may be handed over to the Political Officer at the Malakand, be added to the charge of the Political Officer in the Khyber.

52. The new Frontier Province would then consist of the following Trans-Indus Districts of the Punjab: (1) Peshawar, (2) Kohat, (3) Bannu, (4) Dera Ismail Khan ; and of the following Political Agencies, at present either directly under the Government of India or under the Punjab Government: (1) Dir, Swat, and Chitral, with headquarters at the Malakand, (2) Khyber, (3) Kurram, (4) Tochi, (5) Wana.

53. The chief of this administration would be a Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, who should be appointed by, and should be directly subordinate to, the Government of India. His position would be closely analogous to that of the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, *i.e.*, he would possess some of the powers of a local administration, and his pay should probably be on the same scale, *i.e.*, Rs. 4,000 a month. He would reside at Peshawar, where he would take over the office of the present Commissioner. He would probably require the services of two assistants. The judicial and revenue work of so populous, and in some respects highly organised, a province would doubtless render it impossible to combine the supreme charge of both functions, as in Baluchistan, in the hands of a single Revenue and Judicial Commissioner. A Judicial Commissioner and a Revenue Commissioner would both be required. If the former is to take the place of the Chief Court as the supreme appellate tribunal for the new province, he should clearly be a man of high legal attainments and independent position. There are some who may deprecate the substitution of a more simple system for the complex paraphernalia of the Chief Court and the amenities of facile litigation. I am not in agreement with them. I know of no vice which is more fatal in a Frontier district than litigiousness, and I should prefer summarily to arrest, rather than to foster, its growth. The new staff at

Peshawar, if thus organised, would, therefore, exceed in numbers and probable cost the present higher ranks of the Punjab Commission who are there employed, by the following totals :—

Present Administration.		*Proposed Administration.*	
	Rs. per mensem.		*Rs. per mensem.*
Commissioner of Peshawar	2,750	Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General.	4,000
Commissioner of the Dera-jat.	2,750	Two Assistants	1,600
		Judicial Commissioner ...	3,000
Divisional Judge	2,250	Revenue Commissioner ...	2,750
Total ...	Rs. 7,750	Total ...	Rs. 11,350

54. On the other hand, while there would be some such increase in the head-quarters establishment, I entertain every hope that, in other branches of the administration, a material reduction would be capable of being effected. I will indicate three directions in which this might be possible: (1) Inasmuch as the new arrangement contemplates the substitution of a Judicial Commissioner, as the supreme tribunal, for the Chief Court at Lahore, some simplification of judicial procedure ought, in my opinion, to follow upon the general reduction in the judicial scale; and if this be achieved, then there should follow upon it a corresponding reduction of the judicial staff. (2) In a Frontier Agency, where successful administration will depend chiefly upon the character and influence of the British officers employed, and where a wider discretion will, I hope, be given to them in the future than has hitherto been permitted, it should be possible to abolish the mischievous practice of dealing with the tribes through native officials, and to effect some reduction in the number of native subordinates, which has a tendency to grow under the ordinary provincial system. (3) From the figures which will presently be given, it will be seen that the portions of the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts, which I propose to withdraw from the Punjab, are considerably less, both in size and population, than the single District of Dera Ismail Khan (as administered by the Punjab) is at present. It is conceivable, therefore, that some re-arrangement may be feasible by which the number of districts taken over might be reduced from four to three. I do not say that Bannu, without the Mianwali Sub-division, and Dera Ismail Khan, without its Cis-Indus tracts, can be grouped together in a single district. It would be premature to make any such suggestion at present. If, however, any portion of the Trans-Indus tahsils of Dera Ismail Khan were left to the Punjab, such a concentration would be more easy. In any case, a reduction of the number of administrative units will be worthy of serious consideration, and, if feasible, would certainly carry with it a marked reduction both in establishment and in cost.

55. I had contemplated drawing up a Proposition Statement to accompany this Minute, showing the existing strength and salaries of the superior ranks of the Punjab administration at present engaged in those portions of the province which it is proposed to subtract, and comparing with them the probable corresponding totals for the new agency. I feel, however, after several attempts in this direction, that such a statement would, at the present stage, only be a misleading guide. My reasons are these: It is as yet unsettled what are the precise districts or tracts, if the principle of my proposals be accepted, that will be detached from the Punjab. It is unsettled how, when detached, they will be grouped. It is also uncertain in what manner the Punjab Government would regroup the Cis-Indus tracts left to it, or what change or increase of establishment such re-adjustment might require. Further, it is too early, for the reasons already given, to give figures as to the possible reductions in the new province. Lastly, a statement of the existing position would be a not altogether reliable test, from the facts that the pay and allowances of the actual incumbents of posts upon the Frontier are liable to continual variation with changes of *personnel;* and that the list of officers so employed is apt to contain some, who may, as in the case of Settlement Officers, only be engaged upon temporary work.

56. From a careful comparison, however, of the probable requirements of the new Agency with the existing establishment maintained by the Punjab, I feel in a position to say that the total cost of civil administration at the start is not likely to be greater than under present conditions, while, if my anticipations (in paragraph 54) are realised, there is even reason to hope that a saving may be effected.

57. I now proceed to state how I would propose to officer the new province. Lord Lytton, in his scheme of 1877, contemplated a list, separate from that of the Punjab, but with facilities for interchange between the two; *i.e.*, he advocated the creation of a fresh or branch Commission. Such a scheme might be practicable and even necessary, if a very extensive province were being called into being. But a small Commission, such as a relatively small province might require, would be attended by patent drawbacks, the recognition of which has in practice helped to kill the various proposals for a new Frontier administration that have previously been made. These drawbacks would arise in connection with recruitment, replacement, and promotion. With a small Civil list, an occasional failure is very serious, and is not easily redressed by transfer or removal. Further, as Sir M. Young has observed—"The pick of a large Commission is likely to be far superior to the best outturn of a limited number of specialists."

58. I propose to escape all these difficulties, and at the same time to ensure for the administration of the new province the best ability that the Civil Service can produce, by relieving the Punjab Commission of the duty of providing its establishment and by bringing the latter upon the graded list of the Political Department of the Government of India. This would involve a reduction of the present numbers of the Punjab Commission and a proportionate increase to the Political list. My proposals would of course apply only to the higher or *cadre* posts, and not necessarily to all of these. It would perhaps be found wise in the first instance to borrow the Divisional and District Judges for the new Agency from the Punjab, and afterwards from the Punjab or from other provinces, since we could offer no prospects to such officers in the Political Department. Indeed, if a Judicial Commissioner be appointed, it is not certain that any Divisional Judges would be necessary. Similarly we might borrow officers from the same source, when required for settlement work. Finally, as regards miscellaneous departments, such as Police, Jails, Medical, Educational, Irrigation, and Public Works, and the subordinate establishments of all Departments, the best plan would probably be to take over temporarily the whole or the greater part of the existing staff of the Punjab Government now employed in the area of the new province, and gradually to work out such changes as experience might dictate. *Per contra* if in this way we were to provide appointments for members of the Punjab Commission, the Local Government might be willing in return to continue to find places for educated Pathans of good family, a certain number of whom, under the existing system, rise to high positions in the Civil Service of the Punjab.

59. The effect of these changes upon the Punjab Commission and upon the Political Department, respectively, would be somewhat as follows. At the present time there are in the area covered by the new Agency 16 superior posts (including District and Divisional Judges), *i.e.*, posts carrying a substantive pay of more than Rs. 1,000 a month. To fill these posts (allowing for the percentage of incumbents who would ordinarily be absent on leave and for those in training) there are required 31 officers. The monthly cost of these officers under the Punjab system has been worked out at Rs. 46,300. If this area be brought directly under the Government of India, and if the necessary appointments, graded as nearly as possible on the corresponding scale, be added to the Political Department, the same number (31) of officers will be required, and the monthly cost will amount to Rs. 46,600, or a difference of only Rs. 300. These calculations are of course, in the present stage, only approximate. Both tables would be affected if the judicial appointments were to remain upon the Punjab list. Enough has been said, however, to show that, in so far as officers are concerned, the change of system could be made without involving any injury. The pay and prospects of the officers in the Punjab Commission

would, it can be shown, be left approximately as they are. On the other hand, the prospects of the officers of the new administration, and of the Political Department generally, would be vastly improved; since there would be open to the former a far wider field of employment and promotion under the Foreign Department of the Government of India than is at present possible within the confines of a single province and a restricted Commission; while service on the Frontier, which is now, with a few exceptions, closed to the officers on the political list, should become an object of ambition for the most promising young men whom the Political Department can attract to its ranks.

Merits or Demerits of the Proposal.

60. Having thus not merely sketched the outlines but filled in the principal administrative details of the new province, I now pass to my last subject of enquiry, namely, the objections that may be taken to its creation, and the compensating advantages.

61. The Secretary of State, in his despatch of August 5th, 1898, indicated four possible objections to the project of a separate Trans-Indus charge. The first of these was that by breaking up the established administrative units of British India, the revenue system already introduced would be disturbed. This is not an objection to be despised. The Peshawar District, for instance, contains some of the richest and most highly assessed land in the Punjab, covered in parts by a network of canals, the working of which is no simple matter. The whole District has been surveyed on a scale of 24 ins. to the mile, and the maps are accompanied by elaborate land records which must be kept up to date. Neglect of these would produce insecurity of tenures and rights, and might soon result in chaos. Specially trained officers would be required for this work, such as are not ordinarily found in the Political Department. I concede this difficulty, which will also apply, though in a less degree, to the Districts of Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. But I hope to have provided against it. I do not propose the handing over of technical work to unskilled hands. In these respects we must still look to the parent province. The revenue system of the new Agency would not merely be that of the larger administration of which it at present forms a part, but it would be administered, at any rate to begin with, and possibly continuously, by the same men. No one would propose to inaugurate a new province by disorganising or revolutionising the old revenue system. Continuity in this respect is prudent, and has been provided for.

62. The second objection mentioned by the Secretary of State to a Frontier province was that it would entail a succession of territorial rectifications and compensations. This objection also I have shown not to appply. No other province beyond the Punjab is touched by my scheme; and it remains only to be considered whether the Punjab itself will be mutilated or dismembered by it to a serious or unreasonable degree.

63. The following table will show the approximate extent of the area and population, as calculated from the Census returns of 1891, and of the land revenue, of the districts which it is proposed to withdraw :—

———	Area, square miles.	Population.	Revenue.
			Rs.
Peshawar District	2,444	703,768	11,02,626
Kohat „	2,771	203,175	1,90,849
Bannu (excluding Mianwali Sub-division)	1,664	204,469	2,58,000
Dera Ismail Khan (excluding Cis-Indus Tahsils).	3,812	254,163	3,24,372
Total	10,691	1,365,575	18,75,847

In connection with the above figures; I may mention that the Cis-Indus *tahsils* of the above named districts and the Trans-Indus tracts, which I do not propose to subtract from the Punjab, are of the following dimensions :—

——	Area, square miles.	Population.	Revenue.
			Rs.
Mianwali Sub-division of Bannu	2,183	167,807	1,93,000
Cis-Indus Tahsils of Dera Ismail Khan ...	5,628	232,038	3,24,372
Dera Ghazi Khan District	5,606	404,031	5,15,697
Total	13,417	803,876	10,33,069

Out of the total area, either Trans-Indus, or connected administratively with the Trans-Indus Districts, which is at present administered by the Punjab Government, I therefore leave to the latter more than one-half, with rather more than a third of the revenue, and one-third of the total population. Comparing the subtracted area with the figures for the entire province, which were in 1891 :—

Area, in Square Miles.	Population.	Revenue.
		Rs.
148,966	25,130,127	2,75,32,972

it will be seen that I propose to take away from the Punjab Government, if the maximum of my proposals is accepted, and if no restitution, partial or otherwise, is made to the Punjab of the Trans-Indus *tahsils* of Dera Ismail Khan, only $\frac{1}{14}$th of its total area, $\frac{1}{15}$th of its total revenue, and a little less than $\frac{1}{18}$th of its entire population.

64. Now of these districts it should be remembered that they do not belong either geographically, ethnologically, or historically to the Punjab. They are inhabited by entirely different peoples. They exhibit a different mode and standards of life. They were only conquered and annexed to the Punjab by Runjit Singh. So detached are they in reality from the remainder of the Province that in 1857 during the Mutiny, when our general position in that part of India was in some doubt, Sir John Lawrence was prepared to surrender Peshawar to the Afghans ; while in the following year, he proposed the rendition of Kohat also, on the grounds of economy and of the unhealthy climate. In other words the first and most famous Lieutentant-Governor of the Punjab, himself proposed, though in different circumstances, a portion of that dismemberment of his province which I now advocate.

65. Still more do these considerations apply in the case of those parts of the present Punjab administration lying outside the administrative border of British India, which have in recent years, and notably since the Durand Agreement of 1893, been added to the jurisdiction of that Government. It should be remembered that the conditions under which the Punjab Government was placed in charge of the Frontier at all were widely different from those which now obtain. They were clearly explained by Lord Salisbury when Secretary of State for India, in his despatch to Lord Lytton's Government of November 29th, 1877.

> "The Punjab Government was interposed between the Governor-General and the Frontier officers at a time when communication between Calcutta and the Punjab was tedious and difficult, when the state of affairs beyond our territory caused little solicitude, and when the duties imposed upon the Government of Lahore, were not such as to prevent the Frontier from receiving a large share of its attention."

66. When this Despatch was penned, great changes had already taken place. The telegraph and the railway had brought the Frontier into close and

rapid connection with the head-quarters of the Supreme Government. The Punjab had itself, since its original constitution, as a Chief Commissionership, received the notable addition of the Delhi District from the North-Western Provinces. Frontier questions had gained greatly in number and importance; and the advance of Russia across the regions that previously separated her from the Afghan border had been continuous and alarming. If this was the metamorphosis of conditions that could be recorded in 1877, how unmeasurably greater is it now. It may truly be said that every subsequent change in the frontiers of India has been a change dictated, not by considerations arising out of or directly affecting the interests of the Punjab Government, but by imperial considerations, and by them alone. The consolidation of Baluchistan into a separate administration, the inclusion of Chitral and Dir within the British sphere, the signature of the Durand Agreement and the consequent political protectorate over Waziristan, have revolutionised the position on the Frontier. Moreover, while they are the results of a policy, with which the Local Government has only incidentally been concerned, they have themselves created a further group of problems with which a Local Government is ill qualified to deal. To such an extent is this the case that a considerable part of these territorial acquisitions has already been withdrawn from, or has not been incorporated with, the Punjab Government. The Agency for Dir, Swat and Chitral is directly under the Government of India. So is the Khyber. In the tribal territory further to the south, so strongly has the necessity of severing tribal management from administrative preoccupations, and of putting the political work into the hands of Political Officers, specially appointed for the purpose, forced itself even upon the Punjab Government that already, as pointed out by Sir M. Young in his note of 19th October 1898, "two-thirds to three-fourths of the Punjab Frontier is in the hands of officers who have nothing else to do." There could not be a clearer admission of the extent to which the Frontier work has ceased to be administrative, *i.e.*, to fall within the necessary sphere of a Local Government, and has become political, *i.e.*, has entered the legitimate sphere of the Supreme Government. It is indeed only the logical expansion of the present system (in itself illogical) by which the Frontier work is in part now performed by Political Officers under the Punjab Government, and the logical completion of the system by which the remainder of the Frontier is already under the direct charge of the Government of India, that the whole of it should be transferred to the latter, *i.e.*, to the real controller of its destinies.

67. There is another respect in which the situation has greatly changed since 1877, and which renders the question of any compensation to the Punjab Government for the proposed losses superfluous. Not merely have the administrative problems demanding the attention of the Local Government grown in number and complexity—to such an extent that complaints have frequently to be made of the degree to which the Punjab Secretariat is overworked, and that the work of the Lieutenant-Governor is probably nearly double what it was 25 years ago—but the populatian of the province is rapidly increasing, and must continue to increase, not alone by the normal increment arising from natural causes, but by the reclamation of immense new tracts of habitable country. It is estimated that the great scheme of canalisation, connected with the Chenab River, has, during the last few years, brought under cultivation for the first time an area of over 1,000,000 acres, with a population of 700,000 persons,—figures which are expected to rise, within a few years, to 1,500,000 acres, and 1,500,000 persons. The Jhelum scheme, now in course of execution, will similarly augment the area of cultivation by over 500,000 acres, and should accommodate an increased population of about 400,000 persons. These two increments alone will far more than balance the loss of population which my scheme entails upon the Punjab. The Lower Bari-Doab scheme, which is next on the list, and the surveys for which are about to be commenced, will add another 500,000 acres, and the same number of population.

68. Finally, it is hoped that before very long the immense Sind-Sagar scheme may be undertaken, which is intended to irrigate the staring blank space on the map on the left bank of the Indus between Kalabagh and Multan, and which is expected to reclaim an area of 1,750,000 acres. The realisation of this project, as of its predecessors, will add enormously not merely to the population

of the province, but to the revenue and settlement work devolving upon the local officers, and to the responsibilities of the Punjab Secretariat. They will more than compensate for what it is now proposed to take away. They will probably, before any great length of time has elapsed, demand the replenishment of the Punjab Commission by as many officers as it is now under suggestion to withdraw.

69. So well known are these considerations in the Punjab itself that the necessity for territorial rectifications or compensations would probably no longer be urged by its own officers. One of the foremost of these, Mr. F. D. Cunningham, the Commissioner of Peshawar, has indeed, in his letter of 21st October 1898, already quoted, gone so far as to argue in the opposite sense. Coming as they do from the senior Frontier officer of the Punjab Commission, these views are worthy of quotation here—

"The population, revenue, trade, and wealth of the province have so increased since the question of a separate Frontier Commissionship was mooted some 20 years ago, under the Government of Lord Lytton, that what would be left to the Punjab after removing Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, and a strip of the Derajat, is still sufficient to constitute an administrative area of the first class.

"Towns have grown, Municipalities have been created under new and complex laws, the whole machinery of Local Self-Government has been started, hundreds of miles of railway and canals have been opened, the cultivated, and, what is more important, the irrigated area has been enlarged by scores of thousands of acres,—in a word, development in all directions has been so great that it is questionable whether there is not enough cis-Indus to occupy the full energies of a great administration.

"I am writing without access to an office, and therefore do not attempt to give figures, but a comparison of the chief statistics of the province for 1878 with those of to-day would, I think, show that no 'territorial rectifications or compensations' would be required, and that this supposed objection to the radical and effectual remedy does not in reality exist."

70. I hope, therefore, to have shown conclusively that the time-honoured objection to a new Frontier province which I have been discussing is one that has become obsolete in the lapse of time, and that need not deter us for a moment from the acceptance of the proposed change.

71. Should it be said, however, that, though not detrimental to the prestige or interests of the Punjab, such a change cannot but be condemned by the officers of the administration which it is proposed to supersede, it is easy to show from their recorded opinions (as I might do from more private sources of information) that, so far from this being the case, the erection of a new Frontier province is a solution, which, if there is to be any alteration in the *status quo*, is not only contemplated but is even heartily approved by all. Mr. Merk, Commissioner of the Derajat, said in his letter of 7th October 1898 (paragraph 9)—

"If the Punjab Government is dissociated from Frontier management, it is plain that the Commissioner must be raised to the position and powers of a Local Government on the analogy of the Agent of the Governor-General at Quetta."

72. Mr. Anderson, Officiating Commissioner of the Derajat, said in his letter of 17th October 1898—

"It will be necessary, I consider, to considerably enhance the status of the Commissioner of Peshawar as regards trans-frontier affairs. He must be empowered to dispose of many matters which he has now to refer for orders to the Punjab Government. To enable him to have as wide a view as possible of what is passing across the frontier of the division, it will be advisable to place under his control the Chitral and Dir Agency and the relations with the tribes under that Agency. His status would advantageously be raised to something like that of the Agent to the Governor-General for Baluchistan as regards trans-frontier affairs."

73. Sir R. Udny's (Commissioner of Peshawar) letter of 20th October 1898, paragraphs 5—9, which criticised the Punjab system, was also in reality an argument for the creation of a separate Frontier Commission.

74. Mr. Cunningham (Commissioner of Peshawar) went further and laid down clearly that there could be only two solutions to the problem: either to

give the Punjab real and final authority in respect of Frontier matters (reducing *pro tanto* the power of the Government of India), a solution which he admitted to be "out of the question"; or

"To remove the Frontier districts (excluding the Cis-Indus parts of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu, and the whole of Dera Ghazi Khan) from the Punjab Government, and to place in charge of them an officer with the power of Chief Commissioner for the interior and the position of Agent to the Governor-General for the clans and countries beyond ..... If a strong administration directly under the Government of India is desired, in which Frontier questions can be fully taken up on one consistent line without detriment to the needs and requirements of the greater part of a large province, this can best be secured by such a plan. The Punjab Government would benefit by being relieved of an incubus, by the gain of time and power to devote to the administration of a rapidly growing province; and it would be rescued from what to many has appeared the invidious position into which it has been relegated by the course of events in the past 10 or 20 years on the North-West Frontier."

75. Sir M. Young himself also saw clearly that the object desired by the Secretary of State could not be gained by any compromise, but was only feasible in one way. In his note of 19th October 1898, he wrote (paragraph 16):—

"If what is desired is to eliminate the Punjab Government from trans-frontier control, this can only be done by removing the Frontier districts or such portions of them as are closely connected with trans-frontier tribes from the control of the Punjab Government, and forming this tract into a separate administration under the direct orders of the Government of India."

And again (paragraph 18)—

"I can only state my conviction that, unless and until Her Majesty's Government decide to separate the Frontier and place it under a Chief Commissioner or other officer in direct subordination to the Government of India, the existing machinery cannot with any advantage be altered."

76. Similarly Lord Elgin, though, like the Lieutenant-Governor, he was opposed to such a solution, admitted in his Minute of 6th November 1898 that, granted the necessity for a considerable devolution of powers, "the question must sooner or later resolve itself into one whether it is better to have as an intermediate Local Government, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, or a Commissioner who will be a Chief Commissioner on the Frontier."

77. These various quotations indicate that, in the opinion of the majority of the Punjab Frontier officers of the highest standing and even of those authorities who are opposed to the principle of the suggested change, there is but one mind as to the fact, that if the Local Government is to be deprived, for whatever reasons, of the principal functions which it now discharges with reference to the Frontier, there is only one method by which such a change can be satisfactorily carried out, *viz.*, by the institution of the new administration which it is the object of this Minute to advocate.

78. I now pass to the third objection that was indicated by the Secretary of State in the following words:—

"It may also be inexpedient to deprive the Government of the Punjab, and thus also the Government of India, of a valuable opportunity of training officers for Frontier service, and of gaining a knowledge of the feelings and habits of tribes which are constantly sending settlers into British districts."

It will, I think, be obvious from the scheme that I have submitted that the opportunity which the Secretary of State desires, so far from being diminished, will be immensely enhanced by placing the officers of the new province upon the Political List of the Government of India. There will henceforward be no risk either of an officer being sent to the Frontier who has hitherto been engrossed in civil work, or of an officer being withdrawn from it, because the exigencies either of the public service or of grade promotion demand his return to the interior parts of the province. On the contrary, an officer who displays exceptional aptitudes for tribal politics and management will be under no risk of being withdrawn, unless it be to some more responsible post, of a similar character, either in Baluchistan, or under the Foreign Department in other parts of India. On the other hand, if an individual be found deficient in the special talents that are required for the Frontier, it will be much easier to find work for him elsewhere than it is at present. To the officers of the entire Department will be given a fresh goal of ambition. To

those who attain it will be given a wider field of reward. I anticipate that in a few years' time the new Frontier province will draw towards itself the very best ability that the civil and military services in India can produce, and that it will be the nursery of a new school of Political Officers, who will revive both the memories and the credit of an earlier time.

79. With regard to the fourth objection cited by the Secretary of State in the following terms :—

"It is open to question whether it is altogether advisable to place in the hands of a single Commissioner the whole executive power on both sides of this most important section of the Empire's external frontier, without the restraint, which a trained experience of financial and administrative responsibilities on a large scale imposes upon an authority charged with the Government of a first-class province."

I may say that exactly the same objection was raised when Baluchistan was converted into a separate administration, and that it proved to be entirely groundless ; and that I would not myself propose for one moment to appoint as head of the new province any officer who was destitute of financial and administrative experience. This is a commodity that is fortunately procurable without recourse to the Government of a first class province. It is as frequently forthcoming in our second class as in our first class administrations. Moreover, as I have shown in the case of the Punjab, its present advantages are apt to be somewhat dearly purchased at the cost of inexperience in other and not less vital concerns.

80. There remains the fifth objection of the Secretary of State, touched upon rather than emphasized in the following paragraph :—

"There is no part of India where the need of a strong administration, equipped with all the resources of Government and capable of resisting aggression is more likely to be felt than on the North-West Frontier."

81. There can be no doubt that the phrase of the Secretary of State indicates an objection to the scheme of a new Frontier province, which has been widely entertained in the past, and, more than any other argument, has hitherto availed to defeat its adoption. I refer to the belief that such a scheme would, in some way or other, favour a forward and aggressive policy, and that the Government of India would exercise less control over the activity of its Frontier officers than under a system which interposes the buffer of a Local Government between itself and them. I can only say that I regard such a belief as an entire illusion ; and that if I held it, I should not now be composing this Minute. Twenty-three years ago Lord Salisbury, as Secretary of State, foresaw the same objection to Lord Lytton's scheme (which was, I think, by reason of its magnitude, far more exposed to such a charge than is mine) and emphatically repudiated it. The proposed formation of a new Frontier charge was, he said, "a measure of defence and security, not of aggression." I cannot better explain or defend the proposals which I now submit.

82. If the intervention of the Punjab Government acts as a barrier against aggressive schemes, I would ask how it has come about that the 50 years that have elapsed between the annexation of the Punjab and the present day, during the whole of which time the Frontier has been under the control of the Punjab Government, there have been no fewer than 40 military expeditions against the tribes of that frontier, or one expedition for every 15 months of the entire period ; how, notwithstanding the pacific dispositions of the Punjab Government, there has nevertheless taken place, under its patronage and eye, the series of military advances upon the border which have carried us forward on to the Samana, into the Kurram, and far into Northern and Southern Waziristan ; and how above all it came about that the Government of India were involved, only three years ago, in the greatest Frontier conflagration that has ever been known. I am not saying for one moment that the Punjab Government ought to be held solely, or even mainly, responsible for all these events. The Government of India cannot evade or disown its share. All that I do say is that the plea that we are saved by the intervention of the Local Government from a forward policy, from punitive expeditions, or from Frontier war, is one that will not stand the test of a moment's examination.

83. I will even go further and say that whereas an Agent to the Governor-General for the Frontier could without difficulty be controlled, by reason of his subordinate position, by the Government of India, and whereas a forward or aggressive policy, if initiated under his rule, would rightly be laid not at his door but at that of the Government of India, I can conceive that an ambitious Lieutenant-Governor, if such a phenomenon were to occur, might be very difficult to control. The Punjab has fortunately hitherto been free from any such source of danger. But the fact that a succession of cautious and prudent Lieutenant-Governors have been quite powerless to save the Frontier from the disturbances which I have mentioned, is a proof that there must be something unsound, not in the men but in the system.

84. To me it seems absurd to argue that, if a local administration be brought more strictly under the influence of the supreme authority, it will therefore become more mischievous and unruly. I should infer that precisely the opposite will be the case. If an avoidable war now breaks out upon the Frontier, the Government of India cannot censure or recall the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. It divides the responsibility with him, though very likely innocent of any complicity in its earlier stages. If, however, an Agent to the Governor-General were to compromise the Supreme Government by any rash or bellicose action, I cannot conceive that there would be any hesitation in bringing him smartly to account.

85. I am not aware that since the Dir-Swat-Chitral Agency has been under the direct control of the Government of India there has been any development of aggressive tendencies in that quarter. On the contrary, we have enjoyed peace, on what is by far the most critical section of the Frontier, for three years. Similarly, it is under the control of the Government of India that we have re-pacified the Khyber, which the earlier system had not saved from the fatal convulsion of 1897. Neither does the creation of Baluchistan into an independent administration appear to me to have been attended by the martial expansion which might, according to the plea that I am examining, have followed upon so hazardous a step.

86. I will not further pursue this argument than to say that it is in the most confident belief that the future Frontier administration of the Government of India will, under the change that I advocate, be more, and not less under control ; that disputes, culminating in wars, with the tribes will be less, and not more frequent ; and that India will thereby escape the perils of a policy of bisected responsibility, of vacillation, of drift, and of delay, that I urge the separation from the Punjab Government of the Frontier districts and peoples.

87. There remain three further arguments which have sometimes been employed against the proposed reform. The first is that the more direct control of the Government of India signifies greater centralisation. I have shown in an earlier part of this Minute that the very reverse will be the case. I regard the present administration of the Frontier by the Local Government, with its suppression of local responsibility, and its perpetual reference to the Punjab Secretariat, as centralisation in a most aggravated and pernicious form. What more mischievous evidence of centralisation could be afforded than the ladder of compulsory and dilatory reference, which I have before described, whose foot is across the Frontier, but whose head is at Simla or Lahore ? Under a separate administration, I believe that one-half of the references which now pass up and down this ladder of delay will be settled promptly upon the spot by a superior officer of sufficient authority to decide, and sufficient local knowledge to do so without risk ; while in the case of such matters as still require reference to the Government of India, the process will be by so much accelerated as the number of intervening rungs will have been reduced.

88. The second argument is the allegation that with a new province under the Government of India, the Foreign Department of the latter will be swamped with a mass of work which it will be incapable of digesting, aud which will cripple its capacity in other quarters. Sir M. Young laid stress in his Note upon the number of references which we are spared by the intervention of the

Local Government. Perhaps the best test that I can apply is the number of receipts and issues that pass through the Foreign Department from the Punjab Government—I take those which relate to the Frontier alone—as compared with the whole number relating to internal administration as well as to Frontier affairs, with which we deal from the entire province of Baluchistan. In the year 1899 they were as follows :—

—	Receipts.	Issues.
Punjab Frontier—		
Political	720	316
Administrative	115	119
Total	835	435

—	Receipts.	Issues.
Baluchistan—		
Political	301	186
Administrative	326	357
Total	627	543

89. It, therefore, appears that the entire business, internal and external, devolving upon the Foreign Department for the province of Baluchistan is less than the external business alone, which comes up to it from the Punjab Government. It is, of course, true that Baluchistan is a by far less populous and less advanced province than the Trans-Indus portions of the Punjab would be ; and that no strict analagy can be drawn between the political or administrative business of the two Governments. I quote the figures, however, to show to what moderate and reasonable dimensions the work that is entailed upon the Foreign Department by the Baluchistan Agency has shrunk, in the face of the argument that was so freely employed at the time of its constitution, viz., that the Foreign Department would not be equal to the additional strain. The figures also show how slender in practice the devolution upon the Punjab Government has become. I do not, of course, argue that the Frontier business of the Foreign Department will not, if a new administration be created, be increased. Such will, at any rate for a time at the beginning, in all probability be the case. We may require for a short period the assistance of an extra hand in the Foreign Office. But this transitional epoch will not be of long duration. As the Local Government becomes consolidated so will the references on administrative and internal affairs rapidly diminish, as they have done in Baluchistan. The Frontier and political references may also be expected to dwindle as local responsibility is developed ; and in a few years time I entertain little doubt that the Foreign Department will be less hampered and besieged by Frontier affairs than it is at the present moment.

90. Finally, if the question of financial cost be raised, I might point out that we already possess the authority of the Secretary of State for the submission of proposals that may entail an increase in our charges for administration. In his despatch of the 5th August 1898 he wrote, with reference to his own proposal, already discussed : " I am aware that any such alteration of system may require additional expenditure " ; and " I shall not object to the exercise by your Government of a wide discretion in framing the arrangements, financial and executive, which may be found necessary for giving effect to these considerations." But, as a matter of fact, we have no occasion at present to

profit by this latitude, since I have shown good reason for believing that the scheme which I have proposed, so far from increasing, may possibly even diminish our annual outlay. The financial objection which has impeded the realisation of earlier projects need not, therefore, be considered at the present time.

91. I have now examined and argued the various objections that have been raised in times past to proposals similar to that which I now make, or that may be raised to mine. I trust that I have shown them to be not only much less formidable than has hitherto been believed to be the case, but for the most part destitute of serious foundation. On the other hand, I hope also to have shown that the scheme for the constitution of a new Frontier Province, that I have put forward, possesses these positive merits. It will express and enforce the direct responsibilty of the Government of India for Frontier affairs. It will enable the Viceroy to conduct the most important business of the Department of which he is the personal chief. It will free the management of Frontier politics from the delays that are inseparable from a chain of reference, whose strength is sacrificed to its length. It will promote greater rapidity and consequently greater freedom of action. Its tendency should be not towards aggression, but towards peace : since war with the tribes is commonly the result of ignorance or indecision at earlier stages. It will entrust tribal management exclusively to those who know the tribes. It should train up a school of officers, worthy of the most critical but splendid duty that is imposed upon any of the officers of the Queen's Government in India. For myself I will only add that, having initiated a definite policy on the North-West Frontiers of India, which I believe to contain the germs of possible success, I ask to be relieved of the conditions which appear to me to jeopardise its operation at every turn, and to be presented with those by which alone, in my opinion, its future can be reasonably assured.

August 27th, 1900. (Signed) CURZON.

No. 14.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 20th December 1900.

I have received and given my attentive consideration in Council to the despatch of Your Excellency's Government, dated the 13th of September 1900.

2. Your Excellency in Council records your conviction that the present system of Frontier control is entirely unsatisfactory, interposing as it does hesitation, delay, and difficulties in the execution of a policy for which the Supreme Government is directly responsible, subject to the orders of Her Majesty's Government, but the execution of which is entrusted to the Local Government of the Punjab. You consider, upon a careful review of the past history of the Frontier, that if firmness, promptitude, or continuity of policy in the future are to be secured, a radical change in the present procedure is needed, and you draw attention to the additional burden which the Durand Agreement has put upon the Frontier administration by rendering it to a large extent responsible for the conduct and misdeeds of those living inside the line of demarcation settled by that agreement. Your Excellency sketches in outline a scheme for the construction of a new agency immediately under the control of the Government of India, which seems to you desirable, and which, after a full consideration, your Government endorses as the only scheme that in principle will avoid the evils of the present system. This scheme, regarding the details of which you propose to consult the Government of the Punjab, is described with some fulness of outline in a Minute written by your Excellency, and dated the 27th of August 1900. It contemplates the creation of a Frontier

Province under the direct control of a Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, who would have charge not only of the four districts now under the Punjab Government, namely, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, with the tribal country that lies beyond their limits, but also of the Political Agencies of Dir, Swat, and Chitral, the Khyber, Kurram, Tochi, and Wana. The area detached from the Punjab Province would approximate to $\frac{1}{14}$th of its total area, with $\frac{1}{15}$th of its total revenue, and $\frac{1}{18}$th of its entire population. Your proposals differ from those which have at former times been discussed, in their avoidance of several dislocations of the existing provincial systems, but there are a few details, such as the possible transfer of the control over the Black Mountain Tribes from the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, which are expressly reserved for final consideration. Although the cost of the new staff which would be required at Peshawar would exceed that of the present establishment by 3,600 rupees a month, it is expected that the total cost of the civil administration will not exceed, and may, perhaps, be less than, that which is now incurred. While the holders of the subordinate administrative posts would be drawn from the Punjab or other provinces, you propose to provide for the wants of the higher posts and the political appointments by an increase to the strength of your Foreign Department, and you have discussed the probable effect of these changes upon the prospects of the Punjab Commission.

3. Her Majesty's Government recognise that the adoption of the policy of concentration inculcated in my telegram, dated 13th October 1897, and more fully set forth in my despatch of the 28th of January 1898, paragraph 18, has modified the previous situation, and may require organic changes in administration. The Government of India, in pursuance of the two objects specified by me in that despatch, namely, concentration of your military force, and the limitation of interference with the tribes, so as to avoid the extension of administrative control, has carried out a series of changes along the Frontier, which have received the approval of Her Majesty's Government. In my despatch, dated the 5th of August 1898, I anticipated that the alteration of system introduced into the Khyber Pass would involve further arrangements, both financial and executive, in order to ensure their success, and I indicated certain transfers of authority which might deserve consideration, especially as they would reduce to a minimum any disturbance of the provincial administration in the Punjab. I learn, however, that the Government of the Punjab is strongly opposed to these limited re-arrangements, and the larger scheme proposed by Your Excellency is based upon this conclusion.

4. Your Excellency has referred to the objections which, as I pointed out in my despatch of 5th August 1898, may be raised against the severance of settled districts from the Government of the Punjab, and against the direct control of the Government of India which it is proposed to substitute for that of the Local Government over them and the neighbouring Frontier. To a considerable extent the second and the third of the objections indicated in my despatch of the 5th of August 1898 are provided against in Your Excellency's scheme. I recognise that, in avoiding any alteration of the position of Sind, and in limiting the transfer of districts from the Punjab to those mentioned, your Government will avoid an undesirable series of territorial rectifications and compensations; and that, when the control of the Government of the Punjab is for the most part confined to Cis-Indus districts, the advantage of training its officers in tribal tracts beyond, but adjoining, the administrative Frontier of the Punjab will cease to be of much practicable value. But there are certain unavoidable drawbacks associated with the proposed scheme which will require very careful consideration in order that they may be minimised, and to which the first and fourth of the objections above mentioned were intended to refer.

5. The staff of the new Frontier Province will not be large, and the Governor-General's Agent at its head will have two very different sets of duties to perform and supervise. In respect of the Frontier tribes his duties will be political, and his policy will be under the direct control of your Government. But, in the case of the settled districts, which you propose to detach from the Punjab, it is clearly undesirable that the people having already enjoyed the benefit of a highly organised administration with its careful land

settlements, its laws and regulations, and the various institutions of a progressive Civil Government, should be thrown back from the stage which they have already reached. The Governor of a large province not only possesses a special and large experience of British administration, but can summon to his aid and counsels heads of Departments and Commissioners of Divisions whose advice may be of the utmost value. The Governor-General's Agent will not, without special arrangements, be able to count upon such assistance. I have not overlooked the fact that your Excellency intends to draw upon the Punjab for skilled officers in the subordinate branches or in the technical departments, but I am not satisfied that this will meet the whole case; for the important question of superior direction remains to be dealt with. Nor does recent experience in Baluchistan appear to me to be altogether relevant, since no part of that agency can claim to have a district, or part of a district, in any respect so advanced and settled as the Trans-Indus British districts which you propose to detach from the Punjab.

6. The question of the recruitment of officers for the new agency, to which I have referred above, will obviously be one of very great importance. The nature of the duties to be performed, and the necessarily limited numbers of the staff, make it essential that a very high standard of individual efficiency should be attained and preserved in administrative as well as in political duties. It seems to be probable that in so small a province it will not be easy to keep the staff at the requisite level of efficiency, unless picked officers are largely imported from other provinces; a measure which can hardly fail to produce discouragement among the regular staff of the province by retarding promotion in the lower grades. I should be glad to be more fully informed as to the measures by which Your Excellency proposes to deal with this difficulty, and to be assured that you are satisfied as to their probable effect.

7. There is another point to which I wish to draw Your Excellency's attention. In remarking that the need of a strong administration equipped with all the resources of Government would be felt on the Frontier, I did not refer to the political administration. I referred to the advantages that must accrue to the Frontier districts of British India from the application to them of the ways and means at the command of a first-class administrative unit. The construction of roads, bridges, rest-houses, and hospitals, and generally the assignment of provincial resources to a particular district, may be of the utmost value, and are best secured if the district is an integral part of a large province. In times of disturbance or threatened danger a large province can draft in additional police, procure transport, change local officers, and do much to prepare for trouble before they arise or assume the form of military operations. If it is necessary to transfer settled districts from the control of the Punjab Government, and to place them under the same administration as the adjoining tribal country, it is important that the possible results of such a policy should be fully considered and provided for.

8. Your Excellency in Council will, no doubt, weigh these points carefully in working out the details of your scheme. If, on close examination of the various changes and adaptations inseparable from the constitution of a new Commission, apart from the Punjab Government, it is found that they do in fact involve no additional expense, the result will be undoubtedly satisfactory. But I can hardly anticipate, judging from general experience, that Your Excellency's preliminary estimate will not have to be modified in this respect; and although I do not desire to lay down any fixed limit in the matter, I trust that no pains will be spared to prevent the imposition of any unnecessary burden on the revenues. In the meanwhile Her Majesty's Government approve generally of your proposal, as tending to express and enforce the direct responsibility of your Government for Frontier affairs, and to free the management of Frontier politics from the delay inseparable from the present system. So far as the details of your project, which I shall await, appear likely to secure these objects, they will receive my favourable consideration.

9. In the 29th paragraph of Your Excellency's Minute the argument is pressed that the transfer of the Frontier administration from the Punjab Government to the Government of India will involve no diminution of special

aptitude for and knowledge of Frontier affairs. I am convinced that your remarks were in no way intended to depreciate the eminent abilities of the Lieutenant-Governors who are named in that paragraph, or to undervalue the substantial services which all Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab, beginning with Sir John Lawrence, have rendered in the discharge of the difficult duties connected with these affairs, although none of them had any previous personal experience of political work on the North-Western Frontier. I gather that the general object of Your Excellency's Minute is to prove the present system to be unworkable, and not to reflect unfavourably upon the manner in which the Punjab Government has attempted to work it; and I desire it to be understood that my approval of Your Excellency's proposals is based on my acceptance of the main conclusions which I find that Your Excellency in Council has adopted, that the present system of Frontier management, however worked, is unsatisfactory, that some radical change in that system is required, and that this change should take the form described at length in Your Excellency's Minute.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 15.

Opinion recorded by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, K.C.S.I., Member of the Council of India, dated 17th January 1901.

PUNJAB FRONTIER ADMINISTRATION.

Having at the meeting of the Council, held on the 18th December 1900, dissented from the resolution regarding my proposal to insert an additional paragraph in the draft Despatch relating to the scheme for constituting a Chief Commissionership of the North-Western Frontier, I desire that my opinion may be entered in the minutes of the proceedings, together with the following reasons for it which I laid before the Council on the occasion referred to.

1. I find myself in a somewhat peculiar position with reference to this draft Despatch to India. I agree in the conclusion at which Lord Curzon has arrived, that the Punjab Frontier administration must be placed directly under the Government of India, indeed I have long foreseen that that would one day be necessary. Further I agree with Lord Curzon in thinking that the only workable arrangement* is to separate off the Punjab Frontier districts bodily and make them into a Chief Commissionership. But I at the same time see a certain danger attending the change proposed, and I should have thought that a word of caution as to that danger ought to have been inserted in the Despatch. Moreover, when I look into the arguments and observations contained in Lord Curzon's Minute, I find that, while some of them are sound and sufficient to establish his point, others are of such a nature as to convey an erroneous or distorted impression as to the positions occupied for many years past by the Government of the Punjab and the Government of India respectively with reference to frontier questions, and as to the relations between them so far as concerns those questions. I feel some hesitation about discussing these matters, for, having myself held the office of Lieutenant-Governor down to not quite three years ago, I am liable to be suspected of prejudice; but, on the other hand, if, possessing the knowledge I do, I hold my tongue, I may be supposed to have accepted and endorsed all Lord Curzon's arguments and observations as well as his conclusions. It is impossible for me to allow this to be supposed, and for

* I ought to state that I was absent from here at the time the Secretary of State's Despatch of the 5th August 1898, proposing the alternative arrangement now dropped, was prepared and issued.

this reason, as also because it will serve to make the whole position clearer, I am anxious to place before the Secretary of State and my colleagues a statement of the condition of things that, so far as my knowledge extends, has actually and as a matter of fact prevailed under the system which we are all now agreed should be abolished.

2. To begin with, it must be admitted that in spite of the anxiety of the Punjab Government to carry out the policy of the Government of India and of the consideration shown to the Lieutenant-Governor by successive Viceroys, differences of opinion have from time to time prevailed, which, though they seemed at one time on the point of being thrashed out in a friendly spirit, have evidently not as yet been cleared up. But in order that an exaggerated importance may not be attached to those differences of opinion, it is necessary to explain that the Punjab Government has had nothing to do with the discussion of the great general question as to the merits of what is called the "forward policy." So far as I know, no Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab has ever been consulted on that great question, and I doubt whether any one of them has ever quite understood what the "forward policy," when taken in its full extent and as advocated by various authorities from time to time, exactly means. All that it concerns the Lieutenant-Governor to know is the fact that the Government of India desire to establish some amount of control over the trans-border tribes, up to a certain geographical limit, and that since the Durand line has been laid down, and so long as it may continue to have any meaning, that line is understood to be the limit.

3. As to the nature and extent of the control so to be established, the views of the Government of India seem to have expanded considerably after the Durand delimitation agreement. As shown in the dissent appended by Sir C. Pritchard, Sir J. Westland, and Sir A. MacDonnell to the Government of India Despatch of the 31st July 1894 (Parliamentary Paper C. 8713, Vol. I., pp. 25–27), the Government of India had by the time that Despatch was written come to take a far wider view of our responsibilities than was required by anything in the Durand agreement, or than was contemplated either by those who in 1892 proposed to the Secretary of State that such an agreement should be negotiated, or by the Secretary of State in accepting their proposals. Later on the views of the Government of India seem to have expanded still further. They appear to have got as far as this, that we were bound to establish over the tribes not merely such control as was needed for our own protection and to enable us to check raids against the Ameer on certain parts of the Durand line, but further, such control as might be necessary in order to stop the internal quarrels of the tribesmen among themselves, and authoritatively settle their disputes; and that the Government of India, notwithstanding the emphatic warnings against interference and extensions of administrative control given by the Secretary of State after the disastrous events of 1897, still hold that view, is clear from certain recent discussions. I mention all this not for the purpose of casting any reflection on the wisdom of the general policy adopted by the Government of India, which it would be out of place to discuss here, but simply to make the position with which I have to deal intelligible. Whatever the policy of the Government of India might be, it was, of course, the bounden duty of the Government of the Punjab, as the subordinate, to carry it out loyally and to the best of its ability, and it would be only as to the *modus operandi* and the rate at which particular portions of the work should be pushed on that it would be permissible for the Lieutenant-Governor to raise any questions.

4. As a matter of fact, it was only in regard to these subordinate, though by no means unimportant, matters that questions arose between the Punjab Government and the Government of India, and it is necessary to note the position in which those two authorities have generally stood towards each other when they have been inclined to differ. We have all known cases of a subordinate administration with a hinterland on its border over which it has been burning to expand, while its superior has been endeavouring to restrain its ardour. We need not look beyond the limits of Her Majesty's Indian Empire to find a case which is, to a certain extent, an illustration of this. The Beloochistan Agency has pushed on, drawing the Government of India after it, at

times in spite of the resistance of that Government, until it has got right up to the Gomal on one side and right up to the Durand line on another; further, it has recently extended its posts out along the Nushki Seistan line to the border of Persia. On the Punjab Frontier it has been the reverse. It is the Government of India that has been pushing the local administration forward, and that administration, though it has always loyally obeyed the call, has sometimes done so under a sort of protest.

The main reason of this is simple enough. The Government of India looks at the whole North-Western Frontier line from the Black Mountain round to the neighbourhood of Kurrachee from a remote point of view, and like a person looking at a long coast line from a great distance out at sea, has been at times apt to suppose that there is a greater uniformity about it than there really is; and in particular it has sometimes found it difficult to understand why methods which have been so successful along the line from the neighbourhood of the Gomal southwards, should not be employed with equal success to the north of that river, and especially in the Waziri country. The Punjab Government is in a very different position. In paragraph 29 of his Minute, Lord Curzon gives a list of the Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab from Sir Robert Egerton down to Sir Mackworth Young, showing that none of them had in the earlier part of their service been employed on the North-Western Frontier. He might have gone further, and said that no Lieutenant-Governor from and including Lord Lawrence down had ever been so employed. It may be supposed, from what he says in his 33rd paragraph, that Lord Lawrence was an exception, but that is not so. No one of us would presume to compare himself with Lord Lawrence in other respects, but in this particular we were all in the same predicament. It does not, however, follow from this that Lord Curzon is right when he says that in practice it is found, as a rule, that no Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab knows anything of the frontier at all. A Lieutenant-Governor has not, of course, the sort of knowledge of the frontier that you find in an officer who has spent much of his service on the frontier, and talks Pushtoo fluently, as all our best officers nowadays do—the sort of knowledge that we may hope to find in the new Chief Commissioner now to be appointed; but, to say nothing of what he soon learns in the ordinary course of his daily work, and on the many occasions on which the frontier officers come to him to discuss matters personally, the Lieutenant-Governor commonly spends the whole cold weather, with the exception of a short period at Christmas, in camp, and he gives the frontier a good deal more than its share of his camping time. He has the frontier officers living in his camp, it may be for several weeks at a time, riding the march with him every morning, in and out of his tent all day, bringing up the leading men to interview him in the afternoon, and probably renewing the discussion of pending questions round the table after dinner. It is these officers, and not, as Lord Curzon seems to suppose, the members of the Secretariat Staff, however able these latter may be, that are the Lieutenant-Governor's advisers on frontier affairs, and from them, or in their company, he before long succeeds in learning a not inconsiderable amount about frontier affairs. A great deal, no doubt, is second-hand knowledge, but a certain amount he acquires for himself, especially when, as often happens, some of the important men understand Hindostani. His knowledge is exactly the same sort of knowledge that all of us who have held the post of Chief Commissioner of Assam have had of the numerous tribes that surround that province on all sides but one, and are under our control.

5. Now, having thus at least a considerable knowledge of the position, the Lieutenant-Governor has had on certain occasions, as, *e.g.*, when some of the forward moves mentioned by Lord Curzon were proposed, and also when the advance to the Malakund and the Chitral road and certain demarcations of the Durand line on the ground were under discussion, to represent to the Government of India that such measures would present certain difficulties and be attended with a considerable amount of risk. It is always an ungrateful task for a subordinate to have to suggest difficulties about carrying out the orders of his superior, and it is one from which a subordinate of lower rank

than a Lieutenant-Governor might sometimes shrink ; but about the duty of a subordinate, of whatever rank, in such a position, there can be no room for doubt. It was thus the duty of the Lieutenant-Governor to point out that the tribes we had to deal with, unlike the Pathans who fell under our sway on the annexation of the Punjab, had never been brought under the control of any ruler, and that, owing to various causes, they were far more difficult to control than those further south. One of these causes, I may mention, was the great strength of those tribes, and the bitter hostility against any interference on our part felt by the tribesmen generally as distinguished from the limited number of them who could hope to rise on our shoulders, or receive allowances from us. This after a little time came to be better understood. Another of these causes was the democratic constitution of those tribes, and the absence of powerful tumandars or maliks (leading men) through whom they could be controlled. It took longer to get this understood. An idea got started that you could make maliks (tribal leaders) out of almost anything, and it thus became necessary to explain that a strong malik was a natural product of the tribe, and that it was very difficult to make one grow strong by artificial cultivation. In 1896 the Government of India returned to the point and insisted that "experience has shown that in every Pathan tribe, however democratic, there are responsible head men who are capable of maintaining order if they are properly supported." This proposition had to be combated by giving detailed explanations and illustrations. Reference was made to a report received not long before, showing that the maliks we had subventioned in the upper Tochi declared they could do nothing unless we placed a military force at their very elbow, and to petitions received from our Mahsood maliks, declaring that our countenance and support, far from strengthening them, had led to their being placed under a ban, and begging us to occupy Kanigoram and Makin, in the heart of their hills—places which we could not even visit except with a very large military force. It was further explained that, even in our own district of Peshawar, many of the Pathan zemindars would not stand any one of their number being raised above his natural position over them by our authority. What was then said was amply borne out by what subsequently occurred.

It was exemplified in the case of the Mohmunds in a most striking manner within a month or two later. We had, under the orders of the Government of India, to conclude an arrangement with those Mohmunds who had fallen on our side of the Durand line. When Mr. Merk proceeded to arrange preliminaries with them, they started by declaring that there were no maliks among them, that there might be seniors and juniors, but that, for the purpose of concluding an arrangement of that sort, they were all the same. I was marching along the Peshawar Frontier, and it was arranged that Mr. Merk, who had with infinite labour settled all preliminaries, should bring them before me at Shabkadr. About 900 of them claimed to come down to meet me and discuss the matter, and when they arrived they absolutely refused to put forward any men to represent them, even to the extent of being allowed to sit in front at the meeting. Almost the whole number sat down before us just as they managed to find room, and such of them as got near enough all tried to talk together. Thanks to Mr. Merk's skill an arrangement was somehow concluded, but I felt bound to express some doubt as to its being effectual. What happened at that very place, Shabkadr, in less than a year after we all know.

It was, I may mention, chiefly with reference to the Waziris that this discussion as to the constitution of the tribes and the position of the headmen arose between the Punjab Government and the Government of India, and if anyone still thinks that the Government of India would be right in holding that in the case of a tribe like the Mahsood Waziris "there are responsible headmen "who are capable of maintaining order if they are properly supported," I would refer him to Mr. Merk's note of the 24th of July last, received here the other day with the Government of India's Despatch, No. 145, dated 18th October 1900, from which it will be seen that there are really no persons who can be called maliks among the Mahsoods, and that we must deal with the "ulus," *i.e.*, with the tribesmen *en masse*, merely making such use as we can of

any men who seem to have gained an influential position at the moment—a mode of procedure which, though it may answer for some purposes, will for others, I fear, prove altogether hopeless.

I have thought it well to mention all this about the maliks because it affords a good illustration of the sort of discussion that is apt to arise between the Local Government and the Government of India, and it is only by getting down from vague generalities to details that it is possible to make the position intelligible.

6. So much as to the nature of the position to be dealt with on the parts of the frontier to which I refer. Now as to the policy from time to time enjoined on the Punjab Government towards the tribes there. Apart from the correspondences relating to particular cases, there were two correspondences, one in 1888-89 in Sir James Lyall's time and another in 1896 in my time, in which the general question of our policy towards these tribes was discussed, and in each instance the correspondence was started by a letter from the Government of India urging the Lieutenant-Governor to greater efforts to extend our control over them. Both these correspondences are worth referring to in this connection, but the second of them has a more direct bearing on the present position because, at the time it passed, the important change effected by the Durand demarcation had taken place, and, moreover, the intermediate discussions that had occurred in particular cases had brought out clearly the points on which the Government of India and the Government of the Punjab were at one, and the points which had still to be cleared up between them.

7. In the 21st paragraph of his Minute Lord Curzon, apparently referring to this latter correspondence, writes as follows:—"In the early years of Lord Elgin's administration an attempt was once more made to escape from the necessities of a radical change by again suggesting to the Punjab Government the initiation of a policy of friendly intercourse with the tribes for whom we had thus assumed political responsibility, and of the strengthening of the political service of the border. Into the discussion that followed with the Punjab Government I need not enter, suffice it to say that it was not followed, so far as I can ascertain, by any practical changes either in the principles or in the form of administration." Now, if Lord Curzon is here referring to the correspondence I have just mentioned—and I do not know to what else he can be referring—I must point out that, while his remarks are verbally accurate, they are likely to convey a wholly erroneous impression to his readers. Anyone reading his Minute would be led to suppose that the Government of India had, on the occasion referred to, made an attempt to induce the Punjab Government to initiate a change of policy, and had failed to get it to move. What actually occurred was this: The Government of India, in Mr. Barnes' letter, No. 2197, dated 14th August 1896, to the Government of the Punjab, set forth certain general principles which, in their opinion, should be followed in dealing with the tribes on the North-Western Frontier of the Punjab, and asked for an expression of opinion as to how those principles could be best applied, and what modifications, if any, of the existing system were required. The Punjab Government complied with this request by forwarding a note, in which the whole position on various sections of the frontier was fully reviewed, and definite proposals for carrying out, on certain of those sections, the policy indicated in the Government of India letter were submitted for the approval and orders of the Government of India. The Punjab proposals were forwarded to the Government of India with the Punjab Chief Secretary's letter, No. 14, dated 28th October 1896, and the reason why they were not "followed," to use Lord Curzon's words, "by any practical changes" was a very simple one, namely, that the Government of India never answered that letter. I understand they, at first, deferred answering it as they preferred to wait for certain additional proposals which were promised, and which were not ready for submission until a couple of months later. This brought the matter down to the beginning of 1897, and then the time of my vacating office was so near that I suppose they thought it well to wait and see whether my successor approved of my scheme. Then a few months later

came the great rising of the tribes, and after that rising was suppressed the Government of India made a completely new departure. The whole thing is dead and gone now so far as any question of taking direct official action on it is concerned, but as that correspondence affords, within a short compass, a clearer and more detailed view than can be got elsewhere of the respective positions of the Government of India and the Government of the Punjab, of their relations (their very amicable relations) to one another, and of the opinions held by them respectively, I cannot help regretting that it has never been made public.

8. It would be out of the question for me to give anything like an abstract of that correspondence, but I think it well to refer to two or three points brought out in it in order to make the position as it then existed clearer.

The first of these points is that as to the rate at which the policy should be pushed on.

The view of the Government of India, as expressed in their letter of August 1896, appeared to be that we should endeavour to extend our control generally over the tribes up to the Durand line, and that we should everywhere exert ourselves more actively than we had previously been doing. As to this, after referring to the feeling of the tribes and the probability of opposition from them, the Lieutenant-Governor, while submitting definite proposals for extending our influence and establishing closer control in certain tracts, ventured to represent (in the note above mentioned) that the moment was not a favourable one for urging our frontier officers generally to greater activity. He wrote as follows :—
" I should be averse to issuing any orders which might seem to our officers to sound the advance along the whole line at a moment like this, when we are not yet out of the wood in Waziristan and on the Chitral road, when we have the great Mohmund business impending, and when the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Punjab is already crying out that the force under his command is not sufficient to meet the demands made on it by the forward movements we have already made. At the same time I feel bound to acknowledge the very full manner in which the Government of India, in their present letter, recognise the wide difference between the conditions that prevail on different parts of our frontier and the anxiety displayed throughout to enjoin moderation and caution, and I have in consequence every hope that, when we come to discussing matters in detail, it will turn out that there is really far less difference between my view and theirs than might at first sight be supposed. I have only to add that, however this may be, I shall, during the short time that remains to me here, exert myself to give effect to the views of the Government of India, whatever they may be, exactly as if they were my own."

9. Another question, and one of the first magnitude, was started by the Government of India letter of August 1896, and, as it seems to be still under discussion, I think it well to refer to it, I mean the question as to what instructions we should give our officers regarding quarrels and fighting among the tribesmen themselves in a tribal tract where we have not assumed any sort of administrative control, and where such quarrels and fighting in no way whatever affect us or any interests which we are bound to protect. It was admitted on all hands that our officers, whenever they saw an opportunity of doing so, should interpose in a friendly manner, and use their good offices to promote peace ; but it was also admitted on all hands that the effect of this sort of interposition would in most tracts be limited, and that if peace was really to be established among the tribesmen themselves it could only be done by a political officer interposing authoritatively, *i.e.*, as the Government of India expressed it, "*by forbidding bloodshed and insisting on a peaceful settlement.*" The question was how far we were to direct or allow our officers to interpose in the class of cases referred to in this latter way. The Government of India seemed to treat this question with a somewhat light heart, and to be prepared to give political officers a free hand to do in regard to it as they might think fit under all the circumstances in which they might find themselves placed. It therefore became necessary to point out that we were in the class of cases

referred to, under no obligation of any sort to interpose authoritatively; that the suggestion that we should do so was an entirely new departure; that wherever we attempted to do so we should be drawn into a sort of interference with the internal affairs of the tribes, which, when once started, must from its very nature soon become of all others the most close and systematic, and would land us in responsibilities which we could not discharge without having a strong backing of military force, and perhaps entering into occupation of the country. The root of the whole matter I may explain lies in this:—That if you take upon yourself authoritatively to forbid certain persons or certain sections of a tribe from attacking others not only must you, in order to prevent your face being blackened before the whole countryside, insist upon your order being obeyed and compel obedience to it if necessary by force, but further, as you have prevented those to whom it is addressed from redressing their wrongs in the only way open to them, you are bound, as a matter of common justice, to arrange that they shall have effective redress in some other way, and thus you will have all their quarrels with their many ramifications on your hands. If you interfere authoritatively at all you must be prepared to do justice all round. Having regard to considerations of this kind, it was recommended by the Punjab Government on the occasion referred to that a political officer should be authorised to interfere authoritatively to prevent fighting only in tracts where the Local Government and the Government of India, after considering our position, should decide that it was expedient that we should so interfere. Elsewhere what we sometimes call the "Khyber System" (as distinguished from the "Sandeman System") would prevail; that is to say, the system so successfully carried out for many years by Sir R. Warburton in the Khyber, under which it was not considered our business to interfere authoritatively with the fighting of the tribesmen among themselves, even within sight of Jumrood, so long as such fighting did not give rise to any danger to the peace of the road or any other interest which we were bound to protect. It should be added that at the same time, in order to meet as far as possible the views of the Government of India, proposals were submitted for at once giving the power of interfering authoritatively in certain tracts.

I had an opportunity of discussing this point with Lord Elgin when I went to bid him farewell at Delhi towards the end of 1896, and I gathered that he was disposed to accept the above view, but, as I have said, the fates were against our correspondence being brought to an issue. and I gather that on this all important point the Government of India and the Local Government are still at variance; indeed, from the recent correspondence regarding the internal feuds between the Mahsood and Darwesh Khel Waziris, it would seem that the Government of India regard the distinction between authoritative and merely friendly interposition which has been long observed in the Punjab, and the momentary neglect of which has on some occasions led to embarrassing results, as a mere figment of some theorist's imagination.

10. I have only one more point to refer to in this connection. There were some passages in the Government of India letter of August 1896 calculated to create an impression that the Government of the Punjab was given to holding its political officers with a tightness which was altogether unnecessary, allowing them little discretion, and requiring them to refer every individual case for orders; and I see Lord Curzon now, in more than one passage of his Minute, makes the same charge. Now I may mention that when this charge was made in 1896 it was explained that it was based on a certain misapprehension, and I see in paragraph 36 of Lord Curzon's Minute a quotation from a note by Mr. Frederick Cunningham, in which a very similar explanation is given. That explanation is, that, except in particular classes of cases, the Punjab Government allows its political officers a very free hand indeed, and that when it requires them to refer to it for instructions this is, as a rule, not because it wants to deal with the case itself but because the Government of India expects such cases to be referred to it for orders. Mr. Cunningham, no doubt somewhat overstating the point, speaks in the passage quoted by Lord Curzon of the Punjab Government as not having "power to give orders in any but the most trivial matters," and adds, that he "cannot remember any question sufficiently important

to be reported to the Commissioner by the Deputy Commissioner, which in its turn the Local Government did not think necessary to refer to Calcutta," and winds up in his epigrammatic way by saying that "under the present system the real authorities that issue orders are the Deputy Commissioner and the Government of India." Now I may observe in passing that even after allowing for a certain amount of exaggeration, by which Mr. Cunningham seems to reduce, not only the Local Government but also himself and the other very able men who have held the office of Commissioner, to the position of mere ciphers, there is enough left in this statement to supply a strong additional argument in favour of the change now proposed by Lord Curzon; but I am not at this moment concerned with that. At the period to which I am now referring there was no proposal for such a change. The question was one merely of decentralising, of giving a wider discretion to the local officers, and I think it well to mention what was then suggested to the Government of India on this point, because it holds good still and will hold good after the change now proposed. One of the chief causes which compel the Government of India, and as a necessary consequence the Punjab Government, to keep such a tight hold has always been that the general lines of the policy to be pursued are not sufficiently settled—that we are to a great extent drifting without a plan. So long as that is so you cannot safely allow a local officer any large measure of discretion. Hence it was suggested, and not for the first time, by the Punjab Government, that we should consider each section of the frontier separately, that we should determine what objects we should aim at there, what sacrifices we would be prepared to make, and what risks we would be prepared to run, in order to attain those objects, and what methods of action we should adopt, and that we should issue to the officers concerned general instructions of a certain degree of definiteness in accordance with the conclusions at which we might arrive. Our officers would thus have some idea of what they were at liberty to do on their own authority and what they should refer for orders. It was, indeed, admitted that there might be cases, though they would be very rare and exceptional cases, where we might dispense with anything of this kind. What was said on this last point was as follows:—"There may now and again be a frontier tract over which it is manifestly desirable to establish a close control rapidly at whatever cost, and in the case of which we may consider that the simplest plan is to appoint a strong and reliable officer, and leave him to take his own course, without hampering him with any definite instructions, merely throwing the reins on his neck and letting him carry us along as seems best to him; but these would be rare and exceptional cases, and for any Government to take such a course generally along an extensive line of frontier or to any large extent would be simply to abdicate its most important functions and to incur risks, the extent of which it would be impossible to estimate."

11. Having thus given an idea of the sort of matters on which the Punjab Government ventured to express an opinion different to that which the Government of India was disposed to take, I have next to consider how far such expression of opinion by the Government of the Punjab did any harm and how far it did any good.

As to the harm, I think it may safely be said that until recently there were no complaints of its leading to any undue delay or to any friction in dealing with particular cases. The Government of India and the Government of the Punjab knew their respective places in the system perfectly well. When any course of action was proposed the Government of the Punjab stated its opinion, sometimes adding that that opinion was one formed from the limited point of view of local considerations, and leaving the Government of India, who had to look at matters from the broader point of view of military and Imperial considerations, to decide.* Upon this the Government of India commonly decided, as it was perfectly in its right in doing, without entering into further discussion.

* I suspect it is to this Lord Curzon alludes when, in the 37th paragraph of his Minute, he speaks of the Punjab Government as "anxious to shift the ulterior responsibility to the shoulders of the Government of India"; but it is hard to see how the Punjab Government could have taken any other course than that I have described. They rarely had a sufficient opportunity of fully learning the considerations that influenced the Government of India.

In this connection I cannot do better than quote the description of the position Lord Elgin gives in paragraph 20 of his Minute of 6th November 1898 :—"I am prepared," he says, "to endorse most emphatically the claim that the Local Government has loyally co-operated in the declared policy of the Government of India. The late Lieutenant-Government of the Punjab once said to me when discussing this subject, 'You have only to lift your finger, and the brake will be taken off in any place you think desirable.' That remark is more than an expression of personal loyalty, it contains in a few words a correct exposition of the only principle on which we can rest our arrangements, *i.e.*, that it is the business of the Government of India, and the Government of India alone, to formulate and prescribe a policy outside the borders of British India."

Lord Curzon in paragraph 38 of his Minute writes in a different tone. He says "I do not see how any Governor-General could deny that if he desires a policy to be pursued or a step to be taken in Baluchistan, which is under the administration of an Agent to the Governor-General, directly subordinate to himself, however unpalatable such a policy or step might be to the Agent to the Governor-General, it will be carried out with incomparably less friction and delay than in a similar case in the Punjab, where the dignity and susceptibilities of a Local Government and of its head demand the most scrupulous and respectful consideration."

Now how far there is good ground for this change of tone it is difficult for us to judge, especially as we do not know what there may be to be said on the Punjab side of the question by the present Lieutenant-Governor, who, strange to say, does not appear to have been consulted regarding the proposals now under consideration ; but however this may be, I think that the mere fact that Lord Curzon takes the view of the present position that he does, and expresses that view in the way he does in various passages of his Minute, affords a considerable argument in favour of the change he proposes, unless, indeed, it can be clearly shown that the retention of the Local Government in the management of the frontier serves some highly important purpose, and I must say I doubt whether any argument against the change can be founded on this latter ground.

12. No doubt the Punjab Government has, in the past, played an important part, and I hope generally a useful part, in moulding the details of a scheme after that scheme has been determined on, but that is a thing a Chief Commissioner could do equally well and possibly better. The real question is whether the Punjab Government has been able to do more than that, and this question is discussed by Lord Curzon in paragraphs 82 and 83 of his Minute. In these paragraphs, after referring to the matter of punitive expeditions, which I must reserve for separate notice presently, he goes on to speak of the military advances over the border which have carried us forward on to the Samana, into the Kurram, and far into North and South Waziristan, and of what came later, namely, that the Government of India were involved only three years ago in the greatest frontier conflagration that has ever been known. I may observe that the advance into the Kurram cannot properly be mentioned in this connection, as it stands on a totally different footing from the other forward movements, and on the other hand that the advance to the Malakand and the Chitral road ought to have been mentioned ; but, however that may be, Lord Curzon asks how it is that, notwithstanding the peaceful disposition of the Punjab Government, things of that sort occurred, and his conclusion is that the plea that we are saved by the intervention of the Local Government from such things is one that will not stand a moment's examination. Now I do not know whether anyone would, at the present day, raise such a plea. Lord Elgin has indeed expressed an apprehension that a frontier Chief Commissioner, such as it is now proposed to appoint, might force the pace, but that is a totally different thing. It is a case of *facilis descensus*. Either of the two parties that are coupled together may easily drag the other down ; but it is not so easy for either to hold the other back. It is, however, unnecessary to pursue this. It is enough to say that I entirely agree with Lord Curzon's conclusion, and I may add that even if the Punjab Government were able to hold back the Government of India

which I wrote in 1896, I said "raids in any force to speak of across the frontier of British India* which were formerly so common, are now practically unknown, and we have to deal only with crime of the type which always does and must prevail even in British India, where we have to do with turbulent people. Punitive expeditions properly so called have . . . practically done their work, and have now almost ceased to be necessary." I added, "The only punitive expeditions properly so called, that have been undertaken within the last 15 years, *i.e.*, since we settled down after the second Kabul war, are the first Samana expedition and the first Black Mountain expedition. That is to say these were the only two expeditions that were necessitated by spontaneous aggressiveness on the part of the tribes. The other expeditions that have taken place during the period referred to have been connected with some forward movement or demonstration on our part."

18. It remains to speak of the addition proposed by me to the draft Despatch. I have already (paragraph 12 *supra*) referred to a certain apprehension expressed by Lord Elgin, in paragraph 22 of his Minute of the 6th November 1898, as to the possible effect of establishing on the North-Western Frontier a special authority of the sort now proposed. What he said was as follows :—"If we create this new post, choosing for it, as we are bound to do, a man of energy and ambition, what outlet is he to find for his activity ? The career of a Sandeman, the creation of a new Biluchistan is debarred to him ; for the policy which he must carry out is essentially one of *quieta non movere*. It was a policy of non-annexation, of non-interference, which was declared by Her Majesty's Government in the Despatch of 28th January (1898), and was expounded on their behalf by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State, and the future Viceroy . . . . It is because I wish to see this policy acted upon in the future, and because I regard it as the best hope of a peaceful and permanent settlement, that I deprecate the establishment on the frontier of an authority which, from the nature of things, must, in my judgment, endanger its continuance." Now, I myself do not think that, at the point we have now reached, we can allow any apprehension of that kind to stand in the way of what is proposed ; but, at the same time, I feel bound to state that, in my opinion, the danger referred to is real, and that it is one against which we have to be on our guard. Lord Curzon, it will be seen (in paragraphs 80 *et seq.* of his Minute) utterly scouts the idea of there being any such danger, but, though he has dealt with the matter at considerable length, he has not, I think, seen where the danger really lies. I do not myself think that there is any danger for a long time to come of any authority, high or low, deliberately planning and proposing an advance into any fresh tract beyond the frontier. We may, indeed, be forced to advance into fresh tracts. Having, for example, occupied the Goomal and Tochi valleys, we may be forced into occupying the great Mahsood hill tract which lies between them, as, indeed, the Mahsood maliks told us some years ago we should eventually be compelled to do ; or again, having advanced to the Malakund and opened the Chitral road, we may be forced into occupying the surrounding country ; but such things would now be looked upon by all responsible persons as most serious misfortunes, which we should strain every nerve to avert. Indeed, I see, from some papers recently received regarding the establishment of the Northern Waziristan Militia, that it is proposed by Lord Curzon to restrict our area of effective occupation in the Tochi valley within narrower limits than many of us would think practicable, having regard to the responsibilities we have taken upon ourselves there.

But though we are not likely to see any fresh forward moves deliberately planned for some time to come, there is another danger against which we have to be on our guard, namely, the danger that the local authorities might, especially by over-interference in the internal affairs of the tribes of the sort referred to above (paragraph 9), draw us gradually into responsibilities which it would be found impossible to fulfil, except by

* It will be observed that I spoke only of raids across the frontier of British India. Since we have advanced into the Goomal and into the Tochi, we have had three additional frontiers exposed to raiding, and the raids on them have been very numerous. In fact, on these three new frontiers we are now very much in the position in which we were fifty years ago on the frontier of British India.

occupying some additional tract, or establishing administrative control over it with the support of a military force of some sort. Now, whatever may be the shortcomings of the present system, it has at least been free from any danger of that sort. Lord Curzon himself evidently believes that, whatever a Lieutenant-Governor may be in other respects, he is at least pretty certain to be above, or perhaps I should say below, being ambitious.* But with a Chief Commissioner, specially appointed to administer the border, it would be apt to be somewhat different. I do not mean to suggest that he would be influenced by mere personal ambition or a desire to distinguish himself—we could all name men of that stamp, but they are happily the exceptions—what I mean is, that he would be apt to feel that his chief *raison d'être* was to establish a firmer grip over the tribes than the Punjab Government had succeeded in doing, and that he would be inclined to better his instructions—that he might, to use frontier expressions, be over-anxious to "run the show," "to lift the purdah of the tribes," "to get well in among them," and "to wheel them into line"; and he would know, as we all know, that the most effectual way to do this, provided you can manage it without causing an explosion, is to get your hand well into their internal affairs. No doubt the official instructions to him would continue to be that he should abstain from all unnecessary interference, that he should exercise his control from without, that he should merely teach the tribesmen to govern themselves and manage their own affairs according to our views, and so on. But it is difficult to teach people like the tribesmen in question to do these things, and there would be always a tendency for the work to fall substantially into the only hands able to do it, and for the responsibility to be thrown on to the only shoulders strong enough to bear it, that is to say, into the hands and on to the shoulders of our officials. This would not so much matter if we had only a small tract of tribal territory to deal with; but the transborder tract which will be placed under the new Chief Commissioner is about 500 miles in length, and, even limited as it is at present by the Durand line, is of considerable, and in some places of formidable, breadth. It is, moreover, almost everywhere a country of extraordinary difficulty from a physical point of view, and the numerous tribes inhabiting it are about as hard to manage as any you would find on the face of the earth. No doubt, having started on the lines we have, it may be our ultimate destiny to occupy all that country up to the Durand line, and even that line can not be counted on as a limit for all times and circumstances. But the rate of progress is to a large extent under our control, and if we let ourselves be drawn on too rapidly, we may before long find ourselves on various sections of the frontier with more on our hands at one and the same time than we can well manage; moreover, even taking the most sanguine view of the experiment now being tried in North and South Waziristan, we may find ourselves in places and in circumstances where it would be impossible to rely on levies raised to any considerable extent from the tribes, and where we should need the support of regular troops. This being the position, I should have thought it desirable on the eve of this new departure to reiterate the injunctions contained in the Despatch of January 1898; and I should have thought this the more desirable because it seems to me, as I have already stated, that the Government of India are on the one hand inclined to take a somewhat exaggerated view of the obligations thrown on us by the Durand Convention, and on the other hand are not sufficiently alive to the difficulties of the position. I should further, with reference to what I have said above, at the end of paragraph 10, have thought it well to say that while the Secretary of State concurred with Lord Curzon in thinking that any minute interference of the Government in the details of frontier work was objectionable, he at the same time thought it necessary to bear in mind the observations made by Lord Elgin in paragraph 20 of his Minute of 6th November 1898, and to be on our guard against pushing too far the theory that the local authority should be "given a free hand."

* He says, in paragraph 83, evidently dealing with the point as one of curious speculation, "I can conceive that an ambitious Lieutenant-General, if such a phenomenon were to occur, &c."

(Signed) D. FITZPATRICK.

17 January, 1901.

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